Law Commons^™

Constitutionalism, Jethro K. Lieberman

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

Why Wynne Should Win, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

In Maryland State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, the Court could reshape core features of dormant Commerce Clause law. Maryland’s theory in the case is that it can lay an income tax on every penny of an individual resident’s income even if some of that income is earned entirely outside the state and therefore, in keeping with standard state practice, already taxed elsewhere. On its face, this approach exposes interstate income earners to overlapping income taxation. Maryland’s scheme thus violates a cardinal principle of dormant Commerce Clause law, “forbidding” state laws that expose interstate commerce “to the risk …

First Amendment Neighbors, Sonja R. West

Scholarly Works

An abdication of the Press Clause reflects the most basic of analytical errors: It treats the text of the Press Clause as redundant and ignores the specialized functions that the Framers meant for the Press Clause to play. Failing to give the Press Clause constitutional recognition by declaring it too difficult to interpret or by dismissing it as "mere surplusage" is utterly at odds with our constitutional traditions. The Religion Clauses provide an example on how to give the text of the Press Clause true meaning.

In interpreting the Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court has taken a different attitude than …

(Anti)Canonizing Courts, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Within U.S. constitutional culture, courts stand curiously apart from the society in which they sit. Among the many purposes this process of alienation serves is to “neutralize” the cognitive dissonance produced by Americans’ current self-conception and the role our forebears’ social and political culture played in producing historic injustice. The legal culture establishes such dissonance in part by structuring American constitutional argument around anticanonical cases: most especially “Dred Scott v. Sandford,” “Plessy v. Ferguson,” and “Lochner v. New York.” The widely held view that these decisions were “wrong the day they were decided” emphasizes the role of independent courts in …

The Age Of Consent, Philip Chase Bobbitt

Faculty Scholarship

On three October afternoons in the fall of 1974, Grant Gilmore, a Sterling Professor of Law at Yale, delivered his Storrs Lectures, the lecture series at Yale Law School whose speakers had included Roscoe Pound, Lon Fuller, and Benjamin Cardozo. Gilmore was a magisterial scholar: the author of a prize-winning treatise, Security Interests in Personal Property, and what remains the leading treatise on admiralty law; he was the Chief Reporter and draftsman for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code; and his PhD on French poet and critic Stéphane Mallarmé had led to an appointment at Yale College before …

Through Our Glass Darkly: Does Comparative Law Counsel The Use Of Foreign Law In U.S. Constitutional Adjudication?, Kenneth Anderson

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This (35 pp.) essay appears as a contribution to a law review symposium on the work of Harvard Law School professor Mary Ann Glendon in comparative law. The essay begins by asking what comparative law as a scholarly discipline might suggest about the use of foreign (or unratified or nationally "unaccepted" international law) by US courts in US constitutional adjudication. The trend seemed to be gathering steam in US courts between the early-1990s and mid-2000s, but by the late-2000s, it appeared to be stalled as a practice, notwithstanding the intense scholarly interest throughout this period.

Practical politics within the US …

Is There A Federal Definitions Power?, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Although the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor on equal protection grounds, that case also raised important and recurring questions about federal power. In particular, defenders of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) argued that Congress may always define the terms used in federal statutes, even if its definition concerns a matter reserved to the States. As the DOMA illustrates, federal definitions concerning reserved matters that depart from state law may impose significant burdens on state governments and private citizens alike. This Article argues that there is no general, freestanding federal definitions power and that sometimes—as with marriage—federal law …

Federalism, Treaty Implementation, And Political Process: Bond V. United States, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Federalism As A Way Station: Windsor As Exemplar Of Doctrine In Motion, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article asks what the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Windsor stands for. It first shows that the opinion leans in the direction of marriage equality but ultimately resists any dispositive “equality” or “federalism” interpretation. The Article next examines why the opinion seems intended to preserve for itself a Delphic obscurity. The Article reads Windsor as an exemplar of what judicial opinions may look like in transition periods, when a Bickelian Court seeks to invite, not end, a national conversation, and to nudge it in a certain direction. In such times, federalism rhetoric—like manipulating the tiers of scrutiny …

