Law Commons^™

Litigating Original Meaning From Heller To Rahimi: The Role Of Lawyering In The Confused Path Of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Lawrence Rosenthal

American University Law Review

The Second Amendment is on a jurisprudential march. An individual right to “keep and bear arms” for purposes unrelated to militia or military service was not recognized until the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, applying what it took to be the original meaning of the “right to keep and bear arms” found in the Second Amendment, in District of Columbia v. Heller. Subsequently, the Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, invalidated a statute requiring a permit to carry concealable firearms on a showing of particularized need. Most recently, in United States v. Rahimi, …

Fears, Faith, And Facts In Environmental Law, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Environmental law has long been shaped by both the particular nature of environmental harms and by the actors and institutions that cause such harms or can address them. This nation’s environmental statutes remain far from perfect, and a comprehensive law tailored to the challenges of climate change is still elusive. Nonetheless, America’s environmental laws provide lofty, express protective purposes and findings about reasons for their enactment. They also clearly state health and environmental goals, provide tailored criteria for action, and utilize procedures and diverse regulatory tools that reflect nuanced choices.

But the news is far from good. Despite the ambitious …

Loper Bright In A Larger Interpretive Perspective: Is This Justice Scalia’S Court Anymore?, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo has left administrative lawyers agog: Could the Supreme Court really reverse the “goliath” known as Chevron deference? For those who study the Court’s interpretive landscape more broadly, however, Chevron reversal may not be as unexpected as administrative lawyers believe. This Article will look at Loper Bright by linking three notable interpretive developments: the major questions doctrine, Chevron skepticism, and strict constructions of statutory text. These developments share the same risk: the Court is imposing a new “clarity tax” on both Congress and administrative agencies. Having said this, others’ grave worries about changes in Chevron are …

Dicta Mines, Pretext, And Excessive Force: Toward Criminal Procedure Futurism, Frank Rudy Cooper

Scholarly Works

Scholars have recently criticized Fourth Amendment pretext doctrine for leading to more police contact with Black and Brown people and thus to racially disproportionate uses of excessive force. This Essay reveals the intersection of the Court’s pretext and excessive force doctrines by unearthing their shared roots in the 1973 United States v. Robinson search-incident-to-arrest opinion.

This Essay’s new insight is that Robinson contains what it calls a “dicta mine.” A dicta mine is (1) an unnecessary statement that (2) a Court silently recharacterizes as having already resolved an issue, (3) exploding it into a significant doctrine. The Robinson dicta mine …

Justice William J. Brennan Jr.'S Teleological Jurisprudence And What It Means For Constitutional Interpretation Today, Susan D. Carle

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Observers commonly think of the Warren and Roberts Courts as polar opposites in their modes of constitutional interpretation. But how different are their approaches really? To be sure, the values that underlie the jurisprudence of the Warren and Roberts Courts are dramatically different, but their methodologies for constitutional adjudication are similar in a crucial respect: both Courts frequently employ a teleological approach. They look, in other words, to ends outside of the law to determine the direction in which constitutional law should be heading.

To prove this point, this Article examines the methods and values Justice William J. Brennan Jr. …

The Sociology Of Bail Reform: Crime, Social Interaction, And Offender Experiences In Rurality., Scott Kevin Turner

Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports (ETD)

The study sought to explore the impact of the New York State “Bail Reform Act of 2019,” in rurality. It examined some of the legislative goals of the law, the claim that it caused crime, and offender experiences in rurality. Secondary data was used to map the rural crime landscape and primary data was collected from offenders during face to face interviews. The study was framed using deterrence and opportunity approaches and situated within the broader field environments; legislative, courtroom, and community. The research failed to find support for the claim that bail reform caused crime. Instead, it revealed that …

Brown Now: The Surprising Possibility Of Progressive Reform, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

For four decades, the Supreme Court has engaged in a determined, systematic and successful effort to transform and tame Brown v. Board of Education. But in this article, written for a symposium on Brown at 70, I suggest a surprising counterweight to the standard narrative. If one takes modern doctrine seriously -- a big if, I concede-- it has the potential to support some progressive goals.

In particular, modern doctrine might provide progressives answers to three questions:

1. Are race-conscious but facially neutral means of increasing diversity at state institutions of higher education constitutional?
2. Are legacy admissions to state run institutions …

I Hope The Final Judgment’S Fair: Alternative Jurisprudences, Legal Decision-Making, And Justice, Michael L. Perlin

Articles & Chapters

At the core of any legal decision is an assumption that the decision will be “fair,” yet this is an elusive term. A close study of cases involving criminal defendants with mental disabilities shows that many (perhaps most) of the decisions involving this cohort are not “fair” in the contexts of due process and justice. If legal decisions reflect principles such as procedural justice, restorative justice, and therapeutic jurisprudence, the chances of such fairness will be significantly enhanced. This chapter explains why this goal of fairness, in the context of these cases, can never be met absent a consideration of …

Their Futures, So Full Of Dread: How Barefoot's Contamination Of The Death Penalty Trial Process Continues, Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon, Maren Geiger, Moana Houde-Camirand

Articles & Chapters

Forty years ago, in its most roundly-criticized criminal procedure decision in modern history, the Supreme Court, in Barefoot v. Estelle (463 U.S. 880 (1983)), a decision premised on testimony by the responses to a hypothetical of a witness who had never directly evaluated the defendant, ruled that such testimony as to future dangerousness – testimony that had concluded there was a “100% chance” the defendant would commit more crimes if released into society -- was permissible. Over a stinging dissent by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court had ruled in Barefoot that it was not constitutional error for psychiatrists to testify …

An Unprecedented Verdict: Expanding Parental Liability For Children’S Violent Crimes, Jolie Bodner Zangari

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Courting Citation Consistency: Justice Frankfurter And West Coast Hotel Co. V. Parrish, Helen J. Knowles-Gardner

Touro Law Review

This Article examines the three U.S. Supreme Court opinions authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter that cited the landmark decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937). I describe the three Parrish-citing opinions as: (1) “perfunctory”—Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. (1940) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); (2) “ugly”—Winters v. New York (1948) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Jackson and Burton, JJ., dissenting); and (3) “good”—American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co. (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Whatever one might think about the substance of these opinions, there is absolutely no doubt of the following. …

Interpretive Divergence In The New York Court Of Appeals, Ethan J. Leib

Faculty Scholarship

This Article focuses attention on the New York Court of Appeals, which is decidedly formalist about contract interpretation but decidedly contextualist about statutory interpretation. It explores some recent exemplary cases to show where the New York Court of Appeals tends to land in what turns out to be, for this court at least, two different battlefields in the law of interpretation. Finding that there is “interpretive divergence” between statutory and contract cases, the Article then reflects on the practice of divergence more generally, revisiting assumptions about why anyone might have thought harmonization was sensible in the first place.

Interpreting Religious Doctrine: The Third Rail That Wags The Dog In Religion Clause Jurisprudence, Samuel J. Levine

Scholarly Works

This Article is part of a broader project exploring and assessing the United States Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to interpreting religious doctrine. The mixed metaphor that constitutes the title of this Article incorporates various aspects of the project’s interrelated themes and claims. First, as a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and increasingly refused to adjudicate issues that require the interpretation, evaluation, and resolution of substantive areas of religious practice and belief. Thus, like the third rail of train tracks, interpreting religious doctrine is deemed off-limits and better left untouched. Indeed, the Court’s justifications for the hands-off approach rely …

The Crime Of Aggression: Its Nature, The Leadership Clause, And The Paradox Of Immunity, David Luban

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between acts of aggression and wars of aggression.

Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus …

The (Still) Unexplored Possibilities Of A Poetics Of Law, Naomi Mezey

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this contribution to the symposium celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination, I have accepted White’s invitation in the last chapter of his magisterial book to think about poems and judicial opinions as compatible acts of imagination and meaning making. White asks brilliant questions, and his book is full of them, each a nugget of insight and also a prod that asks the reader to think harder, think deeper, revisit her first thoughts, to perhaps change her mind, and above all, with guidance, to educate herself. In this chapter of the book, White is …

Defiance, Lackland H. Bloom Jr.

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Mass public defiance of legal authority has a lengthy history in America, extending back to the nation’s founding. Indeed, the very existence of the United States is the result of the ultimate act of defiance against legal authority—the revolution against Great Britain. It hardly stopped there, however. Defiance of legal authority has persisted from the outset to the present. Examples include Shays’ Rebellion, defiance of the Supreme Court’s decisions in M’Culloch v. Maryland and the Cherokee territory cases; the Nullification Crisis; slave revolts; defiance of the fugitive slave laws; resistance to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Dred Scott case; …

The Catholic Modernity Of Pope Benedict Xvi: Healthy Secularity And Christian Jurisprudence, Zachary R. Calo

Scholarly Works

This article examines the concept of healthy secularity in the thought of Pope Benedict XVI. In developing the idea of healthy secularity, Benedict builds upon longstanding themes in Catholic social thought while also provoking a deeper engagement with western modernity. Rather than placing Christianity and the secular in an oppositional framework, Benedict positions Christianity as the foundation of an authentic secular order. In so doing, he opens up new modes of critical engagement with western legal and political thought. Yet, while the concept offers a creative theological method for addressing contemporary issues, it depends for its realisation on vanishing cultural …

Ways Of Explaining Law, Dan Priel

Articles & Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Value Judgments In Judicial Reasoning, And The Instability Of The Fact-Law Distinction, Stephen A. Simon

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Voluntary Dismissals, Jurisdiction & Waiving Appellate Review, Bryan Lammon

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Litigants have long tried to manufacture a final, appealable decision by voluntarily dismissing their claims after an adverse interlocutory decision. Recently—and especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker—courts have thought that these dismissals created a jurisdictional problem. Either the voluntary dismissal did not produce a final decision, or the dismissal extinguished Article III jurisdiction. But the problem with these appeals is not jurisdictional. It’s waiver. A voluntary dismissal after an adverse interlocutory decision waives the right to appellate review. This Article shows the flaws in the jurisdictional rejection of this kind of manufactured finality and …

