Business Commons^™

Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.

Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiple-item auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional items and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in an auction model which allows interdependent values. We also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and efficiency terms. …

Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.

Comments On Alternative Policy Options For Managing Capacity And Mitigating Congestion And Delay At Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Recommending auctions to manage congestion at LaGuardia.

A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.

Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.

Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.

Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments in support of wireless number portability. For Leap Wireless.

Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr

Peter Cramton

An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), …

Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.

Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.

Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Wt Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration Of Peter Cramton,", Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.

Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on the impact of fronts in the C and F Block Broadband PCS auction.

The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction; and (2) the seller can commit to not sell the withheld goods after the auction. We examine how the optimal auction problem changes when these assumptions are relaxed. In sharp contrast to the no resale assumption, we assume perfect resale: all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. In a multiple object model with independent signals, we …

Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.

Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Peter Cramton

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …

Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Review Of The Reserves And Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience In The First Four Months, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I review the performance of the operating reserves and the operable capability markets in New England. The review covers the first four months of operation from May 1 to August 31, 1999. The review is based on my knowledge of the market rules and their implementation by the ISO, and the market data during this period, including bidding, operating, and settlement information. In the review, I (1) identify the potential market flaws with these markets, (2) look at the performance of the markets to see if the potential problems have materialized, (3) evaluate the ISO's short-term remedies for these market …

The Role Of The Iso In U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review Of Restructuring In California And Pjm, Peter Cramton, Lisa Cameron

Peter Cramton

Several regions of the U.S. have sought to restructure the electric power industry by separating the potentially competitive generation sector from the natural monopoly functions of electricity transmission and distribution. Under this restructuring scheme, a central authority, which we will refer to as the independent system operator (ISO), is given control over both the transmission system and the spot market for electricity. The ISO's role in managing the spot market is relatively uncontroversial. This is because the spot market takes place in real time and requires continuous physical adjustments to electricity supply and demand subject to complex constraints, such as …

The Distributional Effects Of Carbon Regulation, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr

Peter Cramton

We examine the distributional effects of carbon regulation. An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.

The Efficiency Of The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? Did they award the licenses to the firms best able to turn the spectrum into valuable services for consumers? There is substantial evidence that the FCC's simultaneous ascending auction worked well. It raised large revenues. It revealed critical information in the process of bidding and gave bidders the flexibility to adjust strategies in response to new information. As a result, similar licenses sold …

Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams

Peter Cramton

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs among alternative designs. We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major recommendations:

* Switch to a multi-settlement system.

* Introduce demand-side bidding.

* Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export interfaces.

* Fix the pricing …

Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an ascending auction is likely to perform …

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Package Bidding, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of licenses), and the computational complexity problem (which arises from the fact that the number of possible combinations of licenses is much larger than the number of licenses). Package bidding offers the possibility of an improvement over individual-license bidding only when there are strong complementarities and the pattern of those complementarities varies across bidders. Package bidding works satisfactorily …