The “Constitution In Exile” As A Problem For Legal Theory, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

How does one defend a constitutional theory that’s out of the mainstream? Critics of originalism, for example, have described it as a nefarious “Constitution in Exile,” a plot to impose abandoned rules on the unsuspecting public. This framing is largely mythical, but it raises a serious objection. If a theory asks us to change our legal practices, leaving important questions to academics or historians, how can it be a theory of our law? If law is a matter of social convention, how can there be conventions that hardly anybody knows about? How is a constitution in exile even possible?

This …

Saving Originalism’S Soul, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, And Constitutional Adverse Possession, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause in NLRB v. Noel Canning stands as one of the Supreme Court’s most significant endorsements of the relevance of “historical gloss” to the interpretation of the separation of powers. This Article uses the decision as a vehicle for examining the relationship between interpretive methodology and historical practice, and between historical practice and textual ambiguity. As the Article explains, Noel Canning exemplifies how the constitutional text, perceptions about clarity or ambiguity, and “extra-textual” considerations such as historical practice operate interactively rather than as separate elements of interpretation. The decision also provides a …

None Of The Laws But One, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

This Symposium contribution explores differences in how congressional Republicans responded to Medicare and how they responded to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Given the narrowness of the constitutional challenges to the ACA that congressional Republicans promoted and the many federal taxes, expenditures, and regulations that they support, this Article rejects the suggestion that today's Republicans in Congress generally possess a narrow view of the constitutional scope of federal power. The Article instead argues that congressional Republicans then and now-and the two parties in Congress today-fracture less over the constitutional expanse of congressional authority and more over the …

Universities As Constitutional Law Makers (And Other Hidden Actors In Our Constitutional Orders), Adam J. Macleod

Faculty Articles

In the stories told by opinion makers and many law professors, American constitutional law is concerned with two things-individual rights and the powers of government-and it is settled by the Court, which was established by Article III of our national Constitution. In those now-familiar tales, the United States Supreme Court creates constitutional law when heroic individuals assert their fundamental rights against an overreaching state and when Congress, state legislatures, and executive agencies are called upon to justify their expert enactments to an overreaching judiciary. To settle these constitutional disputes the Court looks either to the text of the written Constitution …

The Singapore Constitution: A Brief Introduction, Smu Apolitical

Student Publications

This primer seeks to provide an easy guide to those interested in finding out more about the Singapore Constitution. The Constitution provides for the structure of the government and the roles of the judiciary and the parliament. It also secures our fundamental liberties. Hence, some basic knowledge of the Constitution is useful for every citizen.

The primer starts by providing an introduction to the Singapore Constitution and explains the meaning of the concept of separation of powers among the executive, legislature and the judiciary. It also touches on the functions of the three entities, such as how laws are made …

Preferences Are Public Rights, Brook E. Gotberg

Faculty Publications

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, there is widespread uncertainty as to what other proceedings may constitutionally fall within a bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction. Supreme Court jurisprudence has been cryptic regarding the constitutional limitations of non-Article III courts, but the Court has identified a "public rights exception" to the general rule that the judicial power must be exercised only by judges with life tenure and salary protection. This public rights exception has not yet been explicitly extended to a bankruptcy proceeding, but the reasoning of the Court strongly suggests that a trustee’s motion to …

Vol. 5 No. 1, Fall 2013; "Correcting" The Foreclosure Crisis?, Matthew Broucek

Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement

Mortgage Resolution Partners, a venture capitalist firm based out of San Francisco, has been visiting with state and local governments across the country. Mortgage Resolution Partners proposes that eminent domain can, and should, be used to seize mortgages and refinance them in an attempt to correct the United States' foreclosure crisis. This article identifies and analyzes the policy issues and constitutional concerns that are inherent in the plan. The most critical constitutional concerns with the plan implicate the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Federal Banks And Federal Jurisdiction In The Progressive Era, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

This is a case study of the Supreme Court’s classic decision in Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co. A stockholder challenged the constitutionality of the Farm Loan Act of 1916, which authorized federal banks to issue tax-exempt bonds to raise funds for loans to farmers. The case is best known for its holding that a federal court could entertain the suit because it arose “under the Constitution” and for Justice Holmes’ argument, in dissent, that federal jurisdiction was not established because state law created the “cause of action.”

