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Articles 241 - 270 of 377
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood
Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch suggests that we should take one well-conducted study that produces results consistent with the idea of pain as being sufficient to invoke the animal sentience precautionary principle. Here, I consider how to balance negative and positive results from such studies using examples from my own work. I also consider which criteria of pain might provide strong inference about pain and which may prove to be weaker.
Fishes Are Gaining Academic Respect, Jonathan Balcombe
Fishes Are Gaining Academic Respect, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
I respond to five commentaries on my 2016 book What a Fish Knows. The commentaries express more harmony than dissent about my interpretation of fishes as cognitive, aware individuals deserving better treatment by humankind.
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) is right to emphasize that we should study consciousness (sentience) in its simplest form, taking its evolution into account. However, not enough evidence is presented to support CBC’s unorthodox claim that even simple, one-celled organisms are conscious. As pointed out by other commentators, the CBC seems to be based on outdated ideas about evolution and does not acknowledge that consciousness could be an evolutionary novel feature. Such emergent features are abundant in living organisms. We review our own emergentist solution, in which consciousness evolved in the elaborating nervous systems of the …
Choice-Induced Preference: A Challenge For Contrast, Benjamin R. Eisenreich, Benjamin Y. Hayden
Choice-Induced Preference: A Challenge For Contrast, Benjamin R. Eisenreich, Benjamin Y. Hayden
Animal Sentience
In his target article, Zentall asks: “to experience cognitive dissonance is it necessary for one to have conflicting beliefs or even beliefs at all?” He then argues that a simple behavioral process, the Within Trial Contrast Effect, may be sufficient to explain observed cognitive dissonance effects in nonhuman animals and possibly humans as well. We agree with Zentall that this effect is sufficient to explain many reported cognitive dissonance effects in nonhuman animals, but question its sufficiency for primate behavior (both monkeys and humans).
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principal is often invoked when talking about the evidence of sentience in animals, largely because we can never be certain what any animal is thinking or feeling. Birch (2017) offers a preliminary framework for the use of the precautionary principal for animal sentience combining an epistemic rule with a decision rule. I extend this framework by adding an evolutionary phylogentic approach which spreads the burden of proof across broad taxonomic groups and a risk assessment component which magnifies the likely impact by the number of animals involved.
Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Animal Sentience
I explore how the findings reviewed by Kujala (2017) influence our understanding of the human-dog bond. The special social cognitive abilities of dogs may be unique among animal species, probably influenced by the circumstances surrounding canine domestication. The bond has influenced animal welfare policies, giving dogs a privileged place among animals. To determine what protections other species should have in a rational animal welfare policy, more research is needed on whether other species have similar social cognitive abilities.
Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris
Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris
Animal Sentience
Psychologists who study humans struggle to agree on a definition of emotion, falling primarily into two camps. Though recent neuroscience advances are beginning to settle this ancient debate, it cannot solve the private-language problem at the heart of inferences about social cognition. This suggests that when we consider the emotional experiences of other species like canines, biological and physiological homologs do not provide enough evidence of emotional experiences similar to those of humans. Secondary complex emotional experiences are even more difficult to attribute to non-humans since such experiences rely, by definition, on social cognition. Given the contextual differences between human-human …
Empathy In Dogs: With A Little Help From A Friend – A Mixed Blessing, Sabrina Karl, Ludwig Huber
Empathy In Dogs: With A Little Help From A Friend – A Mixed Blessing, Sabrina Karl, Ludwig Huber
Animal Sentience
Kujala (2017) presents an extensive overview of existing research on canine emotions in comparison to those of other non-human animals and humans. This commentary provides some additional research results on the intensively debated field of empathy in dogs. We focus on recent advances in the understanding of a fundamental building block of empathy — emotional contagion — and on dogs’ remarkable sensitivity for human emotions, including the skills of assistance dogs.
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Animal Sentience
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mammals and fish to understand where sentience and social cognition might reside in teleosts. He compares neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioural correlates. I discuss current advances in the study of fish cognitive abilities and emotions, and advocate an evolutionary approach to the underlying basis of sentience in teleosts.
Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos
Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is worth pursuing. The case is philosophically uncontroversial under functionalism and reductive materialism. It is also highly heuristic, as it raises interesting issues for further investigation, such as the neural causation of behavior, the role of Mauthner cells in conditioned avoidance, and whether operant conditioning is constitutive of fish sentience.
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Animal Sentience
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
Animal Sentience
Animal vigilance is concerned with the monitoring of potential threats caused by predators and conspecifics. Researchers have argued that threats are part of a landscape of fear tracking the level of risk posed by predators and conspecifics. Vigilance, which is expected to vary with the level of risk, could thus be used as a measure of fear. Here, I explore the relationship between vigilance and fear caused by predators and conspecifics. The joint occurrence of vigilance and other physiological responses to fear, such as increased heart rate and stress hormone release, would bolster the idea that vigilance can be a …
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
Beauchamp’s target article raises important questions about the features that often accompany fear. How reliable an indicator of fear is vigilance? Is it constitutive, cause, or consequence of fear? These questions force us towards a clearer definition of “fear.”
