Philosophy of Science Commons^™

Towards Erasing The Distinction Between The Computational And Syntactic Accounts Of Scientific Theories, Timothy Luft

Theses

One of the main goals of philosophy of science is to give a proper account of scientific theories and their structure. One way that accounts of the structure of scientific theories can be distinguished is by the mathematical or logical structures that they involve. For instance, syntactic accounts of scientific theories hold that theories are axioms in a logical framework, whereas semantic accounts are more liberal in the range of mathematical and logical structures they take as pertinent to the structure of scientific theories. Paul Thagard (1988) offers a computational account of scientific theories, which holds that theories are complex …

The Vector Of Scientific Disciplinarity: An Exploration Of Scientific Disciplines And The Future Of Interdisciplinary Research, Emma K. Garrison

Senior Theses

The disciplinarity of science and the future of interdisciplinarity in science is deeply connected with understanding the scope of scientific practice as well as the demarcation and organization of scientific disciplines. These topics, explored through the structure of their subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation, lead to the conclusion that science and its disciplines are largely defined by the integration of philosophical principles into the ethos of the practices rather than by any specific criteria. The ways in which different disciplines behave and interpret philosophies impact how those disciplines are organized and categorized, resulting in deep philosophical and perspective divides between …

Probability Of Naturalism And Metanormative Realism, Curtis Howd

Theses

Darwin’s Theory of Evolution can be mobilized to provide epistemological challenges to metanormative realism. It is argued that, since natural selection selects for behaviors adequate for survival and fecundity, our psychologies must be shaped by this same process. A-type challenges point to the improbability of the vast number of true normative beliefs given that they evolved to track survival and fecundity, not truth. B-type debunking arguments point to the improbability of the hypothesis that evolution would track truth given that there are a multitude of defeaters for this hypothesis. I will argue that both a-type and b-type arguments fail to …

Answers To Questions - Martin Wieser’S “Psychology In National Socialism [Psychologie Im Nationalsozialismus] At Sigmund Freud Private University Berlin, July 27–28, 2018”, Martin Wieser, Richard W. Bloom

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

This Scholarly Commons record provides the transcript of the interview IBPP editor Dr. Richard Bloom conducted with Dr. Martin Wieser of Sigmund Freud Private University Berlin on March 2, 2019.

With the publication of Dr. Wieser’s “Psychology in National Socialism [Psychologie im Nationalsozialismus] at Sigmund Freud Private University Berlin, July 27–28, 2018” in History of Psychology, 22(1), 107-109., the IBPP Editor requested that the author provide responses to questions…and Dr. Wieser graciously accepted.

Reason In Motion, Luke Francis

Student Works

This essay will explain the historical models of the solar system, which was the known universe for most of human history. There is far more to each model than simply positioning different celestial bodies at the center of the system, and the stories of the astronomers who derived the controversial theories are not discussed often enough. The creation of these theories is part of a much broader revolution in scientific thought and marked the start of a series of observational discoveries that would change the the philosophy of science for centuries to come.

Constraints And Explanation, Alexander Bolano

Theses

For the past 40 years, causal-mechanical approaches to explanation in science have been the received view. In this paper, I will argue that causal-mechanical approaches to explanation are not the whole story; there is a notable class of explanations that I call constraining explanation. Constraining explanation do not work by describing some causal structure; rather they work by highlighting mathematical constraints on what kinds of structure there can be. Constraining explanations are different that causal explanations because they give a kind of modal knowledge that causal-mechanical explanation alone cannot give.

