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Full-Text Articles in Law
Patriotic Philanthropy? Financing The State With Gifts To Government, Margaret H. Lemos, Guy-Uriel Charles
Patriotic Philanthropy? Financing The State With Gifts To Government, Margaret H. Lemos, Guy-Uriel Charles
Faculty Scholarship
Federal and state law prohibit government officials from accepting gifts or “emoluments” from outside sources. The purpose of gift bans, like restrictions on more explicit forms of bribery, is to protect the integrity of political processes and to ensure that decisions about public policy are made in the public interest — not to advance a private agenda. Similar considerations animate regulations on campaign funding and lobbying. Yet private entities remain free to offer gifts to government itself, to foot the bill for particular public projects they would like to see government pursue. Such gifts — dubbed “patriotic philanthropy” by one …
Advancing The Empirical Research On Lobbying, John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher Richter
Advancing The Empirical Research On Lobbying, John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher Richter
Faculty Scholarship
This essay identifies the empirical facts about lobbying which are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges—with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The essay then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in lobbying. It closes by discussing a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance the empirical research in lobbying.
The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo
The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring “structural policy windows” and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby …
Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo
Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Allocation Of Resources By Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation And Administrative Regulation, John M. De Figueiredo, Rui J.P. De Figueiredo Jr.
The Allocation Of Resources By Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation And Administrative Regulation, John M. De Figueiredo, Rui J.P. De Figueiredo Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a …