Individual Variation In Fear Behaviour, Rob Found
Individual Variation In Fear Behaviour, Rob Found
Animal Sentience
Individual variation in behaviour adds another layer of complexity to studies of animal responses to fear and risk, but when individual responses are consistent, and correlated with other behaviours, these patterns can provide a structure that furthers our understanding. I interpret Beauchamp’s review of vigilance and fear from the perspective of my own studies of elk personality. Wild elk responses to changing stimuli (benign or aversive) illustrate how personality is a key factor in explaining variation in vigilance and fear behavior. Personality even influences how wildlife can learn to assess risk and adjust their fear responses accordingly.
Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers
Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
Measures of vigilance and fear might be more consistently associated if side biases are taken into account, because the right side of the brain is specialised to detect predators and to express fear responses. In species with eyes positioned laterally and with relatively small binocular fields, this brain asymmetry is manifested as eye preferences because each eye sends most of its input to be processed in the opposite side of the brain. Hence, responses elicited by stimuli on the animal’s left side are more likely be associated with fear than are responses to the same stimuli on the animal’s right …
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Assuming an animal to be sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an extreme position, hence it should not and could not be the default assumption. Birch explains how the precautionary principle may be used to substantiate decisions to give the animal the benefit of doubt. Although I am reluctant to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument for the use of the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more research is needed to refine and understand this relationship.
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Animal Sentience
Birch’s formulation is persuasive but not nuanced enough to capture at least one situation where it is reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle (PP): when we have multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically significant evidence of a single credible indicator of sentience within the order as required by BAR. I respond to the worry that if we include such cases in our framework for applying the PP, we open ourselves to the charge of being “unscientific.”
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principle regarding animal sentience is often used in decision-making about human actions that may cause harm to nonhuman animals. Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle requiring two pragmatic rules for its implementation. I support Birch's proposal but offer a cautionary note about relying on precautionary principles if one's ultimate goal is to emancipate animals from human domination.
Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater
Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Birch uses existing practice to develop a formal Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP), which he hopes will become more widely adopted and improve animal welfare outcomes. Birch considers the assumption that all animals are sentient to be extreme. Despite its merits, Birch’s ASPP remains human-centred.
Reef Society And The Tyranny Of Data, Robert Wintner
Reef Society And The Tyranny Of Data, Robert Wintner
Animal Sentience
Modern science now approaches divergent processes in many areas, including health assessments of marine eco-systems and social aspects of marine species. Scientific data have long enjoyed a reputation for objectivity but incidents of science-for-hire, data spinning/skewing and political jading are more frequent than ever. In the field of reef creature sensitivity, technical treatises can “logically” explain away what a person of average education can clearly observe on any given reef. Western medicine discounted anecdotal evidence of any cure outside the 4% margin of error until those cures demanded attention and in some cases application. Modern science must now enter an …
Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude
Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Reber believes he has simplified Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness by arguing that subjectivity is an inherent feature of biological forms. His argument rests on the related notions of continuity of mind and gradual accretion of capacities across evolutionary time. These notions need to be defended, not just asserted. Because Reber minimizes the differences in mental faculties among species across evolutionary time, it becomes easier to assert, and perhaps believe, that sentience is already present in early biological forms. The more explicit we are about the differences among these mental faculties and the differences across species, the less persuasive is …
Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward
Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals have a property he calls “pre-reflective awareness,” (ii) the capacity for pre-reflective awareness is sufficient to satisfy the traditional Lockean definition of personhood, and (iii) satisfaction of the traditional Lockean definition of personhood is sufficient for being a person. I agree with (i) and can see that there is a persuasive case for (ii), but I think the case against (iii) blocks the conclusion that animals are persons. I suggest that we may need instead to coin a neologism in order to …
Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina
Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina
Animal Sentience
Reber’s target article “Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind” seems only to shift but not to address the question of where the mind is and how minds occur.
Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form …
Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng
Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Reber’s axiom: “Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” does not seem to be supported by things we know and the logic of evolutionary biology. The latter leads to the conclusion that conscious species are flexible in their behavior (rather than in their cell walls), as argued in Ng (1995, 2016). Locomotion may be completely hard-wired and need not involve consciousness. It is hard enough to explain how consciousness could emerge in a sophisticated brain: Isn’t it a harder problem to show …
The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes
The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes
Animal Sentience
Theoretical frameworks in which consciousness is an inherent property of the neuron must account for the contrast between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain and address how neural events can ever be unconscious if consciousness is a property of all neurons. Other approaches have sought answers regarding consciousness by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes and through investigating the complex interactions between the two kinds of processes, as occurs most notably in human voluntary action. In voluntary action, consciousness is associated most, not with motor control or low-level perceptual processing, but with the stage of processing known as action selection.
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
With the exception of the commentary by Key, the commentaries on Reber have a common feature: the commenters feel, with varying levels of enthusiasm, that there is at least some virtue in the core assumption of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) theory that consciousness (or subjectivity or sentience) accompanies the earliest forms of life. The model has two important entailments: (a) it resolves the (in)famous Hard Problem by redirecting the search for the biochemical foundations of sentience away from human consciousness; and (b) it reduces the need for an emergentist miracle to a far simpler scale than is currently …