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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Business
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.
Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …
Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This is the text of an interview conducted in writing by Professor A. Douglas Melamed, Stanford Law School.
Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust litigation often requires courts to consider challenges to vertical “control.” How does a firm injure competition by limiting the behavior of vertically related firms? Competitive injury includes harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and higher margins.
Historically antitrust considers this issue by attempting to identify a market that is vertically related to the defendant, and then consider what portion of it is “foreclosed” by the vertical practice. There are better mechanisms for identifying competitive harm, including a more individualized look at how the practice injures the best placed firms or bears directly on a firm’s …
The Determinants Of The Private Saving In The Islamic Economy: A Comparative Study, Abdullah Al Badaren
The Determinants Of The Private Saving In The Islamic Economy: A Comparative Study, Abdullah Al Badaren
Jerash for Research and Studies Journal مجلة جرش للبحوث والدراسات
This study aimed to determine the factors affecting the private saving in the Islamic
economy, compared with the traditional economy, in order to investigate the
differences between the two systems in terms of boosters savings, the study found
that the saving in the Islamic economy is affected by a lot of determinants affecting
the savings in the traditional economy; such as income, wealth, consumption,
prices, and income distribution, etc., but it differs in terms of the exclusion of the
interest rate, adjust the structure of the market, the nature of consumption, and the
presence of the provisions of the many …
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …