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Full-Text Articles in Law

Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan Sep 2012

Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

In this Article, I study a fascinating problem - what are the legal, political and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the Administration's recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this and other methods of regulating executive compensation. Especially given the growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance …


Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So "Say On Pay" Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii Jul 2012

Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So "Say On Pay" Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii

University of Miami Business Law Review

No abstract provided.


Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George Jun 2012

Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George

Golden Gate University Law Review

Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …


It's Payback Time, Or Is It?: An Argument To Apply Universal Heightened Standards To All Employee Stock-Based Individual Account Programs In The Post-Enron Era And Why Sarbanes-Oxley's Preventive Measures Do Not Adequately Protect Employee Investor Interests, Sarah Y. Rifaat Mar 2012

It's Payback Time, Or Is It?: An Argument To Apply Universal Heightened Standards To All Employee Stock-Based Individual Account Programs In The Post-Enron Era And Why Sarbanes-Oxley's Preventive Measures Do Not Adequately Protect Employee Investor Interests, Sarah Y. Rifaat

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


We Talk, You Listen: Should Shareholders' Voices Be Heard Or Stifled When Nominating Directors? How The Proposed Shareholder Director Nomination Rule Will Contribute To Restoring Proper Corporate Governance, Rose A. Zukin Mar 2012

We Talk, You Listen: Should Shareholders' Voices Be Heard Or Stifled When Nominating Directors? How The Proposed Shareholder Director Nomination Rule Will Contribute To Restoring Proper Corporate Governance, Rose A. Zukin

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford Jan 2012

Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.


Venture Capital Investments In China: The Use Of Offshore Financing Structures And Corporate Relocations, Jing Li Jan 2012

Venture Capital Investments In China: The Use Of Offshore Financing Structures And Corporate Relocations, Jing Li

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Based on an analysis of the relevant Chinese laws and regulations governing the corporate governance structure of venture capital (“VC”)-invested firms, as well as a discussion on the feasibility of employing different alternatives to make direct and indirect VC investments in Chinese portfolio firms, this article studies a hand-collected sample consisting of the twenty-nine VCbacked Chinese portfolio firms that have been financed and listed from 1990 to 2005 in order to empirically show how these investments were actually made in practice. The findings show that twenty-three out of the twentynine firms received their VC investments in various offshore holding entities, …


Improving The Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance The Innovative New Business Form, Steven Munch Jan 2012

Improving The Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance The Innovative New Business Form, Steven Munch

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

In recent years, a number of states have offered innovative new business forms to accommodate social enterprises, organizations that pursue both profit and social purpose. These hybrid forms are designed to free socially conscious entrepreneurs from the strict pursuit of shareholder value maximization that often controls in business practice and law, allowing them instead to serve the interests of other company stakeholders or even society. One form, the benefit corporation, has been adopted by seven states and is now under consideration in several more. This Note details the development, provisions, and advantages of the benefit corporation. It also identifies and …


Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee M. Jones, Michelle Welsh Jan 2012

Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee M. Jones, Michelle Welsh

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant model of corporate governance, the principal function of the board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors, employees, and society at large. Despite general agreement on the importance of director oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts tout the importance of board …


The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, And Theory: Evidence From The Field And The Path Onward, P.M. Vasudev Jan 2012

The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, And Theory: Evidence From The Field And The Path Onward, P.M. Vasudev

Hofstra Law Review

This article provides an overview of the development of the stakeholder idea in corporate governance, and presents the results from a survey of the American, British and Canadian corporations included in the Fortune 500 Global Corporations (2009) for their adoption of thestakeholder principle. The survey finds near-unanimous acceptance of the stakeholder vision. 97 percent of the US, UK, and Canadian companies included in the survey acknowledge the stakeholder principle in some form. The trend of adoption of the stakeholder model is unmistakable, and this has significant implications for corporate theory. The article also examines how the emerging ideas about stakeholders …