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Articles 1 - 30 of 84
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein
The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein
Georgia Law Review
Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …
A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore
A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straightforward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.
Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …
An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport
An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport
Notre Dame Law Review
Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …
Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum
Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause.
These cases raise important questions about …
The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
Notre Dame Law Review
The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …
The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea
The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea
Notre Dame Law Review
One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of …
Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique Of Professor Vermeule's New Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh
Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique Of Professor Vermeule's New Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh
Notre Dame Law Review
This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly summarizes Common Good Constitutionalism and provides a more detailed description of four of the book’s distinctive features. Part II critiques Vermeule’s argument in light of the classical tradition’s four essential aspects of law, namely that it is an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by one who has care of the community, and promulgated. Part III draws on those reflections to respond to Vermeule’s criticisms of work like ours that argues that original-law-based understandings of the Constitution are at home in the classical legal tradition. A Conclusion briefly reflects …
Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett
Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this review, I explain how "Common Good Constitutionalism" taps into a deficiency of the conservative legal movement: namely, its exclusive focus on the law "as it is" at the expense of the underlying abstract normative principles that justify the positive law of our written Constitution. Due to this deficiency, the conservative legal movement gives short shrift to the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment and the natural rights to which both refer. This deficiency is in need of correction. But any such correction does not justify the jettisoning of originalism as Vermeule proposes. Nor does Vermeule defend his …
Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt
Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt
Arkansas Law Review
In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …
Originalism And The Inseparability Of Decision Procedures From Interpretive Standards, Michael L. Smith
Originalism And The Inseparability Of Decision Procedures From Interpretive Standards, Michael L. Smith
Faculty Articles
In his article, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, Professor Stephen E. Sachs describes a never-ending debate between originalism's advocates and critics. Originalists argue that certain historical facts determine the Constitution's meaning. But determining these facts is difficult, if not impossible for judges, attorneys, and the public. Sachs seeks to rise above this debate, arguing that the legal community should not expect originalism to offer a procedure for interpreting the Constitution. Instead, the legal community should treat originalism as a
standard to judge interpretations.
This Article takes issue with this approach. Originalism is not like other instances in law where statutes or …
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
Washington and Lee Law Review
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to understand …
Greenbacks, Consent, And Unwritten Amendments, John M. Bickers
Greenbacks, Consent, And Unwritten Amendments, John M. Bickers
Arkansas Law Review
I remember a German farmer expressing as much in a few words as the whole subject requires: “money is money, and paper is paper.”—All the invention of man cannot make them otherwise. The alchymist may cease his labours, and the hunter after the philosopher’s stone go to rest, if paper cannot be metamorphosed into gold and silver, or made to answer the same purpose in all cases. Every day Americans spend paper money, using it as legal tender. Yet the Constitution makes no mention of this phenomenon. Indeed, it clearly prevents the states from having the authority to make paper …
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
Law Faculty Scholarship
Does textualism and originalism approach positively impact democracy?
Finding Original Public Meaning, James Macleod
Finding Original Public Meaning, James Macleod
Georgia Law Review
Textualists seek to interpret statutes consistent with their “original public meaning” (OPM). To find it, they ask an avowedly empirical question: how would ordinary readers have understood the statute’s terms at the time of their enactment? But as the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County highlights, merely asking an empirical question doesn’t preclude interpretive controversy. In considering how Title VII applies to LGBT people, the Bostock majority and dissents vehemently disagreed over the statute’s bar on discrimination “because of sex”—each side claiming that OPM clearly supported its interpretation. So who, if anyone, was right? And how can textualists’ …
Keeping Up: Walking With Justice Douglas, Charles A. Reich
Keeping Up: Walking With Justice Douglas, Charles A. Reich
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
From Parchment To Dust: The Case For Constitutional Skepticism (Introduction), Louis Michael Seidman
From Parchment To Dust: The Case For Constitutional Skepticism (Introduction), Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This is the introduction to a new book entitled "From Parchment to Dust: The Case for Constitutional Skepticism." The introduction sets out a preliminary case for constitutional skepticism and outlines the arguments contained in the rest of the book.
Saving America’S Privacy Rights: Why Carpenter V. United States Was Wrongly Decided And Why Courts Should Be Promoting Legislative Reform Rather Than Extending Existing Privacy Jurisprudence, David Stone
St. Mary's Law Journal
Privacy rights are under assault, but the Supreme Court’s judicial intervention into the issue, starting with Katz v. United States and leading to the Carpenter v. United States decision has created an inconsistent, piecemeal common law of privacy that forestalls a systematic public policy resolution by Congress and the states. In order to reach a satisfactory and longlasting resolution of the problem consistent with separation of powers principles, the states should consider a constitutional amendment that reduces the danger of pervasive technologyaided surveillance and monitoring, together with a series of statutes addressing each new issue posed by technological change as …
Reshaping American Jurisprudence In The Trump Era - The Rise Of Originalist Judges, Jeffrey F. Addicott
Reshaping American Jurisprudence In The Trump Era - The Rise Of Originalist Judges, Jeffrey F. Addicott
Faculty Articles
One of the factors that is often cited as a key reason why President Donald J. Trump was elected as the forty-fifth president, was his pledge to the American people to "make America great again" by appointing "conservative judges" to the bench, particularly when it came to filling any vacancies that might open on the United States Supreme Court. Since the never ending fight for securing an ideological majority on the Supreme Court is always viewed with great concern by both political parties, many wondered whether then candidate Trump was simply telling potential voters what they wanted to hear, or …
Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin
Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin
Scholarly Works
The doctrine of precedent, in its stare decisis form, presents a challenge to any originalist. This doctrine provides that a court should (at least sometimes) be bound by its own precedent, even if that precedent was wrongly decided in the first place. Yet if the original meaning of the text at issue is a judge’s focus, why should an intervening decision of the court—and a mistaken one at that— matter at all? Despite this tension, every originalist also at least purports to care about precedent.
