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Articles 211 - 240 of 1137
Full-Text Articles in Law
Institutional Investors As Short Sellers?, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy
Institutional Investors As Short Sellers?, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy
UF Law Faculty Publications
Short selling has the potential to improve the efficiency and fairness of equity markets. Yet institutional investors face both private and regulatory constraints to short selling. We document these obstacles and consider the potential benefits of removing them. We advocate that institutional investors engage in more short selling as part of overall net-long equity strategies, such as a leveraged passive equity index combined with an actively managed short position of a size comparable to the amount of leverage.
Protecting Minority Shareholders In Close Corporations: An Analysis And Critique Of The Statutory Protection In The Saudi Companies Law, Abdulrahman Nabil Alsaleh
Protecting Minority Shareholders In Close Corporations: An Analysis And Critique Of The Statutory Protection In The Saudi Companies Law, Abdulrahman Nabil Alsaleh
Maurer Theses and Dissertations
Worldwide, the protection of minority shareholders in public corporations has received most of the corporate scholars’ attention. This tendency, therefore, has been reflected in the negligence of the same group but in close corporations. A close corporation minority shareholder confronts distinctive issues caused by the locked-in structure of close corporations. The lack of liquid secondary market, the oppression by majority shareholders, and the high expectations held by minority shareholders all contribute to the minority shareholders’ concern that they may be deprived of a voice in management or opportunistically be taken advantage of by those in power. Although these structural issues …
Cross-Listing, Corporate Governance And Private Securities Law Enforceinent In Taiwan, Thomas Yenshou Tsai
Cross-Listing, Corporate Governance And Private Securities Law Enforceinent In Taiwan, Thomas Yenshou Tsai
SJD Dissertations
The regulation of foreign listings have become an increasingly important issue. As issuers can now easily cross borders to gain access to foreign capital markets, jurisdictions have begun to work hard to entice foreign issuers to list on their exchanges. Especially for small markets such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, embracing foreign listings has become the inevitable route in order to boost their capital markets.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides an overview of the regulatory regimes of corporate governance for foreign issuers in the United States. and EU-namely, the United Kingdom and Germany, the EU's two …
Citizen Capitalism: How A Universal Fund Can Provide Influence And Income To All (2019), Lynn A. Stout, Sergio Gramitto, Tamara Belinfanti
Citizen Capitalism: How A Universal Fund Can Provide Influence And Income To All (2019), Lynn A. Stout, Sergio Gramitto, Tamara Belinfanti
Books
Corporations have a huge influence on the life of every citizen--this book offers a visionary but practical plan to give every citizen a say in how corporations are run while also gaining some supplemental income. It lays out a clear approach that uses the mechanisms of the private market to hold corporations accountable to the public.
This would happen through the creation of what the authors call the Universal Fund, a kind of national, democratic, mega mutual fund. Every American over eighteen would be entitled to a share and would participate in directing its share voting choices. Corporations and wealthy …
Derivative Suit Under The Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice, Ahmed Saeed Khabti
Derivative Suit Under The Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice, Ahmed Saeed Khabti
Maurer Theses and Dissertations
Saudi Arabia has been focused on diversification of its economy and attracting foreign investors. Countries that provide strong shareholder protection are more likely to attract foreign investors. However, there is a need for greater protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. This is because Saudi’s companies law fails to equip minority shareholders with adequate protective rights. A current issue with the new Saudi companies law can be linked to derivative suit, which is very important for both foreign investors and local investors. Derivative suit in Saudi Arabia is very limited and difficult to pursue because under article 79 of Saudi …
Do Conflicts Of Interest Require Outside Boards? Yes. Bsps? Maybe., Usha Rodrigues
Do Conflicts Of Interest Require Outside Boards? Yes. Bsps? Maybe., Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
From the Symposium: Outsourcing the Board: How Board Service Providers Can Improve Corporate Governance
Boards of directors are curious creatures. The law generally requires corporations to have them—indeed, they are the focus of the corporate law we teach in Business Associations in U.S. law schools. The corporation is managed by directors or under their direction; directors hire and fire officers; directors are necessary for fundamental transactions.
But the reason why corporations have directors is not entirely clear. In the prototypical privately held corporation, the family firm, the same individuals serve both as directors and officers. The CEO (better known as …
Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak
Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak
Faculty Scholarship
The current model of corporate governance needs reform. There is mounting evidence that the practices of shareholder primacy drive company directors and executives to adopt the same short time horizon as financial markets. Pressure to meet the demands of the financial markets drives stock buybacks, excessive dividends and a failure to invest in productive capabilities. The result is a ‘tragedy of the horizon’, with corporations and their shareholders failing to consider environmental, social or even their own, long-term, economic sustainability.
