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Articles 1 - 30 of 37
Full-Text Articles in Business
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Senior Honors Theses
Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …
The Power Of Antitrust Personhood, Herbert Hovenkamp
The Power Of Antitrust Personhood, Herbert Hovenkamp
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law
Antitrust law addresses conspiracy, or collaborative conduct, more harshly than it does unilateral conduct. One person acting alone can get away with far more than groups of firms acting by agreement. In most cases that distinction is justified. Creating substantial market power unilaterally is difficult and relatively uncommon, but it can be created in a moment’s time by an agreement among firms. But how do antitrust tribunals determine when conduct is unilateral rather than collaborative? Often the ansawer is obvious, but sometimes it is not. Two statutory provisions were intended to be the umpire of such decisions. A section of …
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In July, 2021, President Biden signed a far ranging Executive Order directed to promoting competition in the American economy. This paper analyzes issues covered by the Order that are most likely to affect the scope and enforcement of antitrust law. The only passage that the Executive Order quoted from a Supreme Court antitrust decision captures its antitrust ideology well – that the Sherman Act:
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time …
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.
Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …
Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This is the text of an interview conducted in writing by Professor A. Douglas Melamed, Stanford Law School.
Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust litigation often requires courts to consider challenges to vertical “control.” How does a firm injure competition by limiting the behavior of vertically related firms? Competitive injury includes harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and higher margins.
Historically antitrust considers this issue by attempting to identify a market that is vertically related to the defendant, and then consider what portion of it is “foreclosed” by the vertical practice. There are better mechanisms for identifying competitive harm, including a more individualized look at how the practice injures the best placed firms or bears directly on a firm’s …
The Determinants Of The Private Saving In The Islamic Economy: A Comparative Study, Abdullah Al Badaren
The Determinants Of The Private Saving In The Islamic Economy: A Comparative Study, Abdullah Al Badaren
Jerash for Research and Studies Journal مجلة جرش للبحوث والدراسات
This study aimed to determine the factors affecting the private saving in the Islamic
economy, compared with the traditional economy, in order to investigate the
differences between the two systems in terms of boosters savings, the study found
that the saving in the Islamic economy is affected by a lot of determinants affecting
the savings in the traditional economy; such as income, wealth, consumption,
prices, and income distribution, etc., but it differs in terms of the exclusion of the
interest rate, adjust the structure of the market, the nature of consumption, and the
presence of the provisions of the many …
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …
Pricing Stallion Seasons For An Individual Stallion: The Existence Of Top Tier Pricing And Market Power, Robert L. Losey Ph.D., Thomas E. Lambert 1959-
Pricing Stallion Seasons For An Individual Stallion: The Existence Of Top Tier Pricing And Market Power, Robert L. Losey Ph.D., Thomas E. Lambert 1959-
Faculty Scholarship
This paper is an academic treatment of the pricing of stallion seasons (a “season” confers the right to breed a mare to a stallion) The commercial stallion seasons market can be represented schematically as a triangle that normally has a single-digit number of stallions offering high-priced seasons in the narrow apex, a moderate number of stallions composing the middle section, and over 150 in the $5,000-$10,000 range. We argue that it is logical for profit-maximizing stallion managers, most especially those in the apex of the stallion seasons triangle, to charge different prices for different groups of buyers of the same …
Little To Be Gained From Dth Without Prior Industry Regulations, Syeda Raza-E-Masooma
Little To Be Gained From Dth Without Prior Industry Regulations, Syeda Raza-E-Masooma
MSJ Capstone Projects
In absence of proper legislation prohibiting monopoly & vertical integration of satellite companies and TV channels, DTH TV will cause more harm than good to media in Pakistan. DTH might finally come to Pakistan – legally. It seems a possibility now, a far-fetched one but nevertheless a possibility. It might be noteworthy, that it is already on its way out in our neighboring India, being taken over by mobile apps.
Given Today's New Wave Of Protectionsim, Is Antitrust Law The Last Hope For Preserving A Free Global Economy Or Another Nail In Free Trade's Coffin?, Allison Murray
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
No abstract provided.
Book Review: Zero To One, By Peter Thiel, Ammon Kou
Book Review: Zero To One, By Peter Thiel, Ammon Kou
Marriott Student Review
This is a book review of Zero to One by Peter Thiel.
X-Inefficiency In Monopolies, Emily Nowlan
X-Inefficiency In Monopolies, Emily Nowlan
HON499 projects
This paper takes a case study approach to studying the efficiency and causes of decline for monopoly firms. The focus of the analysis will be on two firms: IBM, and Xerox. The main causes of failure studied will be financial issues, mismanagement, and regulatory cases. One theory is that, as monopolies operate, one begins to see a differential between growth of profits and expenditures. Thus, the firms become “fat and slow.” The company may also become bogged down with overhead, attempting to maintain unsustainable and unnecessary levels of employment. Compounding this issue, many managers fail to accurately predict the movement …
Domination: The Consequence Of A Modern Day Monopoly, Matthew Haimson
Domination: The Consequence Of A Modern Day Monopoly, Matthew Haimson
Business/Business Administration
The objective of this study is to find out what constitutes a company as a monopoly. There are various indicators which establish a monopoly from other dominating businesses; however, it is difficult to pin-point how one company controls the market over its competitors. With financial and quantitative data, there are ways `to determine how a company may be heading towards that direction. In this study, there were two organizations selected and compared; one which has displayed monopolistic features, while the other is slowly being dominated by its competitor. After carefully analyzing and comparing the two well-known corporations, various inferences were …
The Innovation Commons, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Innovation Commons, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This book of CASES AND MATERIALS ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY is intended for educational use. The book is free for all to use subject to an open source license agreement. It differs from IP/antitrust casebooks in that it considers numerous sources of competition policy in addition to antitrust, including those that emanate from the intellectual property laws themselves, and also related issues such as the relationship between market structure and innovation, the competitive consequences of regulatory rules governing technology competition such as net neutrality and interconnection, misuse, the first sale doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Chapters …
Competition For Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competition For Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Both antitrust and IP law are limited and imperfect instruments for regulating innovation. The problems include high information costs and lack of sufficient knowledge, special interest capture, and the jury trial system, to name a few. More fundamentally, antitrust law and intellectual property law have looked at markets in very different ways. Further, over the last three decades antitrust law has undergone a reformation process that has made it extremely self conscious about its goals. While the need for such reform is at least as apparent in patent and copyright law, very little true reform has actually occurred.
