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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The Continuity Of Family Businesses In Saudi Arabia, Saad Abdulmohsin Alrowaished Feb 2021

The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The Continuity Of Family Businesses In Saudi Arabia, Saad Abdulmohsin Alrowaished

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

In small villages, in cities booming with commerce, in remote fishing communities, and massive marketplaces, in tropical destinations, and in corners of the globe few have ever visited, one is always able to find family businesses. From small wares being sold to neighbors, to huge corporations with billions in assets, families hold and always have held a segment of the global market that cannot be ignored. While family businesses have existed throughout history, legal advice and governance specifically geared toward them, which holds the success of the family business at the center of the laws, has never been a focus …


Derivative Suit Under The Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice, Ahmed Saeed Khabti Jan 2019

Derivative Suit Under The Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice, Ahmed Saeed Khabti

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Saudi Arabia has been focused on diversification of its economy and attracting foreign investors. Countries that provide strong shareholder protection are more likely to attract foreign investors. However, there is a need for greater protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. This is because Saudi’s companies law fails to equip minority shareholders with adequate protective rights. A current issue with the new Saudi companies law can be linked to derivative suit, which is very important for both foreign investors and local investors. Derivative suit in Saudi Arabia is very limited and difficult to pursue because under article 79 of Saudi …


Protecting Minority Shareholders In Close Corporations: An Analysis And Critique Of The Statutory Protection In The Saudi Companies Law, Abdulrahman Nabil Alsaleh Jan 2019

Protecting Minority Shareholders In Close Corporations: An Analysis And Critique Of The Statutory Protection In The Saudi Companies Law, Abdulrahman Nabil Alsaleh

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Worldwide, the protection of minority shareholders in public corporations has received most of the corporate scholars’ attention. This tendency, therefore, has been reflected in the negligence of the same group but in close corporations. A close corporation minority shareholder confronts distinctive issues caused by the locked-in structure of close corporations. The lack of liquid secondary market, the oppression by majority shareholders, and the high expectations held by minority shareholders all contribute to the minority shareholders’ concern that they may be deprived of a voice in management or opportunistically be taken advantage of by those in power. Although these structural issues …


Ceo Side Payments In Mergers And Acquisitions, Brian J. Broughman Jan 2017

Ceo Side Payments In Mergers And Acquisitions, Brian J. Broughman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with the sale of their firm. Side-payments differ from golden parachutes in that they are negotiated ex post in connection with a specific acquisition proposal, whereas golden parachutes are part of the executive’s employment agreement negotiated when she is hired. While side-payments may benefit shareholders by countering managerial resistance to an efficient sale, they can also be used to redistribute merger proceeds to management. The current article highlights an overlooked distinction between pre-merger golden parachutes and merger side-payments. Similar to a legislative rider attached to a popular …


A Comparative Analysis Of Shareholder Derivative Litigations In Taiwan: Rethinking Of Law, Implementation, And Suggestion, Ting-Hsien Cheng Dec 2014

A Comparative Analysis Of Shareholder Derivative Litigations In Taiwan: Rethinking Of Law, Implementation, And Suggestion, Ting-Hsien Cheng

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s capital market has been tarnished by several corporate scandals, many involving managerial embezzlements and false/misleading financial reports. One of the main reasons why these scandals frequently occurred is the lack of an effective system of checks-and-balances or good corporate governance mechanisms within Taiwan’s companies. To deal with this deficiency for corporate governance, there have been many discussions in Taiwan’s academia of corporate laws about how to reform the provisions of Taiwan Company Act, especially for a better internal monitoring mechanism.

