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Full-Text Articles in Business
Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction (Ausubel 1996) have important theoretical advantages for sellers. In a setting without private information, these auctions achieve the maximal revenue as a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. In contrast, the pay-your-bid, uniform-price, and standard ascending-bid auction admit a multiplicity of equilibria that yield low revenues for the seller. We show how these results extend to a setting where …
Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton
Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Under Delaware law (the predominant corporate law in the US), when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's board of directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company." (Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 173). The target's board may not use defensive tactics that destroy the auction process and must attempt to seek higher bids. Similarly, the Williams Act requires takeover bids to remain open for at least 20 business days on the grounds that the delay facilitates auctions. This preference …
Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson
Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous ascending auction is the best approach.
Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
The FCC was an innovator in adopting the rules of the simultaneous ascending-price auction for its sales of spectrum licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design improvements suggested in our first report), there are two inherent limitations in any design that seeks to assign and price the licenses individually. First, such designs create strategic incentives for bidders interested in multiple licenses that are substitutes to reduce their demands for some of the licenses in order to reduce the final prices of the others; this is the …
Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to …
Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
For Antigone and Devco.
Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
For Antigone and Devco.
The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton
The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
Synergies In Wireless Telephony: Evidence From The Broadband Pcs Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, R. Preston Mcafee, John Mcmillan
Synergies In Wireless Telephony: Evidence From The Broadband Pcs Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, R. Preston Mcafee, John Mcmillan
Peter Cramton
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action At The Fcc Increased Auction Competition, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action At The Fcc Increased Auction Competition, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Peter Cramton
In recent auctions for paging licenses, the Federal Communications Commission has granted businesses owned by minorities and women substantial bidding credits. In this article, Professors Ayres and Cramton analyze a particular auction and argue that the affirmative action bidding preferences, by increasing competition among auction participants, increased the government’s revenue by $45 million. Subsidizing the participation of new bidders can induce established bidders to bid more aggressively. The authors conclude that this revenue-enhancing effect does not provide a sufficient constitutional justification for affirmative action—but when such justification is independently present, affirmative actions can cost the government much less than is …
The Case For Affirmative Auction: From Conscience To Coffers, Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton
The Case For Affirmative Auction: From Conscience To Coffers, Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission’s auction of wireless communication licenses last fall has been criticized as a huge Government giveaway because of the substantial bidding preferences granted to women and minorities. In March, Federal court action delayed the FCC’s June auction until August to consider the legality of similar preferences. But far from being a giveaway, affirmative action actually increased the total amount paid to the Government by about $15 million. Women and minority bidders were granted a 40 percent bidding credit on certain licenses and the right to pay the Government in installments over 10 years at a favorable rate. …
Money Out Of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband Pcs Auction, Peter Cramton
Money Out Of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband Pcs Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple-round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success—an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of …
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Peter Cramton
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …