Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Keyword
-
- Philosophy of Mind (2)
- Analytic Philosophy (1)
- Animal ethology and cognition (1)
- Animal morals (1)
- Anscombe (1)
-
- Aristotle animals (1)
- Arthur Collins (1)
- Belief (1)
- Deflationary reference (1)
- Deflationism (1)
- Ethics (1)
- First person pronoun (1)
- Flourishing (1)
- G.E.M. Anscombe; first person pronoun; ‘I’; indirect reflexives; persons; radical non-referring; ‘The First Person’ (1)
- History of Philosophy (1)
- Moral Landscape (1)
- Moral Parliament (1)
- Nicomachean Ethics (1)
- Proximate and Ultimate Causation (1)
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
Envisioning Ethical Mass Influence Systems, Alex Mayhew, Yimin Chen, Sarah Cornwell, Nicole Delellis, Dominique Kelly, Liu Yifan, Victoria Rubin
Envisioning Ethical Mass Influence Systems, Alex Mayhew, Yimin Chen, Sarah Cornwell, Nicole Delellis, Dominique Kelly, Liu Yifan, Victoria Rubin
Data and Test Instruments
This work envisions the possibility of ethical Mass Influence Systems (MISs). Modern algorithmic MISs, like Facebook and YouTube, have seen a link between the systems design for profit maximization and the increased radicalization of users (Wu, 2017). Using a Goals analysis grounded in philosophy (Falcon, 2022; Lipton, 1990; Bostrom, 2014), we will contrast the goals of existing algorithmic MISs with the goals of a future ethical algorithmic MIS. With the philosophical guidance of the Moral Parliament (Newberry and Ord, 2021) and the Moral Landscape (Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2013), we elaborate on a set of goals and mechanisms for promoting human …
Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert Stainton
Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
According to a certain ‘Straight Reading’ of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’, she holds a Radically Non-Referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogized to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her position. Her substantive view on ‘I’, rather, is that if what you mean by ‘referring term’ is a certain rich and recherché Frege-inspired notion, then ‘I’ is not one. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be bewitched by language into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax and logical role, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense. Anscombe uses this insight to …
An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert Stainton
An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.
Aristotle On The Moral Status Of Animals, Devin Henry
Aristotle On The Moral Status Of Animals, Devin Henry
Data and Test Instruments
No abstract provided.
Introduction To The Achilles Of Rational Psychology, Thomas Lennon, Robert Stainton
Introduction To The Achilles Of Rational Psychology, Thomas Lennon, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.
Concepts: Core Readings, By Eric Margolis And Stephen Laurance, Robert Stainton
Concepts: Core Readings, By Eric Margolis And Stephen Laurance, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.
Consciousness And The Origins Of Thought, By Norton Nelkin, Robert Stainton
Consciousness And The Origins Of Thought, By Norton Nelkin, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.
The Deflation Of Belief States, Robert Stainton
The Deflation Of Belief States, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
A criticism of Arthur Collins' attempt to deflate beliefs states by treating them as merely correctness-making properties of persons.
Connectionism And The Philosophy Of Psychology, By T. Horgan And J. Tiensen, Robert Stainton
Connectionism And The Philosophy Of Psychology, By T. Horgan And J. Tiensen, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.