Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy of Mind Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert Stainton Jan 2018

Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

According to a certain ‘Straight Reading’ of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’, she holds a Radically Non-Referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogized to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her position. Her substantive view on ‘I’, rather, is that if what you mean by ‘referring term’ is a certain rich and recherché Frege-inspired notion, then ‘I’ is not one. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be bewitched by language into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax and logical role, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense. Anscombe uses this insight to …


An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert Stainton Jan 2018

An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

No abstract provided.


Psychological Continuity: A Discussion Of Marc Slors' Account, Traumatic Experience, And The Significance Of Our Relations To Others, Pieranna Garavaso Jan 2014

Psychological Continuity: A Discussion Of Marc Slors' Account, Traumatic Experience, And The Significance Of Our Relations To Others, Pieranna Garavaso

Philosophy Publications

This paper addresses a question concerning psychological continuity, i.e., which features preserve the same psychological subject over time; this is not the same question as the one concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. Marc Slors (1998, 2001, 2001a) defends an account of psychological continuity that adds two features to Derek Parfit’s Relation R, namely narrativity and embodiment. Slors’ account is a significant improvement on Parfit’s, but still lacks an explicit acknowledgment of a third feature that I call relationality. Because they are usually regarded as cases of radical discontinuity, I start my discussion from the experiences of …


Introduction To The Achilles Of Rational Psychology, Thomas Lennon, Robert Stainton Jan 2008

Introduction To The Achilles Of Rational Psychology, Thomas Lennon, Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

No abstract provided.


Concepts: Core Readings, By Eric Margolis And Stephen Laurance, Robert Stainton Apr 2000

Concepts: Core Readings, By Eric Margolis And Stephen Laurance, Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

No abstract provided.


Consciousness And The Origins Of Thought, By Norton Nelkin, Robert Stainton Dec 1997

Consciousness And The Origins Of Thought, By Norton Nelkin, Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

No abstract provided.


The Deflation Of Belief States, Robert Stainton Jan 1997

The Deflation Of Belief States, Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

A criticism of Arthur Collins' attempt to deflate beliefs states by treating them as merely correctness-making properties of persons.


Connectionism And The Philosophy Of Psychology, By T. Horgan And J. Tiensen, Robert Stainton Dec 1996

Connectionism And The Philosophy Of Psychology, By T. Horgan And J. Tiensen, Robert Stainton

Philosophy Publications

No abstract provided.