Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons^™

Why "Democracy" And "Drifter" Firms Can Have Abnormal Returns: The Joint Importance Of Corporate Governance And Abnormal Accruals In Separating Winners From Losers, Koon Boon Kee

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

Do managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner? Good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, are necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated. The output of quality accounting information, in turn, serves as an input to better governance structures. Thus, governance and earnings quality (EQ) are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship. This suggests two previously unexamined relationships. Firstly, the governance effects on performance in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is overrated without good EQ, measured by the magnitude of abnormal accruals (AA), as an input. …

Why Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence From Seasoned Bond Offerings, Fang Wang

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

To examine the importance of corporate governance, I look at how management and investors behave in the event of seasoned bond offerings, controlling for the corporate governance structure of issuing firms. I find that companies with the weakest governance structure aggressively manipulate their earnings upwards during the two years prior to the debt issuances. And when the bond offerings are announced to the market, these same firms experienced positive abnormal returns over a three day event period, indicating that investors of poorly governed firms value a debt financing for the alleged decrease in agency cost.

Does Corporate Governance Matter, Evidence From Earnings Management Practices In Singapore, Lingxu Hu

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

This paper addresses two questions. First, do good corporate governance practices add values to company or does it lead to higher stock returns in Singapore? Second, does poorly governed listed company in SGX tend to manage their earnings by using discretionary accruals? Following the approach of Gompers et al. (2003), we formed two portfolios consisting of well-governed and poorly governed companies. Well governed companies are able to maintain a higher return relative to poorly governed companies. I also look at the firm valuation from the adoption of corporate governance practices. Our result shows a positive relationship between firm valuation and …

Corporate Governance And Earnings Management Before Share Repurchase Announcements In Singapore, Jian Ming Chua

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

Share repurchase in Singapore was legalized in 1998. It is well known that investors view share repurchase as good news. This study is based on share repurchase announcements from 2006 to 2009. The mean Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns (CAR) for the period [0, +1] and [-1, +1] are significant at 1.25% and 1.33% respectively. In Singapore, there are positive abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements in support of the ―free cash flow‖ hypothesis. By using the Singapore Corporate Governance Index as a proxy, the weakly governed companies exhibit the strongest, positive and significant CAR of 2.62% for the period [0, +1]. …

The Nomination And Motivations Of Irish Non-Executive Directors Of Listed Companies, Anna Egan, Rebecca Maughan, Joseph Coughlan

Conference papers

This paper reports the preliminary findings of an empirical investigation into the process of appointing non-executive directors and their motivations behind the adoption of the position. While research into the board of directors has been extensive, little deliberation has been given to the motives of non-executives who choose to sit on boards (Roberts, 2002). Given that the board of directors has been charged with much more responsibility in recent years and is being held to a higher level of accountability than would historically be expected (Donnelly and Kelly, 2005), the choice of non-executives to continue to take up roles on …

The Association Between Institutional Ownership And Audit Properties, Soongsoo Han, Tony Kang, Lynn Reesc

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this study, we examine how institutional ownership affects the quality and riskiness of the financial statement audit. We hypothesize that institutional investors can influence corporate policy to employ governance mechanisms that reduce their monitoring costs. Our evidence shows that firms are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor (our proxy for audit quality) when long-term institutional ownership is high, suggesting that long-term institutional investors view high quality audits as a viable means of improving corporate governance while reducing their direct monitoring costs. We find no association between auditor choice and short-term institutional ownership. Next, we find that auditors …

Shareholder Bylaws And The Delaware Corporation, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Much like hostile tender offers in the 1980s and 1990s, shareholder bylaws purporting to limit board authority in key areas of corporate governance are, once again, forcing Delaware's courts to grapple with the fundamental nature of the corporate form.

