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Articles 1 - 30 of 398
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
Multiple Insights Into Affective Sentience, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Multiple Insights Into Affective Sentience, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
We discuss some of the many valuable insights into affective sentience from Birch’s The Edge of Sentience, such as its eight criteria for determining which entities have sentience (e.g., emotions) and its insights into the difficulty of testing whether an Artificial Intelligence system has attained sentience. We add our own perspectives on why the eight criteria are valid, on the difficulty of using behavioral trade-offs to determine whether an animal has sentience, and why evolutionary theory says consciousness is not an epiphenomenon.
Ai Is Not The Kind Of Thing That Can Ever Be Sentient, Lori Marino
Ai Is Not The Kind Of Thing That Can Ever Be Sentient, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Sentience evolved to allow organisms to move through their environment avoiding harms and achieving benefits. Sentience did not evolve from computation. It evolved from valenced feelings. AI (even robots) are not embodied and are not the kind of thing that needs to be sentient. There is no way to get from computations to feelings. They are qualitatively different things. We should avoid being lulled into thinking that an inanimate object designed to engage our propensity for anthropomorphism, like AI, is actually a mind.
Look Out For Our Kind, Christof Koch
Look Out For Our Kind, Christof Koch
Animal Sentience
Strongly supportive overall of Birch’s broad tent Sentience Project, I offer an alternative dyadic, single-class, two-stage process based on estimating the probability for sentience, and the associated confidence, for any individual or taxonomic group. I criticize Birch’s narrow computational framework when addressing the question of algorithmic sentience; there are alternative approaches.
On The Edge Of Science?, Mark Briffa, Lynne U. Sneddon
On The Edge Of Science?, Mark Briffa, Lynne U. Sneddon
Animal Sentience
In The Edge of Sentience, Jonathan Birch (2024) provides a thought-provoking synthesis of current perspectives on animal (and artificial) sentience. He addresses the question from conceptual, ethical, regulatory and empirical viewpoints. Here we focus on some of the scientific issues raised, including defining and operationalising the concept of sentience and the implications for policy and regulation. Despite unresolved conceptual challenges, the book makes a compelling case for the continued scientific investigation of animal sentience.
From The Edge To The Grounds Of “Sentientism”, David Degrazia
From The Edge To The Grounds Of “Sentientism”, David Degrazia
Animal Sentience
Birch’s book is a remarkable exploration of the nature of sentience, its moral salience, evidence for its presence, and how to arrive at humane policies regarding our treatment of human beings, animals, brain organoids, and AI systems of uncertain sentience. Although Birch endorses the view that sentience is of fundamental moral importance, he endeavors to remain neutral among reasonable moral views and work out how to navigate through uncertainty—both ethical and epistemological—to arrive at defensible policies. While making common cause with Birch’s project, my own recent book advances a developed case in favor of the “sentientism” Birch endorses.
The Consciousness Inherent In Chasing Your Tail, Sergio M. Pellis Dr.
The Consciousness Inherent In Chasing Your Tail, Sergio M. Pellis Dr.
Animal Sentience
Who is conscious and how do we know? Complexity in behavior and cognition is certainly a clue that cannot be ignored in identifying this trait, and as Mather’s target article shows, it is hard not to imagine consciousness arising in cephalopods. But how complex is complex? An alternative may be gleaned from the fact that all living things rely on negative feedback to navigate their worlds, and this requires all sentient beings knowing what is to be stabilized in reflection to themselves. If so, consciousness is a universal trait.
