Law Commons^™

What's Wrong With Shareholder Empowerment?, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

In his keynote address at the Journal of Corporation Law spring banquet (March 8, 2012), Mr. Sharfman discusses the negative impact shareholder empowerment has on the efficiency of decision making at public companies. Shareholder empowerment is the shifting of decision making from the board of directors and executive management to shareholders.

Why Proxy Access Is Harmful To Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Historically, the SEC has allowed public companies to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder proposals for the nomination of directors by shareholders. This rule has allowed the nomination of directors to remain under the control of the board of directors and its nominating committee. However, under amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders will now be able to include proposals on proxy access in a public company’s proxy materials. Public companies can now expect to receive such proposals for inclusion in their proxy materials for the 2012 proxy season.When voting on proxy access proposals, shareholders need to understand that proxy access is a …

Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas

Eugenio J. Cárdenas

This Paper, written for the “Globalization of the United States Litigation Model” symposium at Brooklyn Law School (October 21, 2011), inquires on whether emerging capital markets are shifting toward enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of their securities laws, under the context of global legal convergence. It ventures into this puzzle of globalization, corporate law enforcement, and financial development, in light of the increasing phenomenon of regulatory convergence and international cooperation among securities regulators, in the realm of capital market surveillance and enforcement.

Focus is placed on the emerging Latin American region, namely Brazil’s securities market. The study explores Brazil’s …

Dodd-Frank's Say On Pay: Will It Lead To A Greater Role For Shareholders In Corporate Governance?, Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter, James F. Cotter

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

"Say on pay" gives shareholders an advisory vote on a company's pay practices for its top executives. Beginning in 2011, Dodd-Frank mandated such votes at public companies. The first year of "say on pay" under the new legislation may have changed the dialogue and give-and-take in the shareholder-management relationship at some companies, particularly on the question of executive pay.

We study the evolution of shareholder voting on "say on pay" - beginning in 2006 as a fledgling shareholder movement to get "say on pay" on the corporate ballot, evolving as a handful of companies and later the financial firms receiving …

Improving The Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance The Innovative New Business Form, Steven Munch

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

In recent years, a number of states have offered innovative new business forms to accommodate social enterprises, organizations that pursue both profit and social purpose. These hybrid forms are designed to free socially conscious entrepreneurs from the strict pursuit of shareholder value maximization that often controls in business practice and law, allowing them instead to serve the interests of other company stakeholders or even society. One form, the benefit corporation, has been adopted by seven states and is now under consideration in several more. This Note details the development, provisions, and advantages of the benefit corporation. It also identifies and …

Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee M. Jones, Michelle Welsh

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant model of corporate governance, the principal function of the board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors, employees, and society at large. Despite general agreement on the importance of director oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts tout the importance of board …

Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses the fundamental question of whether, as a matter of good policy, it is ever appropriate that a foreign issuer be subject to the U.S. fraud-on-the-market private damages class action liability regime, and, if so, by what kinds of claimants and under what circumstances. The bulk of payouts under the U.S. securities laws arise out of fraud-on-the-market class actions – actions against issuers on behalf of secondary market purchasers of their shares for trading losses suffered as a result of issuer misstatements in violation of Rule 10b-5. In the first decade of this century, foreign issuers became frequent …

The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, And Theory: Evidence From The Field And The Path Onward, P.M. Vasudev

Hofstra Law Review

This article provides an overview of the development of the stakeholder idea in corporate governance, and presents the results from a survey of the American, British and Canadian corporations included in the Fortune 500 Global Corporations (2009) for their adoption of thestakeholder principle. The survey finds near-unanimous acceptance of the stakeholder vision. 97 percent of the US, UK, and Canadian companies included in the survey acknowledge the stakeholder principle in some form. The trend of adoption of the stakeholder model is unmistakable, and this has significant implications for corporate theory. The article also examines how the emerging ideas about stakeholders …

Corporate Governance: The Swedish Solution, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Sweden has changed its corporate governance system by delegating the nomination of corporate directors (and thus, in effect, ultimate control) to committees typically comprising representatives of each company’s largest shareholders. This system gives shareholders a degree of power “that only the most daring corporate governance initiatives in the rest of the world could even imagine.” By all accounts the change has been successful; no one is complaining about it.