With less than a decade left to address the threat of climate change, and with consensus emerging that businesses need …
The Corporate Purpose Of Social License, Hillary A. Sale
The Corporate Purpose Of Social License, Hillary A. Sale
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article deploys the sociological theory of social license, or the acceptance of a business or organization by the relevant communities and stakeholders, in the context of the board of directors and corporate governance. Corporations are generally treated as “private” actors and thus are regulated by “private” corporate law. This construct allows for considerable latitude. Corporate actors are not, however, solely “private.” They are the beneficiaries of economic and political power, and the decisions they make have impacts that extend well beyond the boundaries of the entities they represent.
Using Wells Fargo and Uber as case studies, this Article explores …
Labor Interests And Corporate Power, Matthew T. Bodie
Labor Interests And Corporate Power, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
Labor unions exert significant power through collective bargaining, pension fund investing, and political advocacy. But in each of these areas, unions face inherent structural limitations that severely constrain these powers. Workers need participation rights in corporate governance to overcome the multiplicity of forces arrayed against them. And rather than obviating the need for unions, worker corporate power would facilitate a different kind of labor representation — a transition to labor power that advocates for occupational interests and forms coalitions across the shifting political interests of different worker groups.
The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia
The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia
Faculty Scholarship
There is a puzzle at the core of corporate governance theory. Prior scholarship reports a strong relationship between firms best at creating shareholder value and those rated highly by the established corporate governance indices. Little work explores why, however. We hypothesize that the link between governance and performance depends centrally on context. We illustrate the importance of context by exploring circumstances when a firm's governance structure can operate as a signal of the quality of its management. The idea is that better managers are on average more likely to choose a highly rated governance structure than are bad managers because …
Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …
Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.
This Article offers a novel perspective on this …
The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …
Revolving Elites: The Unexplored Risk Of Capturing The Sec, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Revolving Elites: The Unexplored Risk Of Capturing The Sec, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
Fears have abounded for years that the sweet spot for capture of regulatory agencies is the "revolving door" whereby civil servants migrate from their roles as regulators to private industry. Recent scholarship on this topic has examined whether America's watchdog for securities markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is hobbled by the long-standing practices of its enforcement staff exiting their jobs at the Commission and migrating to lucrative private sector employment where they represent those they once regulated. The research to date has been inconclusive on whether staff revolving door practices have weakened the SEC' s verve. In this …
The Enduring Distinction Between Business Entities And Security Interests, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Verstein
The Enduring Distinction Between Business Entities And Security Interests, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Verstein
Faculty Scholarship
What are business entities for? What are security interests for? The prevailing answer in legal scholarship is that both bodies of law exist to partition assets for the benefit of designated creditors. But if both bodies of law partition assets, then what distinguishes them? In fact, these bodies of law appear to be converging as increasing flexibility irons out any differences. Indeed, many legal products, such as securitization vehicles, insurance products known as captive insurance, and mutual funds, employ entities to create distinct asset pools. Moreover, recent legal innovations, such as “protected cells,” which were created to facilitate such products, …
The Compliance Process, Veronica Root
The Compliance Process, Veronica Root
Faculty Scholarship
Even as regulators and prosecutors proclaim the importance of effective compliance programs, failures persist. Organizations fail to ensure that they and their agents comply with legal and regulatory requirements, industry practices, and their own internal policies and norms. From the companies that provide our news, to the financial institutions that serve as our bankers, to the corporations that make our cars, compliance programs fail to prevent misconduct each and every day. The causes of these compliance failures are multifaceted and include general enforcement deficiencies, difficulties associated with overseeing compliance programs within complex organizations, and failures to establish a culture of …
Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences Of Passive Investing, Giovanni Strampelli
Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences Of Passive Investing, Giovanni Strampelli
San Diego Law Review
The exponential rise of mutual funds designed to track stock indices has been one of the drivers behind the re-concentration of ownership of listed companies in the United States. Because of the high concentration of the passive index funds industry, the three leading passive fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—make up an increasingly important component of the shareholder base of listed companies. In spite of this however, it remains questionable whether they are actually interested in playing an active role in the corporate governance of investee companies. In fact, although passive investors are, by definition, focused on the long term …
Dual-Class Shares In Singapore – Where Ideology Meets Pragmatism, Pey Woan Lee
Dual-Class Shares In Singapore – Where Ideology Meets Pragmatism, Pey Woan Lee
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
This article seeks to understand the rationale for and potential implications of the introduction of dual class shares (DCS) in Singapore. It does so by first considering the theoretical as well as evidential arguments for and against the use of DCS, followed by a survey on the reception (or otherwise) of such structures in four common law jurisdictions with vibrant capital markets, viz., Canada, the United States, United Kingdom and Hong Kong. It observes that the chief argument cited by business founders to justify the use of DCS structures is the desire to enhance a firm’s long-term profitability by shielding …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Board Independence As A Panacea To Tunnelling? An Empirical Study Of Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan, Wei Zhang
Board Independence As A Panacea To Tunnelling? An Empirical Study Of Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan, Wei Zhang
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
In this article, we examine a general question: is the legal transplantation of corporate governance rule effective in curtailing agency costs? Entering into the 21st century, we have seen reforms of corporate governance standards in the Far East since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, including in Hong Kong and Singapore. These reforms built on the Anglo-American model of corporate governance in the UK and US supported by broad academic literature of connecting better corporate governance with firm value and identifying the association of tunneling or wrongdoings with poor corporate governance practices. The idea is also to provide more checks-and-balances …
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
The Law And Finance Of Initial Coin Offerings, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Nydia Remolina Leon
The Law And Finance Of Initial Coin Offerings, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Nydia Remolina Leon
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The rise of new technologies is changing the way companies raise funds. Along with the increase of crowdfunding in recent years, the use of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) has emerged more recently as a new form to raise capital. Companies in the United States raised more than $4 billion in 2017 and over $6.3 billion were raised through ICOs in the first three months of 2018. In a typical ICO, a company receives cryptocurrencies in exchange for certain rights embodied in “tokens”, whose nature, treatment and implications are generating controversy among securities regulators around the world.
Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From Derivative Lawsuits, Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang
Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From Derivative Lawsuits, Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies. We find that the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure is driven by firms facing relatively higher ex …
Defying The Tone At The Top: An Analysis On The Effects Of Board Characteristics On The Level Of Tax Avoidance Across Philippine Publicly Listed Firms, John Ryan G. Ledesma, Chester T. Herrera, Sharlene Camille A. Li, Angelo A. Unite, Ailyn A. Shi, Michael J. Sullivan
Defying The Tone At The Top: An Analysis On The Effects Of Board Characteristics On The Level Of Tax Avoidance Across Philippine Publicly Listed Firms, John Ryan G. Ledesma, Chester T. Herrera, Sharlene Camille A. Li, Angelo A. Unite, Ailyn A. Shi, Michael J. Sullivan
Angelo King Institute for Economic and Business Studies (AKI)
Over the years, the growing culture of tax avoidance among multinational companies around the world has shed light on the importance of improving corporate governance mechanisms. In the Philippines, poor tax collection due to tax leakages has contributed to chronic fiscal deficits in the country. The literature argues that good corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., the structure of the board of directors) play a significant role in ensuring that the management acts in the best interest of the firm and shareholders, thus eventually helping to mitigate the incidences of corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, agency theory argues that the presence of more …
Whistling In The Wind: Why Federal Whistleblower Protections Fall Short Of Their Corporate Governance Goals, Meera Khan
Whistling In The Wind: Why Federal Whistleblower Protections Fall Short Of Their Corporate Governance Goals, Meera Khan
University of Miami Business Law Review
Teetering on the line between hero and villain, whistleblowers have a remarkably unusual role in contemporary American society. Those who blow the whistle on public sector activities, like Edward Snowden and the Watergate Scandal’s “Deep Throat”, are often vilified in history as treasonous and unprincipled rogues. In the private sector, however, whistleblowers are seen as moral compasses for corporate behavior, and are even afforded federal protections for speaking out against internal malfeasance. The piecemeal evolution of whistleblower legislation including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 created regulatory and enforcement …
Do Institutional Owners Monitor? Evidence From Voting On Connected Transaction Proposals In Hong Kong-Listed Companies, Félix E. Mezzanotte, Simon Fung
Do Institutional Owners Monitor? Evidence From Voting On Connected Transaction Proposals In Hong Kong-Listed Companies, Félix E. Mezzanotte, Simon Fung
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
The conventional view in Hong Kong has been that institutional owners tend to be passive owners and that they do little to monitor the companies’ management. We investigated whether the presence of institutional owners in Hong Kong-listed companies was associated with greater monitoring of management through dissent voting by hand-collecting information for a sample (n= 96) of connected transaction proposals (“CT proposals”) and of their voting outcomes, as announced in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong during the period from 2012–14. Our study shows that voting approval rates on CT proposals were lower (i.e. greater dissent voting) when institutional owners …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, Matthew Fagan
Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, Matthew Fagan
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
With the rise of institutional activist investors in recent decades—including a purported 495 activist campaigns against U.S. corporations in 2016 alone—the role that third-party institutional proxy advisors play in corporate governance has greatly increased. The United States Office of Government Accountability estimates that clients of the top five proxy advisory firms account for about $41.5 trillion in equity throughout the world. For several years, discussions have developed regarding conflicts of interest faced by proxy advisors. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the top proxy advisory firm in the world, frequently provides advice to institutional investors on how to vote proxies while …