This Essay focuses on Justice Gorsuch’s apparent views on precedent in the context of statutory …
Smith, Scalia, And Originalism, Amul R. Thapar
Smith, Scalia, And Originalism, Amul R. Thapar
Catholic University Law Review
To many principled Originalists and proponent of religious liberty, the opinion in Employment Division v. Smith poses a puzzle. Many commentators believe Smith contradicts the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and hinders the right to religious freedom. Yet it was written by Justice Scalia, a self-professed Originalist and lion of the law. I attempt to resolve this puzzle, reviewing Justice Scalia’s speeches and opinions on religious liberty. Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith reflects his commitments to certain jurisprudential principles. Viewing these principles in the light of New Originalism, though, it becomes clear how Smith most likely does …
The Declaration Of Independence And The American Theory Of Government: “First Come Rights, And Then Comes Government”, Randy E. Barnett
The Declaration Of Independence And The American Theory Of Government: “First Come Rights, And Then Comes Government”, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The topic of this panel is the Declaration of Independence, to which I devoted a chapter of my recent book, Our Republican Constitution. I want to draw on that book to make five points.
Originalism And Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt
Originalism And Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt
Washington and Lee Law Review Online
In this Essay, I argue that originalism conflicts with the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence defining the scope of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the standard established in Boerne v. Flores, the Court limits congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to statutory remedies premised on judicially defined interpretations of Fourteenth Amendment rights. A commitment to originalism as a method of judicial constitutional interpretation challenges the premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in Section 5 jurisprudence in two ways. First, as a matter of history, an originalist reading of Section 5 provides support for broad judicial …
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today. But it is a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St. John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former golf course.
I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend. What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice Scalia’s tenure on the …
Justice Scalia's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: An Unabashed Foe Of Criminal Defendants, Michael Vitiello
Justice Scalia's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: An Unabashed Foe Of Criminal Defendants, Michael Vitiello
Akron Law Review
Justice Scalia’s death has already produced a host of commentary on his career. Depending on the issue, Justice Scalia’s legacy is quite complicated. Justice Scalia’s commitment to originalism explains at least some of his pro-defendant positions. Some of his supporters point to such examples to support a claim that Justice Scalia was principled in his application of his jurisprudential philosophy. However, in one area, Justice Scalia was an unabashed foe of criminal defendants: his Eighth Amendment jurisprudential dealing with terms of imprisonment. There, based on his reading of the historical record, he argued that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel …
For Legal Principles, Mitchell N. Berman
For Legal Principles, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
Most legal thinkers believe that legal rules and legal principles are meaningfully distinguished. Many jurists may have no very precise distinction in mind, and those who do might not all agree. But it is widely believed that legal norms come in different logical types, and that one difference is reasonably well captured by a nomenclature that distinguishes “rules” from “principles.” Larry Alexander is the foremost challenger to this bit of legal-theoretic orthodoxy. In several articles, but especially in “Against Legal Principles,” an influential article co-authored with Ken Kress two decades ago, Alexander has argued that legal principles cannot exist.
In …
The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman
The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman
Michigan Law Review
Review of A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law by Antonin Scalia .
The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman
The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
Justice Antonin Scalia was, by the time of his death last February, the Supreme Court’s best known and most influential member. He was also its most polarizing, a jurist whom most students of American law either love or hate. This essay, styled as a twenty-year retrospective on A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia’s Tanner lectures on statutory and constitutional interpretation, aims to prod partisans on both sides of our central legal and political divisions to better appreciate at least some of what their opponents see—the other side of Scalia’s legacy. Along the way, it critically assesses Scalia’s particular brand of …
James Wilson In The State House Yard: Ratifying The Structures Of Popular Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum
James Wilson In The State House Yard: Ratifying The Structures Of Popular Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum
Scholarly Works
There is an excellent (and rapidly growing) literature examining the influence of James Wilson's Scottish philosophical education on his later political ideas. In this Article, Professor Ian Bartrum makes two contributions to that scholarship. First, he reexamines several of the most important Scottish moral sentimentalists with a particular focus on the specific ontological and epistemological accounts that influenced Wilson. Second, he dissolves the seeming contradictions in Wilson's political thought by showing that, while he understood that representative bodies were essential to legitimate government, he nonetheless distrusted these institutions because they work to obscure, or even subvert, their members' individual experience …
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, John F. Stinneford
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, John F. Stinneford
John F. Stinneford
When the government wants to impose exceptionally harsh punishment on a criminal defendant, one of the ways it accomplishes this goal is to divide the defendant’s single course of conduct into multiple offenses that give rise to multiple punishments. The Supreme Court has rendered the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and the rule of lenity incapable of handling this problem by emptying them of substantive content and transforming them into mere instruments for effectuation of legislative will. This Article demonstrates that all three doctrines originally reflected a substantive legal preference for life and liberty, and a …
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, John F. Stinneford
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, John F. Stinneford
UF Law Faculty Publications
When the government wants to impose exceptionally harsh punishment on a criminal defendant, one of the ways it accomplishes this goal is to divide the defendant’s single course of conduct into multiple offenses that give rise to multiple punishments. The Supreme Court has rendered the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and the rule of lenity incapable of handling this problem by emptying them of substantive content and transforming them into mere instruments for effectuation of legislative will.
This Article demonstrates that all three doctrines originally reflected a substantive legal preference for life and liberty, and a …