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Articles 31 - 36 of 36

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Notion Of Trust As A Comprehensive Theory Of Contract And Corporate Law: A New Approach To The Conception That The Corporation Is A Nexus Of Contract, Eli Bukspan Mar 2005

The Notion Of Trust As A Comprehensive Theory Of Contract And Corporate Law: A New Approach To The Conception That The Corporation Is A Nexus Of Contract, Eli Bukspan

ExpressO

The paper argues that the concept of trust is inevitably latent in every contractual relationship, and is best understood as a comprehensive theory and justification of contract law as both trust and contracts (more than any other legal action) are aiming toward the same universal goal of cooperation, risk-taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations. Contract law, per se and through its “good faith” doctrine, could then function as an expressive, coercive, and thus corrective legal tool, serving to symbolize, build, and internalize a culture of trust wherever it has failed to develop. Accordingly, while viewing the corporation as a nexus …


The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman Feb 2005

The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman

ExpressO

How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) "reasonable investor" have considered the disclosures important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a "reasonable investor." Thus, materiality provides an …


The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer Feb 2005

The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer

ExpressO

Managers of buyout funds typically offer their investors an 8% preferred return on their investment before they take a share of any additional profits. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, rarely offer a preferred return. Instead, VCs take their cut from the first dollar of nominal profits. This disparity between venture funds and buyout funds is especially striking because the contracts that determine fund organization and compensation are otherwise very similar. The missing preferred return might suggest that agency costs pose a larger problem in venture capital than previously thought. Is the missing preferred return evidence, perhaps, that VCs are …


Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec Feb 2005

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed …


The Corporation As God, Douglas Litowitz Jan 2005

The Corporation As God, Douglas Litowitz

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


Corporate Law, Profit Maximization And The "Responsible Shareholder", Ian B. Lee Jan 2005

Corporate Law, Profit Maximization And The "Responsible Shareholder", Ian B. Lee

ExpressO

The article concerns the theorization of shareholder responsibility and ethical investing. The article develops the following arguments, among others:

If public corporations pursue stockholder profits “pathologically,” as claimed by some critical scholars, it is not because of any obligation arising under corporate law, but because the pursuit of stockholder profits is congenial to the stockholders.

For this reason (and others discussed in the article), shareholders have an ethical stake in the conduct of corporate business, quite apart from any notion that shareholders “own” the corporation.

A phenomenon which the article terms “bounded empathy,” analogous to “bounded rationality”, can help to …