In this (short) essay written for a roundtable discussion at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, I discuss CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan - the 2008 opinion in which the Delaware Supreme Court began to define the nature and scope of the shareholders' bylaw authority. In CA, Inc. the court held that a proposed …

Public Ownership. Firm Governance, And Litigation Risk, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Many going-private transactions are motivated – at least ostensibly – by the desire to escape the burdens and costs of public ownership. Although these burdens have many purported manifestations, one commonly cited is the risk of litigation, which may be borne both directly by the firm and/or its fiduciaries or reflected in director and officer insurance premia funded at company expense. An important issue for the "litigation risk" justification of privatization is whether alternative (and less expensive) steps falling short of going private – such as governance reforms – may augur sufficiently against litigation exposure. In this Article, I consider …

The Enduring Ambivalence Of Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Prevailing theories of corporate law tend to rely heavily on strong claims regarding the corporate governance primacy and legitimacy of either the board or the shareholders, as the case may be. In this article I challenge the descriptive power of these theories as applied to widely held public corporations and advance an alternative, arguing that corporate law is, and will remain, deeply ambivalent - both doctrinally and morally - with respect to three fundamental and related issues: the locus of ultimate corporate governance authority, the intended beneficiaries of corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law and theachievement of the …

Change And Continuity In Japanese Corporate Governance, Toru Yoshikawa, Jean Mcguire

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Previous studies on Japanese corporate governance were largely based on the agency theory framework, and can be seen as attempts to understand the unique monitoring mechanisms in the Japanese context. This paper briefly reviews prior research and then discusses the recent changes in the environment that have been affecting Japanese corporate governance. Our central argument is that there is both change and continuity in Japanese Corporate Governance. We also present emerging research from an institutional theory perspective. In this line of research, corporate governance is treated as part of a nation’s institutional framework and hence, researchers need to understand unique …

Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper analyzes institutional and legal changes related to corporate governance and their impact on financial performance in Japan since the second half of the 1990s. We attempt to address two issues systematically: (1) how much the governance reforms of Japanese firms transformed the conventional system of alliance capitalism and managerial control; and (2) what economic outcomes those governance changes have yielded. As the Commercial Code and other legal and institutional frameworks were revised, Japanese firms experienced shifts in terms of stock ownership, corporate control and managerial organizations. Our empirical results show that the influence of new ownership composition and …

Corporate Governance Reform As Institutional Innovation: The Case Of Japan, Toru Yoshikawa, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Jean Mcguire

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

To address the convergence-divergence debate in corporate governance, we conduct a multiple-case, multiple-level study to analyze the diffusion of governance innovation in Japan. We argue that Japanese systems of corporate governance neither fully converge to, nor completely diverge from, the Anglo-American model. Rather, Sony-the pioneer of corporate governance reforms-and its followers selectively adopted features from this model, decoupled them from the original context, and tailored them to fit to their own situations to generate governance innovation. However, we find that the spread of innovation across firms and institutional levels is far from linear and straightforward, and that other well-regarded firms …

The Association Between Corporate Governance And Audit Fees, Cindy K. Harris

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) established not only corporate governance reform but also legislated significant changes to the practice of auditing publicly held corporations. Rules implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) further reinforced stronger corporate governance standards. The effect of these reforms on the cost of public audits is indisputable: the initial rise in audit fees was dramatic as corporations complied with the new provisions. This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and audit fees for a random sample of 100 publicly traded corporations drawn from the 2005 Fortune 500 list. The data is obtained …

The Effectiveness Of Insider Trading Regulation: International Evidence, Art Durnev, Amrita S. Nain

Finance Faculty Publications

There is a long standing debate in the finance and law literatures about the need for insider trading regulation. Some scholars and practitioners argue that insider trading restrictions should be revoked because insider trading allows private information to be quickly incorporated into stock prices, thereby leading to more informationally efficient stock prices (Carlton and Fischel (1983); Dye (1984)). For example, Milton Friedman, laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, said: “You want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make the public …