Cephalopod Consciousness: Asking The Right Questions, Gordon Burghardt
Cephalopod Consciousness: Asking The Right Questions, Gordon Burghardt
Animal Sentience
Jennifer Mather has provided a comprehensive and fascinating overview of the various cognitive accomplishments of cephalopods and their sensory, behavioral, and neurophysiological attributes. The advances in our understanding of a clade that has been separated from vertebrate evolution by well over half a billion years is a testament to advances in both methodology and the questions we now feel free to address. Mather embeds her review in the issue of consciousness, which is certainly a perennial issue in mental evolution, going back to Romanes and earlier. I argue that the term “consciousness” has such a checkered history and is used …
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
We often face grave practical decisions that seem to hinge on whether a system is sentient. This family of cases includes invertebrate animals, people who are unresponsive after brain injury, fetuses, neural organoids, and now AI technologies. We must decide what to do despite ongoing disagreement about the nature of sentience. In our state of uncertainty, we should pragmatically transform the question from “Is it sentient?” to “Is it a sentience candidate, an investigation priority, or neither?”. When a system is a sentience candidate, it is negligent to fail to consider precautions. We should instead evaluate precautions for their proportionality …
Griffin's Slow Burn Revolution In Philosophy And Comparative Cognition, Kristin Andrews
Griffin's Slow Burn Revolution In Philosophy And Comparative Cognition, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
Ristau presents Griffin as launching a scientific revolution supported by philosophical insights. This commentary focuses on two points: Griffin as a scientific revolutionary, although the cognitive ethology revolution is not yet complete; and on the immense influence Griffin had, and continues to have, on philosophy.
What Is It Like To Be A Diplomat? Reflections On Donald Griffin And Emotion, Oliver H. Turnbull
What Is It Like To Be A Diplomat? Reflections On Donald Griffin And Emotion, Oliver H. Turnbull
Animal Sentience
This commentary addresses three aspects of Donald Griffin’s work: (1) his thoughts beyond cognition, on emotion; (2) his views on the earliest origins of mind, including primitive forms of consciousness; and (3) his diplomatic use of memorable phrases to facilitate change.
Can Animal Consciousness Be Resolved Scientifically?, Yoram Gutfreund
Can Animal Consciousness Be Resolved Scientifically?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau's biography of Donald Griffin is a comprehensive work that sheds light on a seminal chapter in the history of ethology—the ambitious attempt to establish a research field dedicated to animal consciousness. Although Donald Griffin's endeavor ultimately fell short of its revolutionary goals, it catalyzed significant progress in understanding evolution and mechanisms of animal cognition.
Beyond Human Perception: The Remarkable Science Of Donald R. Griffin, Gareth Jones
Beyond Human Perception: The Remarkable Science Of Donald R. Griffin, Gareth Jones
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau shows how Donald Griffin’s revolutionary science sometimes progressed from ridicule, to opposition, to being self-evident. Griffin’s work involved phenomena beyond human perception, making it sometimes difficult for others to fathom. His work on ultrasonic echolocation, navigation and animal cognition has shifted established paradigms. His ‘zoomorphic’ approach provides a realistic framework for understanding how other animals perceive the world.
Donald Griffin: A Visionary In Science And Consciousness, Brock Fenton
Donald Griffin: A Visionary In Science And Consciousness, Brock Fenton
Animal Sentience
I share some reflections on a sabbatical with Donald Griffin a half-century ago, with fieldwork on bats and echolocating swiftlets in Australia and our discussions of animal behavior and consciousness. Griffin's influence has been vast, from recent advances in bat research, including learning, navigation, and longevity, to his enduring legacy as a pioneer in animal cognition.
To Be Conscious Or Not To Be, Bjørn Grinde
To Be Conscious Or Not To Be, Bjørn Grinde
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau has done a fine job summarizing the work and life of the zoologist Donald Griffin. Most scientists now accept the existence of animal sentience, but identifying which species possess consciousness remains controversial. Griffin defined consciousness as "the subjective state of feeling or thinking about objects and events.” Nonconscious processes are faster and more energy-efficient, however, and often drive behavior. Consciousness probably evolved for complex decision-making, shaped by evolutionary continuity, with feelings as a common currency for evaluating outcomes. Its survival advantage may be limited, and its presence across species varies depending on evolutionary trajectories.
