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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Science
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.
Just-If-Ication, Raam P. Gokhale
Resolution Of Grue Using A Support Measure, Raam P. Gokhale
Resolution Of Grue Using A Support Measure, Raam P. Gokhale
Raam P Gokhale
Goodman’s grue paradox is unassailable if we hold that instances confirm generalizations, for the evidence at hand is both an instance of ‘All emeralds are green’ and ‘All emeralds are grue’. But if we consider what bearing the denials of the two hypotheses have on the evidence, a very different picture emerges. This paper argues that the denial of ‘All emeralds are grue’ is more positively relevant to the evidence to date than the denial of ‘All emeralds are green’ is to the evidence and that therefore ‘All emeralds are green’ is better supported by the evidence than ‘All emeralds …
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation, Stuart Glennan
Stuart Glennan
Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.