In the United States investors have long been kept weak in corporate governance for fear that giving them a major role would damage corporations in numerous ways. The Swedish experience seems …

Agency And The Ontology Of The Corporation, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Bank Ceos, Inside Debt Compensation, And The Global Financial Crisis, Frederick Tung, Xue Wang

Faculty Scholarship

Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis, and reform of banker pay is high on the public policy agenda. While Congress targeted its reforms primarily at bankers’ equity-based pay incentives, empirical research fails to show any correlation between bank CEO equity incentives and bank performance in the Financial Crisis. We offer an alternative analysis, hypothesizing that bank CEOs’ inside debt incentives correlate with reduced bank risk taking and improved bank performance in the Crisis. A nascent literature shows that inside debt may dampen CEOs’ risk taking incentives. Unlike the industrial firms that …

The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …

Do Vcs Use Inside Rounds To Dilute Founders? Some Evidence From Silicon Valley, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In the bank-borrower setting, a firm's existing lender may exploit its positional advantage to extract rents from the firm in subsequent financings. Analogously, a startup's existing venture capital investors (VCs) may dilute the founder through a follow-on financing from these same VCs (an “inside” round) at an artificially low valuation. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley startup firms, we find little evidence that VCs use inside rounds to dilute founders. Instead, our findings suggest that inside rounds are generally used as “backstop financing” for startups that cannot attract new money, and these rounds are conducted at relatively high valuations …

Equity Swaps And Implications In Company Law: An Examination Of Singapore Law, Chao-Hung Christopher Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This article explores issues from the use of equity swaps by corporate stakeholders under Singapore law. The article accepts that non-disclosure of economic interests might have an impact on market efficiency and corporate governance. To address potential problems, Singapore should consider revising the Takeover Code, while it requires further regulatory impact analysis to decide whether amendments to the Securities and Futures Act and the Companies Act are needed. As an alternative, companies can use their articles of association to impose a duty of disclosure before statutory intervention. In addition, the trading of equity swaps by directors raises issues about fiduciary …

Governing Systemic Risk: Towards A Governance Structure For Derivatives Clearhouses, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

Derivatives transactions create systemic risk by threatening to spread the consequences of default throughout the financial system. Responding to the manifestations of systemic risk exhibited in the financial crisis, policy-makers have sought to solve the problem by requiring as many derivatives transactions as possible to be “cleared” (essentially guaranteed) by a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse will centralize and, through the creation of reserve accounts, seek to contain systemic risk by preventing the consequences of default from spreading. This centralization of risk makes the clearinghouse the new locus of systemic risk, and the question of systemic risk management thus becomes a question …

Executive Trade Secrets, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets. In the eyes of the law, commercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection and nondisclosure. This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal landscape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning executive disclosures — a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and institutional stability.

This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public corporations …

The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …

Pathway To Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions In The People's Republic Of China, Donald C. Clarke, Nicholas C. Howson

Book Chapters

Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly authorized in the PRC’s 2006 Company Law effective January 1, 2006. In addition, we describe the very unique ecology of enterprise organization and corporate governance in modern China, and critique the formal design of the derivative action and offer reform suggestions. We find the design of the Chinese derivative lawsuit to be, in some respects, innovative and …

Behavioral Approaches To Corporate Law, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This chapter reviews the challenges associated with developing a plausible theory of why psychological "heuristics and biases" might persist in high-stakes business settings. Specific attention is given to issues of loyalty on corporate boards, behavioral finance, and corporate cultures.

Cadbury Twenty Years On, Cally Jordan

Faculty Papers & Publications

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the Cadbury Report, one of the most significant events in modern corporate governance. The Cadbury Report, and its simple two page 'best practices', triggered a global debate on corporate governance. 'Cadbury' codes of corporate governance spread like wildfire. The legacy of the Cadbury Report lives on in the UK with no diminution in the appeal of its voluntary code/comply or explain approach to corporate governance. But there are several clouds looming on the horizon. Comply or explain and voluntary codes of corporate governance appear to have run their course elsewhere …

Corporate Control And Credible Commitment, Ronald J. Gilson, Alan Schwartz

Faculty Scholarship

The separation of control and ownership – the ability of a small group effectively to control a company though holding a minority of its cash flow rights – is common throughout the world, but also is commonly decried. The control group, it is thought, will use its position to consume excessive amounts of project returns, and this injures minority shareholders in two ways: there is less money and the controllers are not maximizing firm value. To the contrary, we argue here that there is an optimal share of the firm that compensates the control group for monitoring managers and otherwise …

Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, And The Redefinition Of Corporate Purpose Without Law, David Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.