Law | Open Access Articles | Digital Commons Network™

Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell Jan 2011

Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Inadequate civil regulatory liability can be an incentive for public enforcers to pursue criminal cases against firms. This incentive is undesirable in a scheme with overlapping forms of liability that is meant to treat most cases of wrongdoing civilly and to reserve the criminal remedy for the few most serious institutional delicts. This effect appears to exist in the current scheme of liability for securities law violations, and may be present in other regulatory structures as well. In this chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom," the author argues that enhancements of the SEC's enforcement processes likely would …

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Who’S Afraid Of The Federal Circuit?, Arti K. Rai Jan 2011

Who’S Afraid Of The Federal Circuit?, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

In this brief Essay, Professor Rai responds to Professor Jonathan Masur's Yale Law Journal article "Patent Inflation." Professor Masur's argument rests on the assumption that U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") behavior is determined almost entirely by a desire to avoid reversal by the Federal Circuit. Although the PTO is certainly a weak agency over which the Federal Circuit has considerable power, Masur overestimates the extent to which high-level PTO administrators are concerned about Federal Circuit reversals and underestimates institutional influences that are likely to operate in a deflationary direction. The PTO is influenced not only by the Federal Circuit …

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The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox Jan 2011

The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

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Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox Jan 2011

Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …

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Special Incentives To Sue, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2011

Special Incentives To Sue, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

In an effort to strengthen private enforcement of federal law, Congress regularly employs plaintiff-side attorneys’ fee shifts, damage enhancements, and other mechanisms that promote litigation. Standard economic theory predicts that these devices will increase the volume of suit by private actors, which in turn will bolster enforcement and encourage more voluntary compliance with the law. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. I use empirical evidence to demonstrate that special incentives to sue do not dependably generate more litigation. More crucially, when such incentives do work, they often trigger a judicial backlash against the very rights that Congress sought to promote. …

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The Surprising Benefits To Developing Countries Of Linking International Trade And Intellectual Property, Rachel Brewster Jan 2011

The Surprising Benefits To Developing Countries Of Linking International Trade And Intellectual Property, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The World Trade Organization's Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement is controversial, requiring WTO members to establish a host of domestic institutions to support intellectual property rights, including substantive laws creating rights and a host of enforcement procedures. Trade scholars and development advocates frequently criticize the agreement as economically harmful to developing countries. This Article does not argue that the TRIPS Agreement is beneficial for developing states, but highlights how the agreement has produced some surprising benefits over the last decade and a half. First, the TRIPS Agreement's requirement that developing states make the domestic enforcement of intellectual property rules …

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The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster Jan 2011

The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of …

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The Functionalism Of Legal Origins, Ralf Michaels Jan 2011

The Functionalism Of Legal Origins, Ralf Michaels

Faculty Scholarship

This article, written on request for the centennial issue of Ius Commune Europaeum, connects the economic literature on legal origins (La Porta et al) and the World Bank's Doing Business reports with discussions in comparative law about the functional method. It finds that a number of parallels and similarities exist, and that much of the criticism that has been voiced against functionalism should apply, mutates mutants, also to these more recent projects. The attraction that these projects have derive not, it is argued, from their methodological sophistication, but instead from "the strange lure of economics" and from the ostentatious objectivity …

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Safe Harbor For Officer Reliance: Comparing The Approaches Of The Model Business Corporation Act And Delaware’S General Corporation Law, R. Franklin Balotti, Megan W. Shaner Jan 2011

Safe Harbor For Officer Reliance: Comparing The Approaches Of The Model Business Corporation Act And Delaware’S General Corporation Law, R. Franklin Balotti, Megan W. Shaner

Law and Contemporary Problems

Balotti and Shaner discuss the duties of and potential for imposing liability on corporate officers. The fiduciary duties of officers is addressed, in differing degrees, under Delaware law, the law frequently applied to corporate-governance disputes, and under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). In discharging their fiduciary duties, directors under both the MBCA and the General Corporation Law are generally protected from personal liability if, in making business decisions, they reasonably rely on the reports and records of officers, employees, advisors, and experts of the corporation.

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Director Confidentiality, Cyril Moscow Jan 2011

Director Confidentiality, Cyril Moscow

Law and Contemporary Problems

The Corporate Directors Guidebook contains the bare proposition that a director must keep confidential all matters involving the corporation that have not been disclosed to the public. Moscow explores the need to modify the flat recitation of a rule of director confidentiality in light of the limited authority for a blanket restriction, and the necessary exceptions in the business contexts in which the issue arises. In particular, many situations do not involve damage to the corporation, or there is express or implied consent to the sharing of information.

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On Corporate Codification: A Historical Peek At The Model Business Corporation Act And The American Law Institute Principles Through The Delaware Lens, E. Norman Veasey Jan 2011