Strategic Investments In Japanese Corporations: Do Foreign Portfolio Owners Foster Underinvestment Or Appropriate Investment?, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Murali D. R. Chari, Abdul A. Rasheed

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper investigates the effect of foreign ownership on strategic investments in Japanese corporations. Foreign owners are typically portfolio investors who frequently buy and sell shares and hold diversified portfolios of small stakes in many firms. Prior research has presented two conflicting perspectives on the role of such investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pressure for short-term returns that fosters underinvestment; (b) their active trading fosters appropriate investments. We investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and strategic investments using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 146 Japanese manufacturing firms from 1991 to 1997. We found that foreign …

Good Faith, State Of Mind, And The Outer Boundaries Of Director Liability In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

The Delaware General Corporation Law was amended in 1986 to permit shareholder-approved exculpatory charter provisions shielding corporate directors from monetary liability for certain fiduciary duty breaches not including (among other things) breaches of the duty of loyalty and acts not in good faith. This article examines the development of corporate fiduciary duty doctrine in Delaware leading up to and following this statutory amendment, focusing particularly on the Delaware courts' evolving conception of the meaning anddoctrinal status of the good faith concept employed in recent cases to permit a non-exculpable cause ofaction for conscious nonfeasance.

The article argues that Delaware's good …

On Public Versus Private Provision Of Corporate Law, Gillian K. Hadfield, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Law in modern market societies serves both democratic and economic functions. In its economic function, law is a service, a means of enhancing the value of transactions and organizations. Yet modern market economies continue to rely on the state, rather than the market, to provide this service. This paper investigates whether private provision of law may be superior to public provision. We look in particular at corporate law, where there is a substantial literature exploring the efficiency implications of "regulatory competition" and compare this competition with market competition between private providers. Drawing from the well-known framework of spatial models of …

The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Wage Intensity In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Parthiban David

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The authors studied the effect of ownership structure on human capital investments as indicated by wage intensity, defined as the ratio of expenditure on employee wages to sales, in a sample of 996 Japanese manufacturing firms during their economic recession of 1998-2002. They found that domestic shareholders, with interests beyond financial considerations, enhance wage intensity, especially when performance is low, and thereby safeguard human capital investments. Foreign shareholders with sole interest in financial returns have an opposite effect; they reduce wage intensity when firm performance is low.

The Effects Of Ownership And Capital Structure On Board Composition And Strategic Diversification In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The board of directors plays an important role in solving the agency problem between shareholders and management. This paper investigates the relationships between ownership and board structure with the diversification strategy of large Japanese firms. The results show that corporate nominee directors are associated with lower levels of product diversification of their investee firms. This suggests that nominee directors in large Japanese corporations see themselves representing specific interests and therefore investors should pay attention to board composition in order to assess the level of protection they can expect to receive. Even without any apparent agency problem with management, there remains …

Ownership Structure, Investment Behaviour And Firm Performance In Japanese Manufacturing Industries, Eric Gedajlovic, Toru Yoshikawa, Motomi Hashimoto

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Using data spanning the 1996-98 fiscal years of 247 of Japan's largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm's investment behaviour and financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated companies and insiders. Our findings strongly indicate that the relationship between the equity stakes of a particular category of investor and a firm' s financial performance and investment behaviour is considerably more complex than is depicted in simple principal-agent representations. Such a result emphasizes the …

Worker Ownership In Enron's Wake - Revisiting A Community Development Tactic, Peter R. Pitegoff

Faculty Publications

Worker ownership of business enterprise has long been touted as a vehicle for community economic development. Employee stock ownership plans in leveraged buy-outs, ESOPs and broad-based stock options in going concerns, and worker cooperatives in selected sectors - the experience has varied widely in goals, method, and outcome.

