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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Science

Kant On Teleology, Georgia Rae Rainer, Kenneth J. Curry Feb 2012

Kant On Teleology, Georgia Rae Rainer, Kenneth J. Curry

Kenneth J. Curry

Immanuel Kant was born (1724) into a society that largely embraced a mechanical universe in which matter theory rested on material properties of size, shape, solidity, and motion. But the development of organisms from undifferentiated matter could not be explained by the properties of matter alone. The ontogeny of organisms appeared to have a goal toward which matter was organized, and the parts of organisms seemed in so many instances to play both cause and effect of each other. Kant argued that human artefacts were explained in part by the intention of the designer and in part by the mechanics …


Science: World Under Construction, Georgia Rae Rainer Feb 2012

Science: World Under Construction, Georgia Rae Rainer

Kenneth J. Curry

Society naively accepts the position of scientific realism, which grants that science has an epistemic advantage in providing true theories about a mind-independent natural world. For realists, there is no distinction made between observable and unobservable entities in that both have the same ontological status that aid in the discovery of facts about the natural world. The opposing position, scientific anti-realism, traditionally denies the existence of a mind independent world and claims that the explanatory value of scientific theories is based not on truth or correlation to the perceived world, but rather how well the theory works within the paradigm …


Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan Feb 2011

Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan

Stuart Glennan

Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.


Just-If-Ication, Raam P. Gokhale Feb 2011

Just-If-Ication, Raam P. Gokhale

Raam P Gokhale

A Discussion of Scientific Reasoning


Resolution Of Grue Using A Support Measure, Raam P. Gokhale Nov 2010

Resolution Of Grue Using A Support Measure, Raam P. Gokhale

Raam P Gokhale

Goodman’s grue paradox is unassailable if we hold that instances confirm generalizations, for the evidence at hand is both an instance of ‘All emeralds are green’ and ‘All emeralds are grue’. But if we consider what bearing the denials of the two hypotheses have on the evidence, a very different picture emerges. This paper argues that the denial of ‘All emeralds are grue’ is more positively relevant to the evidence to date than the denial of ‘All emeralds are green’ is to the evidence and that therefore ‘All emeralds are green’ is better supported by the evidence than ‘All emeralds …


Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan Apr 2010

Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan

Stuart Glennan

Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.


Hierarchical Modeling: Biogeochemical Processes And Mechanisms That Drives Clay Nano- And Microfabric Development, Kenneth J. Curry, Richard H. Bennett, Paula J. Smithka, Matthew H. Hulbert Dec 2008

Hierarchical Modeling: Biogeochemical Processes And Mechanisms That Drives Clay Nano- And Microfabric Development, Kenneth J. Curry, Richard H. Bennett, Paula J. Smithka, Matthew H. Hulbert

Kenneth J. Curry

Conceptual scientific models of clay and clay fabric development can be constructed profitably by considering chemical and physical systems in terms of an ordered hierarchy. We develop here a hierarchical model of early stages of marine sediment development identifying processes and focusing on mechanisms. While the focus of our model is on mechanisms, the physical aspects of the hierarchy are cast in terms of the scale of structure in which the mechanisms occur. Our primary scale of interest is the nanometer (nanofabric) level of organization of sediment fabric. This level is nested below the micrometer (microfabric) level that includes aggregates …