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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

An Interview With John Heron: Exploring The Interface Between Cooperative Inquiry And Transpersonal Studies, John Heron, Olga R. Sohmer Jan 2019

An Interview With John Heron: Exploring The Interface Between Cooperative Inquiry And Transpersonal Studies, John Heron, Olga R. Sohmer

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

In this interview, John Heron—the founder of cooperative inquiry (CI; Heron, 1996, 1998)—discusses this experiential, participatory approach to research and learning with participatory research special issue guest editor Olga Sohmer. After presenting a summary of cooperative inquiry, Heron and Sohmer discuss CI in the context of transpersonal studies, including past and prospective future applications. Questioning the emphasis on “trans” in transpersonal, Heron unfolds the three dimensions of human spirituality that CI engages and offers a vision for transpersonal studies in light of CI ideals. Additional themes that are explored include cultivating authentic relationships in CI, the role of the nonhuman …


Assessing The Effectiveness Of Core-Shamanism On A Group Of Westerners: A Brief Research Report, Joanic Masson, Yannick Gounden, Charlemagne Simplice Moukouta, Amal Bernoussi, Antoine Saurat Jan 2019

Assessing The Effectiveness Of Core-Shamanism On A Group Of Westerners: A Brief Research Report, Joanic Masson, Yannick Gounden, Charlemagne Simplice Moukouta, Amal Bernoussi, Antoine Saurat

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

A study was conducted on Western adults who participated in a group undergoing initiation into therapeutic shamanism. It investigated how shamanic work could be a factor triggering changes in persons who never had been previously immersed in such a tradition. Five groups, each composed of six people for a total of 30 participants, met eight times over a period of four months. Analyzing questions asked of the 27 who completed the program resulted in the following identified themes: experiences of the group, trust in the shamanic practitioner, raised awareness of their feeling states, experiences of the shamanic journeys, understanding of …


The Meso-American Goddess Coatlicue: Too Terrifying For The Spaniards, Stanley Krippner Jan 2019

The Meso-American Goddess Coatlicue: Too Terrifying For The Spaniards, Stanley Krippner

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

The Coatlicue myth of Meso-America is currently represented by the huge basalt statue of the Earth goddess on display at the National Museum of Anthropology and History in Mexico City. The Spanish invaders who unearthed the statue promptly reburied the goddess, who did not again see the light of day until 1803. Today she commands attention both as a singular work of art and as a reminder that Earth is, at the same time, a loving mother and an insatiable monster, one who ultimately devours those to whom she has given birth. From a postmodern stance, myths are


Participatory Research Methods In Transpersonal Studies: Introduction To The Special Topic Section, Olga R. Sohmer Jan 2019

Participatory Research Methods In Transpersonal Studies: Introduction To The Special Topic Section, Olga R. Sohmer

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

N/A


Sheeple? The Need For More Research On Sheep Cognition, Michael Colombo, Damian Scarf Jan 2019

Sheeple? The Need For More Research On Sheep Cognition, Michael Colombo, Damian Scarf

Animal Sentience

Marino & Merskin (2019) provide a comprehensive review of the cognitive abilities of sheep. If research with other animals is any guide, there may be justification for the view that the abilities of sheep have been underestimated, and their review will likely stimulate more research into sheep cognition.


Why Are Sheep Sheepish? How Perception Affects Animal Stereotyping, Robert G. Franklin Jr. Jan 2019

Why Are Sheep Sheepish? How Perception Affects Animal Stereotyping, Robert G. Franklin Jr.

Animal Sentience

Marino & Merskin present compelling evidence that many stereotypes of sheep are incorrect. One factor that may play an important role in animal stereotyping is the physical appearance of animals, which can directly lead to stereotyping through automatic mental processes. Sheep have a round and babyish appearance that directly evokes judgments of warmth and docility. Depictions of sheep in art, and especially cartoons, reinforce this stereotype.


Sheep In Aesop’S And Phaedrus’S Fables, Matteo Colombo, Chiara Raucea Jan 2019

Sheep In Aesop’S And Phaedrus’S Fables, Matteo Colombo, Chiara Raucea

Animal Sentience

Sheep feature in various animal fables. Marino & Merskin suggest that “we” view sheep as “docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid,” but animal fables do not support this view. In Aesop’s and Phaedrus’s fables, sheep are a primary target of injustice; but they are not passive targets. Sheep endure injustice actively and honestly. They are intelligent, aware and outspoken about their own condition.


Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt Jan 2019

Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt

Animal Sentience

In the past few years, Marino and her colleagues have written a series of comprehensive and helpful review articles on the cognitive, emotional, and social complexity of pigs, chickens, cows, and most recently, sheep. These articles are similarly structured, even formulaic, which has benefits but also limitations. Here, I point out the limitations in order to suggest new directions and contributions for the authors in the future.


The Problem Is Not Discourses Of Production; It Is Production Itself, Sean Hermanson Jan 2019

The Problem Is Not Discourses Of Production; It Is Production Itself, Sean Hermanson

Animal Sentience

The mistreatment of sheep is not because of fables, stereotypes, unconscious cultural paradigms, our collective consciousness, anthropocentricism, human arrogance, or our drive to dominate. Nonetheless, protections for sheep used in research and agriculture ought to be strengthened.


Debunking Human Prejudice And Blindness, Peter J. Li Jan 2019

Debunking Human Prejudice And Blindness, Peter J. Li

Animal Sentience

Human prejudice and blindness to animal suffering are shocking. Despite their differences in culture, politics, and religious beliefs, humans have one thing in common. They see nonhuman animals as inferior and have since time immemorial assumed a dominant position in an asymmetrical human-animal relationship. When it comes to human-animal relations, there is no “clash of civilizations.” Human prejudice and blindness are predicated on “common sense assumptions” about the natural world and nonhuman animals in particular. Marino & Merskin’s review is part of the growing effort to debunk the assumptions that have shaped human actions so as to end the injustice …


Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate Jan 2019

Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate

Animal Sentience

Marino & Merskin’s review shows that sheep are intelligent and highly social but their methodology has some shortcomings. I describe five problems with reviewing only the academic and scientific literature and suggest how one might provide an even more compelling case for the complexity of sheep minds.


Cognitive Dissonance About Sheep Cognition And Consumption, Catia Correia Caeiro Jan 2019

Cognitive Dissonance About Sheep Cognition And Consumption, Catia Correia Caeiro

Animal Sentience

Sheep are perceived as mere resources under the massive demand of the food and wool industry. Evidence that sheep cognition is comparable to that of other species may inspire reflection on sheep consumption. Dogs may be a promising comparison species.


What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather Jan 2019

What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather

Animal Sentience

It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind, though perhaps a mind that is different from those of “higher” vertebrates. It stimulates us to look at the welfare of these animals and challenges us to find better ways to test mindfulness and cognition across animals with widely differing natural histories and sensory and motor capacities.


Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso Jan 2019

Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso

Animal Sentience

Marino and Merskin (2019) list a number of tasks that sheep can perform well. As comparative psychologists, we are not surprised by these results. Indeed, many domesticated animal species show similar abilities.


Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett Jan 2019

Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett

Animal Sentience

Is the mirror a reliable indicator of self-awareness for any species, whether sheep or human? Taking a cue from feminist, phenomenological, and cross-cultural philosophy, a relational self rather than a reflective one might better capture what is at stake for the lives of social animals and for science.


Volition And The Readiness Potential, Paul David Sanford Jan 2019

Volition And The Readiness Potential, Paul David Sanford

Online Theses and Dissertations

In the “Libet study” the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that non-conscious brain processes predetermine voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). While the study’s basic results have been replicated, its validity and assumptions have been questioned. Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence against the study’s assumption that movement and intention to move are distinct events. In this study, in which researchers did not train participants to distinguish between movement and intention, reports for intention and movement were identical. This differed from the Libet study, in which intention …


Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry Jan 2019

Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry

Animal Sentience

The first question to ask is whether octopuses are sentient, so that, if so, they can be protected. Three consensual criteria to evaluate animal sentience can be applied to the octopus. Octopuses meet all three of them.


Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander Jan 2019

Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander

Animal Sentience

Treves et al.’s target article can play an important role in reconciling the needs of future generations and non-human animals in conservation. Human capacities are adequate for interpreting and defining many non-human animal needs. Worldviews are more complex, however, and conservation science, like the target article itself, suffers from a lack of diversity and inclusiveness. This may pose practical impediments to realizing just preservation.


The Mental Lives Of Sheep And The Quest For A Psychological Taxonomy, Carrie Figdor Jan 2019

The Mental Lives Of Sheep And The Quest For A Psychological Taxonomy, Carrie Figdor

Animal Sentience

Research into nonhuman cognition has broadened and deepened in recent years. It supports and motivates a shift toward an ecological rather than an anthropocentric approach to cognition.