In fact, in last two decades, Taiwan has taken a series of legal reforms as an …


Biometric Id Cybersurveillance, Margaret Hum Oct 2013

Biometric Id Cybersurveillance, Margaret Hum

Indiana Law Journal

The implementation of a universal digitalized biometric ID system risks normalizing and integrating mass cybersurveillance into the daily lives of ordinary citizens. ID documents such as driver’s licenses in some states and all U.S. passports are now implanted with radio frequency identification (RFID) technology. In recent proposals, Congress has considered implementing a digitalized biometric identification card—such as a biometric-based, “high-tech” Social Security Card—which may eventually lead to the development of a universal multimodal biometric database (e.g., the collection of the digital photos, fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA of all citizens and noncitizens). Such “hightech” IDs, once merged with GPS-RFID tracking …


Shareholder Voting As Veto, Michael S. Kang Oct 2013

Shareholder Voting As Veto, Michael S. Kang

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried Jan 2013

Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …


Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman Jan 2013

Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In most VC-backed firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the VC investors control the board. Instead control is typically shared with a mutually appointed independent director holding the tie-breaking seat. Contract theory, which treats control as an indivisible right held by one party, does not have a good explanation for this practice. Using a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration, I show that an independent director as tie-breaker can reduce holdup by moderating each party’s ex post threat position, potentially expanding the range of firms which receive external financing. This project contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting and holdup, …


Do Vcs Use Inside Rounds To Dilute Founders? Some Evidence From Silicon Valley, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried Jan 2012

Do Vcs Use Inside Rounds To Dilute Founders? Some Evidence From Silicon Valley, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In the bank-borrower setting, a firm's existing lender may exploit its positional advantage to extract rents from the firm in subsequent financings. Analogously, a startup's existing venture capital investors (VCs) may dilute the founder through a follow-on financing from these same VCs (an “inside” round) at an artificially low valuation. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley startup firms, we find little evidence that VCs use inside rounds to dilute founders. Instead, our findings suggest that inside rounds are generally used as “backstop financing” for startups that cannot attract new money, and these rounds are conducted at relatively high valuations …


The Coevolution Of Transnational Corporations And Institutions, Sarianna M. Lundan Jul 2011

The Coevolution Of Transnational Corporations And Institutions, Sarianna M. Lundan

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

While economic theories of the firm have traditionally focused on the ownership of assets, the increasing use of contractual partnerships is beginning to challenge our conception of the firm by emphasizing its coordinating role. In structuring their contracts, as well as in managing the relationships governed by the contracts, firms try to mitigate uncertainties that could destroy the value-adding potential of such transactions. These uncertainties may be specific to the transaction partner, but they might also arise from the institutional context of the contracting parties, particularly in the case of transactions that cross borders. The coevolutionary process whereby firms both …


Private Actors And Public Governance Beyond The State: The Multinational Corporation, The Financial Stability Board, And The Global Governance Order, Larry Cata Backer Jul 2011

Private Actors And Public Governance Beyond The State: The Multinational Corporation, The Financial Stability Board, And The Global Governance Order, Larry Cata Backer

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Transnational corporations are at the center of extraordinary and complex governance systems that are developing outside the state and international public organizations and beyond the conventionally legitimating framework of the forms of domestic or international hard law. Though these systems are sometimes recognized as autonomous and authoritative among its members, they are neither isolated from each other nor from the states with which they come into contact. Together these systems may begin to suggest a new template for networked governance beyond the state, but one in which public and private actors are integrated stakeholders. This provides the source of the …


The Changing Face Of Transnational Business Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability And Accountability Of Transnational Groups In A Post-Financial Crisis World, Peter Muchlinski Jul 2011

The Changing Face Of Transnational Business Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability And Accountability Of Transnational Groups In A Post-Financial Crisis World, Peter Muchlinski

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article seeks to critically assess the recently dominant financialized model of corporate law and governance and its contribution to the creation of the "asocial corporation" geared only to the enhancement of shareholder value. This article places corporate law in a wider context of national and international legal developments that, together, create a framework for the financialization of transnational corporate activity. This article shows that a new approach to transnational corporate governance is emerging from a number of sources. These predate the crisis but have been given impetus by it. In particular, three important phenomena are examined: the rise of …


Transnational Corporations, Global Competition Policy, And The Shortcomings Of Private International Law, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Jens Mertens Jul 2011

Transnational Corporations, Global Competition Policy, And The Shortcomings Of Private International Law, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Jens Mertens

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

In this article we criticize the so-called more economic approach to European competition law for disregarding the importance of a functional system of private law. Based on the availability of market governance as an alternative mode for organizing transactions, it is presumed that vertical integration, which is the central organizational structure of transnational corporations, is economically efficient. Since the enforcement of cross-border contracts by state-organized systems of private law, however, is insufficient, "make-or-buy" decisions in international commerce are prejudiced against arms' length transactions in markets. Consequently, international transactions are integrated vertically into firms' structures to a higher degree than comparable …


Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through The Shareholder-Primacy Norm, Marshall M. Magaro Jul 2010

Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through The Shareholder-Primacy Norm, Marshall M. Magaro

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Renegotiation Of Cash Flow Rights In The Sale Of Vc-Backed Firms, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried Jan 2010

Renegotiation Of Cash Flow Rights In The Sale Of Vc-Backed Firms, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Incomplete contracting theory suggests that VC cash flow rights - including liquidation preferences - may be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected dataset of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.


The Future Of Shareholder Democracy, Lisa M. Fairfax Oct 2009

The Future Of Shareholder Democracy, Lisa M. Fairfax

Indiana Law Journal

In 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered, and ultimately rejected, a rule that would have required corporations to include shareholder-nominated candidates on the ballot. This Article seeks to ascertain the impact of this rejection. On the one hand, the SEC's rejection appears to be a stunning blow to the shareholders' rights campaign. This is because many shareholders' rights advocates have long considered access to the corporate ballot as the "holy grail" of their campaign for increased shareholder power. Such advocates believe that access to the corporate ballot is critical to ensuring that shareholders can participate legitimately in the …


Emerging Global Environmental Governance, N. Brian Winchester Jan 2009

Emerging Global Environmental Governance, N. Brian Winchester

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Environmental thinking and activism are steadily gaining widespread, even global acceptance, but are often in conflict with economic interests and international politics. Environmental priorities are further challenged by scientific uncertainty involving effects that in some cases will only become manifest far into the future. Nonetheless, accompanying this global environmental awakening has been an extraordinary number of international agreements on a wide range of critical environmental issues. While many of these environmental regimes lack adequate financial support and sanctions for non-compliance, they involve a variety of non-state actors, suggesting meaningful movement towards an evolving, complex form of global environmental governance. Indeed, …


"The Momentous Gravity Of The State Of Things Now Obtaining": Annoying Westphalian Objections To The Idea Of Global Governance, Timothy W. Waters Jan 2009

"The Momentous Gravity Of The State Of Things Now Obtaining": Annoying Westphalian Objections To The Idea Of Global Governance, Timothy W. Waters

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Are there situations in which otherwise attractively complex, sub- and cross-national networks are unlikely to replace the hoary old Westphalian state? Perhaps, but whatever the answer, global governance as a discipline seems to have a hard time fully considering the question. One oft he problems with operationalizing global governance may be the simultaneous profligacy and poverty of the idea itself: its definitional overemphasis on change and consequent inattention to the state's capacity to reconstitute its core functions and thus to achieve a predictable continuity. As a result, for all the excellent work done under its name, global governance as a …


The Parallel Worlds Of Corporate Governance And Labor Law, Peer Zumbansen Jan 2006

The Parallel Worlds Of Corporate Governance And Labor Law, Peer Zumbansen

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This paper engages the concept of transnational law (TL) in a way that goes beyond the by now accustomed usages with regard to the development of legal norms and the observation of legal action across nation-state boundaries, involving both state and nonstate actors. The concept of TL can serve to illustrate much further-reaching set of developments in norm creation and legal regulation. TL is here understood not only as a body of legal norms, but it is also employed as a methodological approach to illustrate common and shared challenges and responses to legal regulatory systems worldwide. In the case of …


Who Should Pay The Corporate Tax In A Flat Tax World?, Rebecca S. Rudnick Jan 1989

Who Should Pay The Corporate Tax In A Flat Tax World?, Rebecca S. Rudnick

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article reviews the corporate tax system within the context of the historical bias and current effects of the current system of taxation of corporations and shareholders. Drawing on public finance theory, financial markets microstructure research, and perspectives on corporate governance, Professor Rudnick proposes a profits tax on the liquid equity of firms. She finds this to be a normative rationale for a double tax system under optimal tax principles due to the inelasticity of demand for and supply of liquidity and the economic rent it produces. The value of liquidity in different capital markets is the crucial determinate. Under …