Toward Explaining The Gap : How A Particular View Of Explanation Underwrites The Explanatory Gap, Kimberly Van Orman

Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)

In my dissertation, I consider a common argument for the existence of an unbridgeable explanatory gap between materialism and conscious experience which purports to show that we can determine a priori that conscious experience cannot possibly be explained by a materialist theory. The claim is: no matter what we might yet learn about the brain (or the world), we know enough right now about materialism and explanation to know that an explanation of conscious experience is beyond our reach. I argue that three well-known examples of this position (Jaegwon Kim, David Chalmers, and Joseph Levine) rely on a very narrow …

The Fine-Tuning Of Nomic Behavior In Multiverse Scenarios, Max Lewis Edward Andrews

Masters Theses

The multiverse hypothesis (the view that there is not just one world or universe in existence, bur rather that there are many) is the leading alternative to the competing fine-tuning hypothesis (the laws of physics and constants are fine-tuned for the existence of life). The multiverse dispels many aspects of the fine-tuning argument by suggesting that there are different initial conditions in each universe, varying constants of physics, and the laws of nature lose their known arbitrary values; thus, making the previous single-universe argument from fine- tuning incredibly weak. The position that will be advocated will be that a form …

Removing The Classical Landmark: Assessing An Epistemology Governed By Methodological Naturalism, Kegan Shaw

Masters Theses

This paper proposes to assess the naturalist project in epistemology with an eye towards exposing the project as deficient for serving as a robust epistemological project. Epistemologists treasure a certain family of questions and burden themselves with a number of specific concerns the most important of which, I think, cannot be answered by the epistemological naturalist. Ignoring these questions, I will argue, essentially amounts to a dismissal of the principle tension that primarily motivates and properly guides epistemological theorizing. This tension is the familiar appearance vs. reality distinction and characterizes what I am calling the classical landmark or boundary-stone for …

Nietzsches Hermeneutische, Phänomenologische Wissenschafts-Philosophie. Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen Zu Altphilologie Und Physiologie, Babette Babich

Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections

No abstract provided.

Aristotle On Pure And Simple Stuff, Tiberiu Popa

Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

A view that has been entertained traditionally by Aristotelian scholars is that the four simple bodies in the sublunary world (earth, water, air, and fire) cannot exist independently; a consequence of this view is the general belief that all homoeomers or uniform bodies have to be compounds. i would like to suggest that, while Aristotle consistently maintains that the four basic opposites (hot, cold, moist, dry) cannot exist independently, this is not always the case with the four simple bodies. My central claim is that Meteorology IV – Aristotle’s ‘chemical treatise’ – provides evidence that, contrary to the traditional interpretation …

Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan

Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.

Human Technology And Terrorism: Implications For Aviation Security, Ibpp Editor

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

This article describes common human vulnerabilities when using technology to minimize aviation security threat.

Trends. When Science Isn't Science: The Political Psychology Of Policy On Children, Ibpp Editor

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

The author discusses one of the myths of science, insistence on reliable and valid notions of Truth, and separation from social and cultural values.

Instrumental Rationality And Naturalized Philosophy Of Science, Harvey Siegel

Philosophy Articles and Papers

In two recent papers, I criticized Ronald N. Giere's and Larry Laudan's arguments for 'naturalizing' the philosophy of science (Siegel 1989, 1990). Both Giere and Laudan replied to my criticisms (Giere 1989, Laudan 1990b). The key issue arising in both interchanges is these naturalists' embrace of instrumental conceptions of rationality, and their concomitant rejection of non-instrumental conceptions of that key normative notion. In this reply I argue that their accounts of science's rationality as exclusively instrumental fail, and consequently that their cases for 'normatively naturalizing' the philosophy of science fail as well.

Space-Perception And The Philosophy Of Science, Patrick Heelan

Research Resources

No abstract provided.

Horizon, Objectivity And Reality In The Physical Sciences, Patrick A. Heelan

Research Resources

An exploration of the utility of a phenomenological style of philosophizing about nature called the analysis of horizons. The name refers to a banner of philosophical reflection practiced by many philosophers mostly of European origin who have been influenced by the Husserlian tradition, like Heidegger, de Waelhens, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, Luijpen, to mention but a few. To philosophize about science in a phenomenological vein, one must begin with a phenomenological description of the form of life of scientific research, because it is only within a form of life, that is, within a way of experiencing objects, that objects present themselves as …