Law Commons^™

Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, And The Federalist Revival After Gonzales V. Raich, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo

Faculty Scholarship

This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring “structural policy windows” and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby …

When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber

Faculty Scholarship

Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to comply with an initiative’s policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and observers to better distinguish cases …

Law, Politics, And Judicial Review: A Comment On Hasen, Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Welcome To The Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism In The Wake Of The War On Terror, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Agenda Power In Brazil’S Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98, Octavio Amorim Neto, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mixing Metaphors: Voting, Dollars, And Campaign Finance Reform (Review Essay), Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

Reviewing, Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayers, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (2002)

Why Is There So Little Money In U.S. Politics?, John M. De Figueiredo, Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Cracked Foundations Of The Right To Secede, Donald L. Horowitz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Pluralism And Democratic Politics: Reflections On The Interpretive Approach Of Baker V. Carr, Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

Baker v. Carr is one of the Supreme Court's most important opinions, not least because its advent signaled the constitutionalization of democracy. Unfortunately, as is typical of the Court's numerous forays into democratic politics, the decision is not accompanied by an apparent vision of the relationship among democratic practice, constitutional law, and democratic theory. In this Article, Professor Charles revisits Baker and provides several democratic principles that he argues justifies the Court's decision to engage the democratic process. He examines the decision from the perspective of one of its chief contemporary critics, Justice Frankfurter. He sketches an approach, described as …

Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Activism And Conservative Politics, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Allocation Of Resources By Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation And Administrative Regulation, John M. De Figueiredo, Rui J.P. De Figueiredo Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a …

Marshall’S Questions, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Virtues Of Presidential Weakness: A Comment On Fitts, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Calling The Tune Or Following The Lead: The European Court Of Justice In European Policy Making, Rachel D. Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rationality And The Foundations Of Positive Political Theory, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Michael F. Thies

Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, we discuss and debunk the four most common critiques of the rational choice research program (which we prefer to call Positive Political Theory) by explaining and advocating its foundations: the rationality assumption, component analysis (abstraction), strategic behavior, and theory building, in turn. We argue that the rationality assumption and component analysis, properly understood, can be seen to underlie all social science, despite the protestations of critics. We then discuss the two ways that PPT most clearly contributes to political science (i.e., what distinguishes it from other research programs), namely the introduction of strategic behavior (people do not …

Politics, Institutions, And Outcomes: Electricity Regulation In Argentina And Chile, William B. Heller, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatory policies are based …

Politcs And The Courts: A Positive Theory Of Judicial Doctrine And The Rule Of Law, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Bonding, Structure And The Stability Of Political Parties: Party Government In The House, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

The public policy benefits that parties-deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision making, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is "unstable." In this paper, we argue that institutions - and thereby policy coalitions -- can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership is support on the floor of Caucus decisions for a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party’s caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of …

Warrior Bards, Kevin Mccarthy, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

A major issue in the study of American politics is the extent to which electoral discipline also constrains bureaucrats. In practice, executive agencies operate with considerable independence from elected officials. However,the entire process of policy execution is a game among legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucratic agents. It includes the initial delegation of authority, the choice of policy alternatives,and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.in its simplest form, the model predicts a world in which bureaucrats are the sole active participants in policymaking, but in …

Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations on the veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure …

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act And The Pursued Refugee: Lessons From Letelier V. Chile, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy, And Corporatism, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Mccarthy Era: History As Snapshot, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.