Communication In Noise Is The Window On Cognition, R. Haven Wiley
Communication In Noise Is The Window On Cognition, R. Haven Wiley
Animal Sentience
As Griffin surmised, communication is the window on cognition, but as shown here, only if it is noisy. This commentary is an invitation to consider the full implications of the evolution of noisy communication. A combination of Information Theory, Signal Detection Theory, and Natural Selection, in a unified theory of the evolution of communication, reveals that noise is inevitable. All organisms are thus decision makers. Perception, thought, freedom of decision, self-awareness, metabolism, and natural selection all share the consequences of signals in noise. A full understanding of each requires attention to the errors of receivers. Griffin’s hunch is correct with …
Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau
Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin co-discovered bat sonar and founded the field of echolocation. He studied bird migration and founded Cognitive Ethology, the study of animal awareness and mental experiences. In all these endeavors, he faced hostile opposition. The biography (Ristau 2024) examines Griffin's life and the scientific explorations by him and others in these fields. This Précis emphasizes his arguments and supporting evidence for animal consciousness as well as his later research. Griffin considered the inhibiting assumptions made by scientists, including Cartesian views, the misunderstanding of innate behaviors, prejudice against lower animals, concern with violations of parsimony, and the assertions of the …
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Animal Sentience
Research on the behaviour of animals in zoos has been conducted for decades, and observations have provided information that has improved the psychological and social well-being of animals. However, research on fishes in zoos and aquariums seems to be lacking. Here, we assess the current state of research on fishes in zoos and aquariums by surveying the peer-reviewed literature. Our assessment differs from previous surveys in that we examine the taxonomic classes Chondrichthyes (sharks and rays) and Osteichthyes (bony fishes) separately. Our survey finds that bony fishes have been drastically underrepresented in zoo journals, more drastically than chondrichthyans, revealing an …
Animal Personality And Sentience As Distinct Concepts, Mark Briffa
Animal Personality And Sentience As Distinct Concepts, Mark Briffa
Animal Sentience
Owens et al (2024) discuss how knowledge of both animal personality and sentience in target populations can be leveraged to enhance wildlife conservation programmes. In this commentary I expand on the distinction between these two concepts. Behavioural differences should be considered broadly across conservation programmes, not just those involving species deemed sentient.
Disentangling Sentience From Developmental Plasticity, Jonathan Birch
Disentangling Sentience From Developmental Plasticity, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
Plants, like animals, display remarkable developmental plasticity, inviting the metaphorical use of terms like “decision” and “choice”. In the animal case, this is not taken to be evidence of sentience, because sentience is a complex product of development, not something that guides it. We should apply the same standards when evaluating the evidence in plants. It is hard to overstate the contrast with the case of invertebrates such as octopuses, where pain markers that were originally developed for use in mammals have been clearly demonstrated and plausible neural substrates for sentience have been identified.
Plant Sentience: "Feeling" Or Biological Automatism?, Andrea Mastinu
Plant Sentience: "Feeling" Or Biological Automatism?, Andrea Mastinu
Animal Sentience
Sentience refers to the ability of an organism to have subjective experiences such as sensations, emotions and awareness. Whereas some animals, including humans, are widely recognized as sentient, the question of whether plants are sentient is still debated among scientists, philosophers, and ethicists. Over the past 20 years, many scientists such as Trewavas, Baluška, Mancuso, Gagliano, and Calvo have reported interesting discussions about memory, behavior, communication, and intelligence in plants. However, the reported conclusions have not convinced the entire scientific community. In this commentary, I would like to focus on two critical aspects related to sentience: cognition and emotion
What Can Plant Science Learn From Animal Nervous Systems?, Luiz Pessoa
What Can Plant Science Learn From Animal Nervous Systems?, Luiz Pessoa
Animal Sentience
I welcome Segundo-Ortin & Calvo’s (2023) call for a rigorous science of plant behavior and physiology. My commentary addresses three points drawn from the literature on animal brains that could help elucidate the possibility of cognition and sentience in plants: (1) the presumed requirement of a centralized brain; (2) centralization of control versus heterarchical organization; and (3) connecting plant research with research on animal nervous systems.