This Article reflects on the continued utility of worker ownership as a component of community development and calls attention to contrasts with conventional corporate governance and goals. Rather than an end in itself or just another way of doing business, worker ownership can be a vital element of a broader job creation, …

The Performance Implications Of Ownership Driven Governance Reform, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper explores the performance impact of recent changes in foreign shareholdings and boardroom reforms in Japan. Empirical research on the impact of reform on the Japanese corporate governance system could provide useful lessons for their European counterparts who are themselves facing similar pressures to reform. We found that although participation of outside directors in strategic decision-making was associated with positive stock returns, the increase in the ratio of outside directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and the reduction of board size were not related to firm performance.

Ethics In Business : An Overview, Rishikesha T Krishnan

IIMB Management Review

Finding a model to ensure ethical behaviour will be as elusive as the alchemists’ quest for a way of converting base metals into gold. More so, in India where the atmosphere is far from conducive to ethical behaviour. Yet, heightened public opinion and assertion by citizens’ bodies can eliminate, corruption.

Corporate Governance And Ethics, Samir K Barua

IIMB Management Review

Will a model ever be found that would guarantee ethical corporate behaviour? Samir Barua, Professor, IIM Ahmedabad, traces the efforts of governments worldwide, including the setting up of the Treadway Commission (USA), the Cadbury Committee (UK), the King Committee (South Africa) and the National Task Force on Corporate Governance (India) in the last decade and a half, to ensure corporate governance. The improvements in the 90s in the accounting and reporting standards, the regulatory and supervision framework, the composition and functioning of boards and the apparent efficiency of the capital markets led to a sense of complacency that at last …

Institutional Investors And Corporate Governance, Jinesh Panchali

IIMB Management Review

The challenge of promoting enterprise and accountability is common to all markets. What degree of freedom is right for corporate boards and how to make them accountable is a major concern in the realm of corporate governance. Even where market forces are expected to take care of the utilisation of available resources, there has to be a system which ensures that owners of these resources are made accountable for their use in the larger interests of the economy. This paper examines the rationale for institutional investors’1 activism in general and for the Indian capital market in particular, discusses empirical evidences …

Teaching Students How To Become In-House Counsel, Christian C. Day

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Corporate Caregiver, Dipali Sikand

IIMB Management Review

My career as a Human Resources manager had led me to specialising in HR in the telecom business, first with the Essar group, then with JT Mobiles and the Northern Telecom group in Singapore as a Resourcing Director. I saw that people mainly took time off during office hours to do personal jobs - small jobs like paying their bills or buying tickets. This took up a major chunk of their time and it cost the organisation. I began to realize how vital it was for companies to find new ways of retaining employees and helping them use their office …

Corporate Citizenship – Convergence In Corporate Governance?, Vikram Rajaram

IIMB Management Review

In an almost seamless manner good corporate governance is seen to include corporate citizenship and, through an extension of good citizenship - corporate philanthropy. Corporate India seems to have accepted the nexus between the creation of wealth and the distribution of wealth. In the same manner that recommended corporate governance practices of yesteryear have now been enshrined in statutes, it is probably a portent of things to come that what constitutes good corporate Round Table 90 citizenship today will, with the passage of time, be decreed by law.

Corporate Governance, Reputation And Competitive Credibility, N Balasubramanian, David Kimber

IIMB Management Review

The decade of the 1990s has perhaps seen the most profound changes in global economic structures. The effects of structural adjustment and globalisation, and the emergence of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have meant that the role of business has dramatically changed throughout the world. Statistics of the number of corporations that are larger than nation states abound and only illustrate the importance of the corporate sector and its impact on the world order

Corporate Governance In India: Disciplining The Dominant Shareholde, Jayanth Rama Varma

IIMB Management Review

Corporate governance problems in India are very different from that of, say, the US or the UK where the issue is essentially that of disciplining the management who have ceased to be effectively accountable to their owners. The problem of the Indian corporate sector is that of disciplining the dominant shareholder and protecting the minority shareholders. The role of two such disciplining forces - the regulator and the capital market has been discussed.