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The Power Of An Indictment – The Legal Implications Of The Demise Of Arthur Andersen, James Kelly
The Power Of An Indictment – The Legal Implications Of The Demise Of Arthur Andersen, James Kelly
ExpressO
This article examines the impact an indictment can have against a limited liability partnership of professionals, in particular the Justice Department’s prosecution of accounting firm Arthur Andersen. Following a brief chronological description of the factual background of the case, the article then examines the weight an indictment is supposed to have, followed by the standards for issuing an indictment against an entire partnership rather than just the individuals who allegedly performed wrongful acts. The notion of prosecutorial discretion is heavily emphasized, and the factors that contributed to the prosecution of Andersen are discussed. Finally, the implications of this situation are …
Organizational Form As Status And Signal, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Organizational Form As Status And Signal, Kimberly D. Krawiec
ExpressO
In this Article, the author analyzes the reactions of 147 New York City law firms to the 1994 enactment of the New York Limited Liability Partnership statute, which provided New York law firm partners with the first convenient mechanism to limit their personal liability for partnership debts. Using both quantitative and qualitative evidence, she evaluates whether the behavior of New York law firms supports the signaling theory of organizational form—that is, the theory that firms use the partnership form to signal to the marketplace that they provide high quality legal services, due to either superior monitoring or to profit sharing. …
Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor
Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor
ExpressO
No abstract provided.
The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer
The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer
ExpressO
Managers of buyout funds typically offer their investors an 8% preferred return on their investment before they take a share of any additional profits. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, rarely offer a preferred return. Instead, VCs take their cut from the first dollar of nominal profits. This disparity between venture funds and buyout funds is especially striking because the contracts that determine fund organization and compensation are otherwise very similar. The missing preferred return might suggest that agency costs pose a larger problem in venture capital than previously thought. Is the missing preferred return evidence, perhaps, that VCs are …