Insentient “Cognition”?, Stevan Harnad
Insentient “Cognition”?, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
A sentient state is a state that it feels like something to be in. Cows have them, cars don’t. Cognitive capacities are a subset of behavioral capacities. Not all behavioral capacities are cognitive (but the distinction is fuzzy). Might the difference have something to do with whether the behaver is sentient?
Plant Sentience Revisited: Sifting Through The Thicket Of Perspectives, Paco Calvo, Miguel Segundo-Ortin
Plant Sentience Revisited: Sifting Through The Thicket Of Perspectives, Paco Calvo, Miguel Segundo-Ortin
Animal Sentience
In our target article (Segundo-Ortin & Calvo 2023), we proposed the intriguing possibility of plant sentience, drawing parallels with non-human animal studies. This response aims to sift through the rich thicket of perspectives offered by our commentators. To do so, we assess the risks of employing double standards, as well as the tendencies of anthropomorphizing and zoomorphizing in plant studies. We also emphasize the need for clarity in linguistic and conceptual terms, examine the neurophysiological evidence for plant sentience, and discuss the ethical implications of such recognition.
Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience
One of the commentaries on the target article notes that "animal sentience" is difficult to define operationally. This response to the commentaries develops a working, usable definition of animal sentience and examines the relationships between animal emotions and sentience.
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Animal Sentience
On the basis of the target article by Crump and colleagues, we suggest a more parsimonious scheme for evaluating the evidence for sentience. Since some of the criteria used by Crump et al. are not independent and some are uninformative we exclude some criteria and amalgamate others. We propose that evidence of flexible learning and prioritization, in conjunction with relevant data on brain organization, is sufficient for assigning pain-sentience to an animal and we suggest a scoring scheme based on four criteria.
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Animal Sentience
The criteria for determining animal sentience proposed in the target article are sensible but they lack an explicit functional justification for the focus on pain. This commentary provides an abbreviated account of the most basic functional principles that underpin animal sentience and articulates some minimal criteria for determining its presence.
Crustacean Pain, Michael Tye
Crustacean Pain, Michael Tye
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses the target article’s methodology, the relevance of the claim that crustaceans lack a neocortex to the thesis that they feel pain, and the evaluation of the results of some trade-off experiments done with hermit crabs.
No Need For Certainty In Animal Sentience, Yew Kwang Ng
No Need For Certainty In Animal Sentience, Yew Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
This commentary supports Crump et al.’s (2022) point that where risks to welfare are severe, strong evidence of sentience is sufficient to warrant protecting welfare. Crump et al.’s eight criteria for sentience are also useful. Flexible decision-making (5) and flexible behaviour (6) are consistent with Ng (1995). The concession that the “no-need-for-sentience” proposition is unnecessary also strengthens the importance of the target article’s conclusions.
Generalizing Frameworks For Sentience Beyond Natural Species, Michael Levin
Generalizing Frameworks For Sentience Beyond Natural Species, Michael Levin
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. (2022) offer a well-argued example of an essential development: a rigorous framework for assessing sentience from the perspective of moral concern over an agent’s welfare. Current and forthcoming developments in bioengineering, synthetic morphology, artificial intelligence, biorobotics, and exobiology necessitate an expansion and generalization of this effort. Verbal reports (the Turing Test) and homology to human brains are utterly inadequate criteria for assessing the status of novel, unconventional agents that offer no familiar touchstone of phylogeny or anatomy. We must develop principled approaches to evaluating the sentience of (and thus, our responsibility to) beings of unfamiliar provenance and …
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod crustaceans are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to markers that could increase confidence in an animal’s sentience more generally. Some of the commentaries have already pointed out that pain is only one kind of sentience (Souza Valente). It has also already been pointed out that there are other criteria for pain that could be usefully added to the framework’s eight (Burrell). This expansive thinking about criteria that can be used to increase confidence in sentience raisess the question: in an expansive …