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Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Law
Quick - Somebody Call Amnesty International! Intel Says Eu Antitrust Fine Violated Human Rights, Robert H. Lande
Quick - Somebody Call Amnesty International! Intel Says Eu Antitrust Fine Violated Human Rights, Robert H. Lande
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This articles discusses Intel's claim that the EU's fine against it for a competition law violation was so large that its human rights' were violated.
The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande
The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande
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The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:
- Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
- Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
- The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
- Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in turn.;
Of Myths And Evidence: An Analysis Of 40 U.S. Cases For Countries Considering A Private Right Of Action For Competition Law Violations, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
Of Myths And Evidence: An Analysis Of 40 U.S. Cases For Countries Considering A Private Right Of Action For Competition Law Violations, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
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This article assesses some of the benefits of private enforcement of the United States antitrust laws by analyzing forty large recent, successful private cases. It should help in assessing the desirability and efficacy of private enforcement - information that may prove useful to jurisdictions contemplating a private right of action for competition cases.
Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be unilateral - that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, non-merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-merger firm's prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any …
The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The Neal Report, which was commissioned by Lyndon Johnson and published in 1967, is rightfully criticized for representing the past rather than the future of antitrust. Its authors completely embraced a theory of competition and industrial organization that had dominated American economic thinking for forty years, but was just in the process of coming to an end. The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm that the Neal Report embodied had in fact been one of the most elegant and most tested theories of industrial organization. The theory represented the high point of structuralism in industrial organization economics, resting on the proposition that certain …
Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande
Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande
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This paper makes two points. First, Section 5 of the FTC Act, properly construed, is indeed significantly broader and more encompassing than the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. Section 5 violations include incipient violations of the other antitrust laws, and also violations of their policy or spirit.
Second, the best - and probably the only - way to interpret Section 5 in an expansive manner is to do so in a way that also is relatively definite, predictable, principled and clearly bounded. This best can be done if Section 5 is articulated using the consumer choice framework. Without the discipline …
Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Mergers involving dominant firms legitimately receive close scrutiny under the antitrust laws, even if they involve tiny firms. Further, they should be examined closely even in markets that generally exhibit low entry barriers. Many of the so-called "unilateral effects" cases in current merger law are in fact mergers that create dominant firms. The rhetoric of unilateral effects often serves to disguise this fact by presenting the situation as if it involves the ability of a small number of firms (typically two or three) in a much larger market to increase their price to unacceptable levels. In fact, if such a …
Competition Law And The Institutional Embeddedness Of Economics, David J. Gerber
Competition Law And The Institutional Embeddedness Of Economics, David J. Gerber
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Transnational debates about the role of economics in competition law have paid relatively little systematic attention to the embeddedness of economics in institutions. They typically proceed as if embeddedness were not an issue. The assumption often appears to be that economics looks, acts and functions in the same way wherever it is applied. This assumption is frequently the basis for claims supporting increased use of economics in competition law systems around the world.
This article examines that assumption and argues that the institutional embeddedness of economics needs to be taken into account when we wish to evaluate and analyze the …
Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, Sungjoon Cho
Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, Sungjoon Cho
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Through trade policies such as antidumping remedies, the United States government often protects domestic producers at the expense of market competition. Yet a judicially created antitrust immunity, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, obstructs the Federal Trade Commission’s antitrust investigations of these trade remedies. This Article argues that judicial and administrative interventions are needed to restore antitrust oversight when implementing trade remedies. This Article does not propose a repealing of the current antidumping statue, an act that would be politically infeasible in the current protectionist atmosphere of Congress. Instead, it takes a more modest yet realistic stance: antidumping remedies must be sanitized by …
Complex Bundled Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Erik Hovenkamp
Complex Bundled Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Erik Hovenkamp
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A bundled discount occurs when a seller conditions a discount or rebate on the buyer's purchaser or two or more different products. Firms that produce fewer than all the good in the bundle find it difficult to compete because they must amortize the discount across a smaller range of goods. For example, if the dominant firm offers a 10% discount for purchase of both good A and good B, but the rival makes only good B, it will have to offer a discount that is large enough to match the dominant firm's B discount as well as the foregone discount …
The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm "squeezes' a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand's famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a "fairness" or "fair profit" test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted a cost-based …
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
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One is hard-pressed to find in law an undertaking more fraught with uncertainty than the application of the efficiencies defense in merger analysis. Generalist fact finders (judges) and politically-attuned government officials (prosecutors and regulators) are charged with two Herculean tasks: (1) predicting the outcome of organic changes in business enterprises and (2) comparing the magnitude of those changes to the equally uncertain amount of harm to future competition that the transaction will cause. Given the enormous, perhaps intractable, uncertainty of this inquiry, it is therefore paradoxical that many of the strongest advocates for strengthening the role of efficiencies analysis in …
Federalism, Variation, And State Regulation Of Franchise Termination, Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein
Federalism, Variation, And State Regulation Of Franchise Termination, Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein
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This article discusses and expands on our recent work examining the effects of franchise-termination laws. In a prior article, we examined empirically the effect of franchise-termination laws on the level of franchise activity. Our analysis improved upon the prior literature in two major ways. First, our work exploited two new sources of panel data to provide new empirical evidence on the effect of franchise termination laws. Second, our analysis examined variation in states’ restrictions on the ability of franchisors and franchisees to contract around a particular state’s regulation. We found that the effects of termination laws on the overall level …
United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition theory. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem, and as a result many economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws in the early decades of the twentieth century. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when Joan Robinson and particularly Edward Chamberlin developed models that …
Patents, Property, And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Patents, Property, And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The decision to regulate involves the identification of markets where simple assignment of property rights is not sufficient to ensure satisfactory competitive results, usually because some type of market failure obtains. By contrast, if property rights are well defined when they are initially created and can subsequently be traded to some reasonably competitive equilibrium, then regulation is thought not to be necessary. In such cases the antitrust laws have a significant role to play in ensuring that the market can be as competitive as free trading allows. One problem with the patent system is that once a patent is granted …