Law Commons^™

The End Of Antitrust—Or A New Beginning?, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande

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Antitrust is in one of its periodic states of decline. Historically, it has rebounded from these valleys to rise to even higher peaks of enthusiastic public and political popularity. The first period of substantial antitrust activity began 15 years after the passage of the Sherman Act, and lasted into the 1920s. The Great Depression saw antitrust at its lowest, followed by Thurman Arnold's aggressive tenure, but World War II was hardly a period of great antitrust enthusiasm. The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 began the golden age of antitrust, a period that lasted until the middle 1970s. So far, …

Gray-Market Imports: Causes, Consequences And Responses, Michael S. Knoll

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This article explores the issue of gray-market imports. The author explains the four causes of gray-market imports and explores the possibility of private remedies in order to stem the flow of these imports. The article then turns to the possibility of protection in the public sector by discussing pertinent statutory provisions and the development of the case law in this area.

Duties To Offset Competitive Advantages, Richard B. Dagen, Michael S. Knoll

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No abstract provided.

Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs And Benefits, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.

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There is a fundamental conflict between labor law and antitrust law. The antitrust laws reflect the powerful idea that competition should usually dictate the way our economy is organized, to the benefit of the economy as a whole, including workers. But the labor exemption to the antitrust laws suggests a different policy: workers should have the right to eliminate competition for wages, hours, and working conditions.

Vertical Restraints Guidelines: A Step Forward, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande

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No abstract provided.

Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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This article, which was published in 1985, describes the development of a "Post-Chicago" antitrust policy. The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has made an important and lasting contribution to antitrust policy. The School has placed an emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence that will likely never disappear. At the same time, however, the Chicago School's approach to antitrust is defective for two important reasons. First of all, the notion that public policymaking should be guided exclusively by a notion of efficiency based on the neoclassical market efficiency model is naive. That notion both overstates the ability of the policymaker …

Doj Adds Revisionist Dollop To '82 Merger Guidelines, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande

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No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law And Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach, David J. Gerber

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No abstract provided.

Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints On The Reach Of National Laws, David J. Gerber

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No abstract provided.

Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele

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This article demonstrates that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly. The article also shows that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an efficiency focus (in other words, it re-does the Williamsonian merger tradeoff, using price to consumers instead of net efficiencies as its focus). We demonstrate this by calculating how large the necessary efficiency gains would have to be to prevent price increases under different market conditions.

Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande

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This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to mergers (a wealth transfer concern). This is the first article to show how to analyze mergers with this goal in mind. Doing so challenges the fundamental underpinnings of Williamsonian merger analysis (which assumes mergers should be evaluated only in terms of net efficiency effects).

In this and three related articles we re-do …

The Extraterritorial Application Of German Antitrust Law, David J. Gerber

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No abstract provided.

Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande

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Chicago School antitrust policy rests upon the premise that the sole purpose of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency. This article shows that this foundation is flawed. The fundamental purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers. To protect purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices when they buy goods or services. This is the "wealth transfer," "theft", "consumer welfare" or "purchaser protection" explanation for antitrust.

The article shows that the efficiency view originated in a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act undertaken by Robert Bork. Bork purported to show that Congress only cared about enhancing economic efficiency.

To …

Potential Immunity Of Land Use Control Systems From Civil Rights And Antitrust Liability (With J. Bonder), Fred P. Bosselman

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No abstract provided.

Economic Pressure And Antitrust (With James A. Wilkinson), Henry H. Perritt Jr.

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No abstract provided.