This study is the first to go beyond the jurisdictional issue …

The Limits Of Custom In Constitutional And International Law, Michael D. Ramsey

San Diego Law Review

This Article does not contend that arguments for extension of custom are illegitimate. Instead, it makes two more limited claims. First, there is an important difference between arguments from pure custom and arguments for the extension of custom, with the latter being more properly called common law arguments. Second, the legitimacy of common law arguments in some fields, especially constitutional law and international law, is substantially more problematic than the legitimacy of arguments from pure custom. The Article develops as follows. Part II sets out in greater detail the proposed distinction between arguments from pure custom and arguments for extension …

Book Review Of Framed: America's 51 Constitutions And The Crisis Of Governance, By Sanford Levinson, Lawrence Friedman

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Editors’ Foreword, Editors

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Originalism: A Critical Introduction, Keith E. Whittington

Fordham Law Review

      The theory of originalism is now well into its second wave. Originalism first came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s as conservative critics reacted to the decisions of the Warren Court, and the Reagan Administration embraced originalism as a check on judicial activism. A second wave of originalism has emerged since the late 1990s, responding to earlier criticisms and reconsidering earlier assumptions and conclusions. This Article assesses where originalist theory currently stands. It outlines the points of agreement and disagreement within the recent originalist literature and highlights the primary areas of continuing separation between originalists and their critics.

The Gravitational Force Of Originalism, Randy E. Barnett

Fordham Law Review

    In Part I of this Article, I describe four aspects of the New Originalism: First, New Originalism is about identifying the original public meaning of the Constitution rather than the original Framers’ intent. Second, the interpretive activity of identifying the original public meaning of the text is a purely descriptive empirical inquiry. Third, there is also a normative tenet of the New Originalism that contends that the original public meaning of the text should be followed. Finally, distinguishing between the activities of interpretation and construction identifies the limit of the New Originalism, which is only a theory of interpretation. In …

Originalism And Constitutional Construction, Lawrence B. Solum

Fordham Law Review

    Constitutional interpretation is the activity that discovers the communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. Constitutional construction is the activity that determines the legal effect given the text, including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of constitutional cases or issues by judges and other officials. The interpretation–construction distinction, frequently invoked by contemporary constitutional theorists and rooted in American legal theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marks the difference between these two activities.

    This Article advances two central claims about constitutional construction. First, constitutional construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice. The central warrant for this claim is conceptual: …

On What Distinguishes New Originalism From Old: A Jurisprudential Take, Mitchell N. Berman, Kevin Toh

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Originalism And The Foreign Affairs Constitution, Andrew Kent

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Original Meaning, Precedent, And Popular Sovereignty?: Whittington Et Al. V. Lincoln Et Al., Leslie F. Goldstein

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Inclusiveness Of The New Originalism, James E. Fleming

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Originalism And The Uses Of History, Jack M. Balkin

Fordham Law Review

    Central to the new originalism is the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction. Interpretation tries to determine the Constitution’s original communicative content, while construction builds out doctrines, institutions, and practices over time. Most of the work of constitutional lawyers and judges is constitutional construction.

    The distinction between interpretation and construction has important consequences for constitutional theory. In particular, it has important consequences for longstanding debates about how lawyers use history and should use history.

    First, construction, not interpretation, is the central case of constitutional argument, and most historical argument occurs in the construction zone.

    Second, although people often associate …

Originalism, The Why And The What, Larry Alexander

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.