The Curious Case Of Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justin Burnworth

Pace Law Review

Justice Gorsuch has a propensity for unexpected decisions. His opinions in Bostock v. Clayton County, United States v. Vaello Madero, and McGirt v. Oklahoma confounded the legal community at large. Some argue that his Western upbringing played a role. Others argue that his time clerking for Justice Kennedy primed him for unpredictable decisions. These explanations do not get at the core of Justice Gorsuch’s legal reasoning. This article dives into the depths of these opinions to extract his “Enduring” theories of law. I argue that legal scholarship has incorrectly viewed these three decisions as isolated incidents when they are best …

Request For An Advisory Opinion On Climate Emergency And Human Rights By The Republic Of Colombia And The Republic Of Chile, Diane A. Desierto, Francisco Urbina, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Nicolas Buitrago Rey, Faisal Yamil Meneses, Garrett Pacholl

Court Briefs

The Notre Dame Law School Human Rights Clinic (NDLS GHRC) in collaboration with the Notre Dame Reparations Design and Compliance Lab (ND Reparations Lab)

From the Introduction

Noting the request of the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Chile for this Honorable Court to "provide guidance towards human rights-based solutions with an intersectional perspective," this Expert Opinion deliberately draws on interdisciplinary methods that weave international law, international human rights law, jurisprudence, quantitative tools of political science, and qualitative tools of social science research to assist this Honorable Court in its task of addressing the manifold questions brought by the …

Common Law Statutes, Charles W. Tyler

Notre Dame Law Review

The defining feature of a “common law statute” is that it resists standard methods of statutory interpretation. The category includes such important federal statutes as the Sherman Act, § 1983, and the Labor Management Relations Act, among others. Despite the manifest significance of common law statutes, existing caselaw and legal scholarship lack a minimally defensible account of how courts should decide cases arising under them. This Article supplies such an account. It argues that judges should decide cases arising under common law statutes by applying rules representing a consensus among American courts today—i.e., rules that jurisdictions generally have in common. …

Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Perhaps the most surprising feature of the last Supreme Court Term was the extraordinary public discourse on 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. According to many commentators, the Court decided what was really a “fake” or “made-up” case brought by someone who asserted standing merely because “she worries.” As a doctrinal matter, these criticisms are unfounded. But what makes this episode interesting is that the criticisms came from the legal Left, which has long been associated with expansive principles of standing. Doubts about standing in 303 Creative may therefore portend a broader standing realignment, in which liberal Justices become jurisdictionally hawkish. …

Congressional Power To Institute A Wealth Tax, Will Clark

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Over the last few years, several high-profile politicians have pushed to impose a federal “wealth tax.” For example, a recent bill introduced in the Senate would create a two percent tax on the value of assets between fifty million and one billion dollars, plus a higher percentage on wealth valued over one billion dollars. The proponents of the tax argue that it would reduce the growing wealth inequality in the United States, while opponents say that it would disincentivize investment in the American economy.

Policy arguments, however, are only relevant if the federal government has the authority to institute such …

A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straight­forward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.

Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Midstream Contract Interpretation, Alan Schwartz, Simone M. Sepe

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article makes two original contributions to the contract interpretation and renegotiation literatures. First, we introduce an underexplored cause of renegotiation failure: party uncertainty regarding the type of court that will interpret their contract. Parties may predict differently how the applicable court will weigh facts, apply legal rules, or interpret contracts. When parties disagree regarding the court’s interpretive practices, they will assess their expected litigation payoffs differently. This could cause parties to litigate transactions rather than complete them, even when the parties agree on the economic parameters. Litigators know that differing predictions about what a court will do can impede …

Converse-Osborn: State Sovereign Immunity, Standing, And The Dog-Wagging Effect Of Article Iii, Carlos M. Vázquez

Notre Dame Law Review

“[T]he legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well constructed government, are co-extensive with each other . . . . [T]he judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing every . . . law [which the Legislature may constitutionally make].” Chief Justice Marshall relied on this axiom in Osborn v. Bank of the United States to stress the breadth of the federal judicial power: the federal courts must have the potential power to adjudicate any claim based on any law Congress has the power to enact. In recent years, however, the axiom has sometimes operated in the …

State Officers And The Enforcement Of Federal Law, Charlie Nugent

Notre Dame Law Review

There is an unresolved question whether the state enforcement of federal law is compatible with the structure of government that the Constitution creates for the United States. Commentators have advanced two diametrically opposed positions to justify the state enforcement of federal law. The “federal delegation” position maintains that federal executive power is the only executive power that can perform federal executive functions. Proponents of this position argue that, when state officers enforce federal law, they exercise federal executive power at the pleasure of the President. This federal delegation position, however, has not been adequately defended. There is no clear reason …