Philosophy of Mind Commons^™

The Signature Of The Self: Toward A Critique Of The Phenomenological Origins Of Self-Constitution, Dylan Mendez

Honors Undergraduate Theses

This thesis is primarily concerned with how the narrative self emerges, as conceptualized in literature spanning phenomenology, philosophy of identity, and psychology. The first chapter focuses on an argument given by Dan Zahavi, in which he claims that an account of narrative self-constitution necessitates an account of minimal subjectivity, which he terms the “minimal self.” I argue against this claim on the grounds that an account of minimal intersubjectivity is a far more pragmatic and compatible model in determining how the narrative self emerges and develops throughout the lifespan. The model of minimal intersubjectivity that I propose is Trevarthen’s primary …

And You Don't Seem To Understand: Disanalogies Between Artificial And Biological Consciousness, Derek Freeman

The Journal of Purdue Undergraduate Research

This paper posits a new way of attempting to formulate theories of machine consciousness. At present, inquiry revolves around formulating criteria that could be applied to machines to determine if they possess human-like consciousness. The paper demonstrates that efforts so far have not been fruitful, instead finding that present methods of inquiry are destined to result in an impasse between those who support the notion of machine consciousness and those who oppose it. Consequently, the paper questions the assumption that human and machine consciousness must resemble each other. It explores a different approach, one that rejects the idea that the …

Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau

Animal Sentience

Donald Griffin co-discovered bat sonar and founded the field of echolocation. He studied bird migration and founded Cognitive Ethology, the study of animal awareness and mental experiences. In all these endeavors, he faced hostile opposition. The biography (Ristau 2024) examines Griffin's life and the scientific explorations by him and others in these fields. This Précis emphasizes his arguments and supporting evidence for animal consciousness as well as his later research. Griffin considered the inhibiting assumptions made by scientists, including Cartesian views, the misunderstanding of innate behaviors, prejudice against lower animals, concern with violations of parsimony, and the assertions of the …

Logical Sense In The Skeptical Self-Refutation Problem: Sextus Empiricus’ Logos And Pathos, Stacy E. Cunningham

Honors Theses

The self-refutation problem is an all too familiar objection to all varieties of skeptical arguments, in fact, it is as old as skepticism itself. My analyses will first focus on the arguments and objections to ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes the goal of Pyrrhonian skepticism as “suspension of judgment as a way of achieving calm (ataraxia) in the face of seemingly intractable disagreement.” The position involves a series of arguments, or, “modes”, for evaluating claims in such a way that the evidence for and against accepting a claim are equally balanced, leaving the inquirer with no …

Kripke’S Knowledge Argument Against Materialism, Adriana Renero

Publications and Research

In his unpublished 1979 Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, Saul Kripke offers a knowledge argument against materialism, focusing on deaf people who lack knowledge of auditory experience. Kripke’s argument is a precursor of Frank Jackson’s better-known knowledge argument against materialism (1982). The paper sets out Kripke’s argument, brings out its interest and philosophical importance, and explores some similarities and differences between Kripke’s knowledge argument and Jackson’s.

The 'I' In First-Person Thought And What Is Meant By Self-Knowledge, Aaron Morris

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

There has been a great deal of disagreement over what exactly it is that is being referenced by the first-person pronoun, ‘I.’ Immanuel Kant believed the ‘I’ associated with a thinking subject is just a formal representation of the substantially existing subject. This raises the question about whether or not ‘I’ is actually a referring expression? In this paper I explore two accounts from both sides of the debate which opens up a dialectical space for determining a positive answer for this question. On the one hand, ‘I’ is said to be a referring term for the speaker or utterer …

George Berkeley's Idealism: An Examination Of The Idealist Metaphysics And Its Connection To Philosophy Of Mind, Joshua L. Powell

Honors Theses

The prominent 18th century empirical philosopher George Berkeley espoused a philosophy known as “idealism.” This thesis aims to show that George Berkeley’s idealism is a formidable player in philosophy of mind. The present research unfolds his arguments for idealism as they appear in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, turning at several points to The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous for clarification. This research further explores the fundamentals of idealism in light of philosophy of mind, highlighting idealism’s intrinsic connection to this discipline. While this work is far from exhaustive, it provides the reader with essential information …

Elucidation And The Solipsism Of The Tractatus, Jacob Phillips

Theses/Capstones/Creative Projects

In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) of 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein presents his metaphysical account of the logical structure of the world and language. He aims to establish the possibility of the connection between “pictures” of the world—including linguistic constructions as sentences—and the constituent elements of the world. The account Wittgenstein promotes yields, by his own admission, a form of solipsism. Underlying the difficulties in interpreting the details of Wittgenstein’s solipsism (which he does little to explicate), there is a fundamental tension between solipsism of any sort and a metaphysical account that relies on language, something which seems essentially shared and …

Higher-Order Thought And Borderline Cases Of Consciousness: An Objection To Hot, Francesca Karin Beach

Scripps Senior Theses

David Rosenthal, in his Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, argues that it is a higher-order thought to the effect that the subject is in a conscious state that makes one conscious of his or her own mental states. In this paper, I argue that since phenomenal consciousness can be vague and Rosenthal’s HOT cannot, HOT is not a necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness. I use primarily Ned Blocks’ refrigerator hum case and Sartre’s example of non-positional awareness to argue that the threshold which determines the degree of first-person awareness necessary for a mental state to be conscious is vague …

Beyond Enlightenment: The Evolution Of Agency And The Modularity Of The Mind In A Post-Darwinian World, Derek Elliott

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Working out of the social and philosophical revolutions from the Enlightenment, contemporary action theory has unwittingly inherited several Cartesian ideas regarding the human mind: that it is unified, rational, and transparent. As a result, we have for too long conceived of action as intimately bound up with reason such that to act at all is to act for a reason, leaving us with theoretical difficulties in accounting for the behavior of non-human animals as well as irrational behavior in human beings.

But rather than propose that such difficulties can be resolved by retreating to a pre-Enlightenment view of human nature, …

Owning Our Implicit Attitudes: Responsibility, Resentment, And The Whole Self, Wesley Whitaker

CMC Senior Theses

Are implicit biases something we can rightly be held responsible for, and if so, how? A variety of social and cognitive psychological studies have documented the existence of wide-ranging implicit biases for over 30 years. These implicit biases can best be described as negative mental attitudes that operate immediately and unconsciously in response to specific stimuli. The first chapter of this thesis surveys the psychological literature, as well as presents findings of real-world experiments into racial biases. I then present the dominant model of implicit attitudes as mere associations, followed by evidence that at least some implicit attitudes take on …

The Discursive Functioning Of Knowledge Claims In Research Studies On Children’S Conceptual Knowledge Of Number, Patrick D. Byers

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Researchers interested in the development of conceptual knowledge of number have studied children’s behavior in various tasks or other contexts in order to draw conclusions about what they know. The guiding assumption of this work is that the presence or absence of a given form of knowledge is typically reflected in the ability/inability to perform certain types of behavior. Researchers complicate this assumption when they claim that (1) the ability to perform a given behavior may also reflect simple imitation or rote learning in the absence of understanding, and/or (2) that the inability to perform a certain behavior may reflect …

Trust, Trustworthiness, And The Moral Consequence Of Consistency, Jason R. D'Cruz

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications of its adoption) as well as something about trust (in particular, that the conditions necessary for genuine trust include …

Carruthers And Constitutive Self-Knowledge, John C. Hill

Student Publications

In his recent book, The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers advances a skeptical theory of self-knowledge, integrating results from experimental psychology and cognitive science. In this essay, I want to suggest that the situation is not quite as dire as Carruthers makes it out to be. I respond to Carruthers by advancing a constitutive theory of self-knowledge. I argue that self-knowledge, so understood, is not only compatible with the empirical research that Carruthers utilizes, but also helps to make sense of these results.

Mechanistic Explanations And Animal Model Simulations In Neuroscience, Nina Atanasova

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

The ‘new mechanists’ assume that discovering neural mechanisms is a major aim of neuroscience where this constitutes a process of explaining. They strive to articulate the norms for good explanations. I argue that: the normative project of the ontic mechanistic explanation is unrealistic; the epistemological version of mechanistic explanation accounts for the practical epistemological constraints of neuroscience but fails normatively; hence a dilemma: either methodologically strong but unrealistic or epistemologically realistic but methodologically weak view of mechanistic explanation. I propose that the solution is in abandoning the idea that the study of mechanisms in neuroscience aims mainly at explaining. Model-building …

Mary’S Dilemma: A Novel Take On Jackson’S Famous Thought Experiment, Noah O. Abolafia-Rosenzweig

CMC Senior Theses

This paper explores and evaluates the famous Mary case put forward by Frank Jackson in support of what he calls the knowledge argument against physicalism. After laying out Jackson’s position, I set out to determine whether certain previous physicalist attempts at undermining it have been successful. Finding that they have not, I use their shortcomings to inform the construction of a new position, one which I argue renders the Mary case at odds with itself and frees physicalism from the knowledge argument’s grasp.

Reconsidering The Mind/Body Distinction: Towards A Continuist Ontology Of Consciousness, Michael Robillard

Undergraduate Review

In his paper, “The State and Fate of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind,” John Haldane likens the present condition of Philosophy of Mind to that of the philosophically stultifying period of late scholasticism, where naming took the place of explaining, and philosophy was reduced to taxonomy. Haldane argues that our current physicalistic lexicon has made it virtually “impossible to accommodate the basic features of mindedness revealed in reflection and direct experience.” For Philosophy of Mind to progress, Haldane argues, we must “make space” for alternative modes of knowing that exist beyond the bounds of our current, overly physicalistic terminology.