Antitrust has …
Institutional Advantage In Competition And Innovation Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Institutional Advantage In Competition And Innovation Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are assigned to different agencies with different authority. The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy are the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such.
Since early in the twentieth century antitrust courts have had to confront practices that …
Ifrs Monopoly: The Pied Piper Of Financial Reporting, Shyam Sunder
Ifrs Monopoly: The Pied Piper Of Financial Reporting, Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.
Ifrs Monopoly: Pied Piper Of Financial Accounting, Shyam Sunder
Ifrs Monopoly: Pied Piper Of Financial Accounting, Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.
Is There A Role For Common Carriage In An Internet-Based World?, Christopher S. Yoo
Is There A Role For Common Carriage In An Internet-Based World?, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
During the course of the network neutrality debate, advocates have proposed extending common carriage regulation to broadband Internet access services. Others have endorsed extending common carriage to a wide range of other Internet-based services, including search engines, cloud computing, Apple devices, online maps, and social networks. All too often, however, those who focus exclusively on the Internet era pay too little attention to the lessons of the legacy of regulated industries, which has long struggled to develop a coherent rationale for determining which industries should be subject to common carriage. Of the four rationales for determining the scope of common …
Mortgage Securitization 666: The Crime That Took Place - Jpmorgan Chase And Its Wamu Customers, Symphony Music
Mortgage Securitization 666: The Crime That Took Place - Jpmorgan Chase And Its Wamu Customers, Symphony Music
Symphony Music
This description of the crime that Chase participates in as it proceeds with its foreclosure activities is necessary because the banking industry is misleading the judicial system about important financial aspects of today’s home loan mortgages. This is an initial attempt to describe the crime, including references to La Cosa Nostra and the crime families.
Ifrs Monopoly: Pied Piper Of Financial Reporting., Shyam Sunder
Ifrs Monopoly: Pied Piper Of Financial Reporting., Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.
Ifrs Monopoly: Pied Piper Of Financial Reporting, Shyam Sunder
Ifrs Monopoly: Pied Piper Of Financial Reporting, Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.
Antitrust And Innovation: Where We Are And Where We Should Be Going, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Innovation: Where We Are And Where We Should Be Going, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
For large parts of their history intellectual property law and antitrust law have worked so as to undermine innovation competition by protecting too much. Antitrust policy often reflected exaggerated fears of competitive harm, and responded by developing overly protective rules that shielded inefficient businesses from competition at the expense of consumers. By the same token, the IP laws have often undermined rather than promoted innovation by granting IP holders rights far beyond what is necessary to create appropriate incentives to innovate.
Perhaps the biggest intellectual change in recent decades is that we have come to see patents less as a …
The Nba And The Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, Michael A. Mccann
The Nba And The Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, Michael A. Mccann
Law Faculty Scholarship
This Article will explore the relationship between the National Basketball Association, its independently-owned teams, and associated corporate entities, including the Women’s NBA, NBA Properties, NBA Developmental League, NBA China, and single entity analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 chiefly aims to prevent competitors from combining their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm consumers, be it in terms of raised prices, diminished quality, or limited choices. Single entities are exempt from section 1 because they are considered “one,” rather than competitors, and thus their collaboration does not implicate anticompetitive concerns.
In American Needle …
Schumpeterian Competition And Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Schumpeterian Competition And Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Joseph Schumpeter's vision of competition saw it as a destructive process in which effort, assets and fortunes were continuously destroyed by innovation. One possible implication is that antitrust's attention on short-run price and output issues is myopic: what seems at first glance to be a monopolistic exclusionary practice might really be an innovative enterprise with enormous payoffs in the long run. While this may be the case, three qualifications are critical. First, one must not confuse the prospect of innovation with the scope of the intellectual property laws; their excesses and special interest capture cast serious doubt on the proposition …
Monopoly Or Competition: Standard Setting In The Public And Private Sector, Shyam Sunder
Monopoly Or Competition: Standard Setting In The Public And Private Sector, Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.
Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. There is no independent justification for an essential facility doctrine separate and apart from general Section 2 doctrine governing the vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to deal. In its Trinko decision the Supreme Court placed that doctrine about where it should be. The Court did not categorically reject all unilateral refusal to deal claims, but it placed …
Monopoly And Competition: Standard Setting In The Public And Private Sector.", Shyam Sunder
Monopoly And Competition: Standard Setting In The Public And Private Sector.", Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.
Monopoly And Competition: Standard Setting In The Public And Private Sector., Shyam Sunder
Monopoly And Competition: Standard Setting In The Public And Private Sector., Shyam Sunder
Shyam Sunder
No abstract provided.