Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Institution
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Language
Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
The chapter examines fifty years of philosophers working on lying - from the 1970s to the current day – focusing on how lying is defined (descriptively and normatively), whether lying involves an intention to deceive (Deceptionists) or not (Non-Deceptionists), why lying is wrong, and whether lying is worse than other forms of deception, including misleading with the truth. Philosophers discussed include Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, Alan Donagan, Sissela Boy, Charles Fried, David Simpson, David Simpson, Bernard Williams, Paul Faulkner, Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Andreas Stoke, Jonathan Webber and Clea Rees
Full-On Stating, Robert Stainton
Full-On Stating, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
What distinguishes full-on stating a proposition from merely communicating it? For instance, what distinguishes claiming/asserting/saying that one has never smoked crack cocaine from merely implying/conveying/hinting this? The enormous literature on ‘assertion’ provides many approaches to distinguishing stating from, say, asking and commanding: only the former aims at truth; only the former expresses one’s belief; etc. But this leaves my question unanswered, since in merely communicating a proposition one also aims at truth, expresses a belief, etc. My aim is not to criticize extant accounts of the state-vs.-merely-convey contrast, but rather to draw on clues from Dummett, functional linguistics and moral …
Iffy Predictions And Proper Expectations, Matthew A. Benton, John Turri
Iffy Predictions And Proper Expectations, Matthew A. Benton, John Turri
SPU Works
What individuates the speech act of prediction? The standard view is that prediction is individuated by the fact that it is the unique speech act that requires future-directed content. We argue against this view and two successor views. We then lay out several other potential strategies for individuating prediction, including the sort of view we favor. We suggest that prediction is individuated normatively and has a special connection to the epistemic standards of expectation. In the process, we advocate some constraints that we think a good theory of prediction should respect.
Lying, Misleading And What Is Said, By Jennifer M. Saul, Melissa Macaulay, Robert Stainton
Lying, Misleading And What Is Said, By Jennifer M. Saul, Melissa Macaulay, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.
Two More For The Knowledge Account Of Assertion, Matthew A. Benton
Two More For The Knowledge Account Of Assertion, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
The Knowledge Norm or Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.