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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
Individual, Group, And Paradox: Essentials Of The Social Bond, Alex Tonus
Individual, Group, And Paradox: Essentials Of The Social Bond, Alex Tonus
Honors Capstone Projects and Theses
No abstract provided.
Interview: Brenda Laurel, Jason Challas
Interview: Brenda Laurel, Jason Challas
SWITCH
This interview with Brenda Laurel, Virtual Reality (VR) author and thinker, discusses the applications and challenges of VR. Creating an emphatic experience using VR technology is possible, but the challenge lies in designing an environment that models the senses to stimulate emotions. VR enables experiences of different genders, but physiological differences between the sexes exist and are important to understand. However, technology used to create the environment and simulation of physical objects in VR is only in the developmental stage. Laurel believes in the importance of keeping the mind grounded in the physical body, in order to strengthen the appreciation …
What Bernard Lonergan Learned From Susanne K. Langer, Richard Liddy
What Bernard Lonergan Learned From Susanne K. Langer, Richard Liddy
Department of Religion Publications
No abstract provided.
Computationalism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Stuart M. Glennan
Computationalism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Stuart M. Glennan
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS
In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition that it is “empirically absurd” that such a system could be conscious is unfounded. In the second section I show …