“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino Jan 2019

“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.


Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch Jan 2019

Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that judgments of human superiority underlie our cruelty to animals. It might be useful to examine how such judgments operate within the human community. Children arguably have a potential for developing “superior” capacities but are outperformed on many tasks by animals. There is a continuum of development in children’s capacities. Perhaps there are interspecies evolutionary continua too. This highlights the complexity of reasoning about humans, animals, and moral inclusion.


Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff Jan 2019

Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the world not caused by any other species. The ability to conceive of and articulate a claim of rights is an example. However, possession of superior cognitive ability does not entitle humans to superior moral status. It is sentience, not cognitive complexity, that is the basis for the assignment of rights and the protections under the law that accompany them.


Humans: Uniquely Responsible For Causing Conservation Problems, Uniquely Capable Of Solving Them, Michael L. Wilson, Clarence L. Lehman Jan 2019

Humans: Uniquely Responsible For Causing Conservation Problems, Uniquely Capable Of Solving Them, Michael L. Wilson, Clarence L. Lehman

Animal Sentience

We share Chapman & Huffman’s views on the importance of promoting animal welfare and conservation. We disagree with their implication, however, that reverence for life and concern for the wellbeing of global ecosystems depend on a belief that other living things are similar to humans in any of their capacities. Humans exhibit special traits — language, cumulative culture, extraordinary capacity for cooperation when we are at our best, and ever-advancing technological developments — that enabled them to dominate the planet, resulting in the current conservation crisis. It is precisely the fact that humans have become unique that provides hope for …


More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers Jan 2019

More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman have highlighted observations of animals performing, in nature, complex behaviour once thought to be unique to humans. Just as relevant to their argument are examples of cognition shown by domesticated species tested in controlled conditions. These strengthen the case for human/nonhuman similarities in behaviour and cognition. Recent research has brought to our attention the ability of nonhuman species to perform many tasks previously considered to be the hallmark of humans. Even though different species may use different ways of solving these tasks, the very fact that they can do it undermines the notion of human superiority.


Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2019

Unique In Degree Not Kindness, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Humans are certainly unique among living species. This is evident in the transformation of human environments and its resulting impact on other animals. However, many of the traits unique to humans are costly as well as adaptive and should certainly not be used to elevate their status above that of other species.


Non-Human Animals Providing Rescue In Medical Emergencies, Rainer Spiegel Jan 2019

Non-Human Animals Providing Rescue In Medical Emergencies, Rainer Spiegel

Animal Sentience

In their target article, Chapman & Huffman challenge the quotation of Sir William Osler that the desire to take medication distinguishes humans from non-human animals. They provide examples of self-medication in non-human animals. Based on these examples, it can be inferred that non-human animals practice at least some form of medicine for symptom control. I would like to extend this view by showing that non-human animals not only provide self-medication, but also rescue others facing emergencies.


Mirror Neurons And Humanity’S Dark Side, Gisela Kaplan Jan 2019

Mirror Neurons And Humanity’S Dark Side, Gisela Kaplan

Animal Sentience

The last two decades have revealed brain mechanisms in birds and primates showing that, contrary to earlier prejudices, some birds can do things (cognitive and affective) on par with or even better than great apes and humans. The old dichotomies are breaking down; but the dark side is that these insights come at a time in the Anthropocene when humans have caused and continue to cause mass extinctions.


Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant, Eze Paez Jan 2019

Humans May Be Unique And Superior — And That Is Irrelevant, Eze Paez

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals, cruelty to animals is not justified. Though I agree with their conclusion, I do not think their argument works. Many human beings do have some capacities that animals do not have and are greater in some respects, in the sense of having superior abilities. It is a better argument to deny that any of that is morally relevant. Sentience suffices for moral consideration, and for deriving a moral duty not to harm other animals and to assist them when they are in need.


Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew Jan 2019

Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew

Animal Sentience

Arguments about human uniqueness apply not only to extant species but also to extinct ones, that is, the hominin predecessors of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Thus, unique and superior are doubly relative terms, in past and present. The scope for empirical comparison faces a spectrum of difficulty, from material (e.g., artefacts) to non-material (e.g., concepts) phenomena.


Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude Jan 2019

Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for …