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- Norms of assertion (3)
- Assertion (2)
- Hope (2)
- Knowledge (2)
- Knowledge norm (2)
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- Social epistemology (2)
- Testimony (2)
- Belief (1)
- Concessive knowledge attributions (1)
- Constitutive norms (1)
- Credence (1)
- Deception (1)
- Definition of lying (1)
- Epistemic authority (1)
- Epistemic modals (1)
- Epistemology (1)
- Expert testimony (1)
- Factives (1)
- Fallibilism (1)
- Formal epistemology (1)
- Hopefulness (1)
- Induction (1)
- Infallibilism (1)
- Interpersonal knowledge (1)
- Knowing persons (1)
- Lies (1)
- Lying (1)
- Moore's paradox (1)
- Moral psychology (1)
- Other minds (1)
Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Language
Epistemological Aspects Of Hope, Matthew A. Benton
Epistemological Aspects Of Hope, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order inductive reflection on when one should, or should not, hope for an outcome with which one has a long …
Lying, Accuracy, And Credence, Matthew A. Benton
Lying, Accuracy, And Credence, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss (Analysis, 2017) seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback of being unable to explain nearby cases; and even worse, that account fails to distinguish cases …
Knowledge, Hope, And Fallibilism, Matthew A. Benton
Knowledge, Hope, And Fallibilism, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when …
Epistemology Personalized, Matthew A. Benton
Epistemology Personalized, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
Recent epistemology has focused almost exclusively on propositional knowledge. This paper considers an underexplored area of epistemology, namely knowledge of persons: if propositional knowledge is a state of mind, consisting in a subject's attitude to a (true) proposition, the account developed here thinks of interpersonal knowledge as a state of minds, involving a subject's attitude to another (existing) subject. This kind of knowledge is distinct from propositional knowledge, but it exhibits a gradability characteristic of context-sensitivity, and admits of shifty thresholds. It is supported by a wide range of unexplored linguistic data and intuitive cases; and it promises to illuminate …
Expert Opinion And Second-Hand Knowledge, Matthew A. Benton
Expert Opinion And Second-Hand Knowledge, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
Expert testimony figures in recent debates over how best to understand the norm of assertion and the domain-specific epistemic expectations placed on testifiers. Cases of experts asserting with only isolated second-hand knowledge Jennifer (Lackey 2011, 2013) have been used to shed light on whether knowledge is sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion. I argue that relying on such cases of expert testimony introduces several problems concerning how we understand expert knowledge, and the sharing of such knowledge through testimony. Refinements are needed to clarify exactly what principles are being tested by such cases; but once refined, such cases raise more questions …
Believing On Authority, Matthew A. Benton
Believing On Authority, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
Linda T. Zagzebski's "Epistemic Authority" (Oxford University Press, 2012) brings together issues in social epistemology with topics in moral and political philosophy as well as philosophy of religion. In this paper I criticize her discussion of self-trust and rationality, which sets up the main argument of the book; I consider how her view of authority relates to some issues of epistemic authority in testimony; and I raise some concerns about her treatment of religious epistemology and religious authority in particular.
Iffy Predictions And Proper Expectations, Matthew A. Benton, John Turri
Iffy Predictions And Proper Expectations, Matthew A. Benton, John Turri
SPU Works
What individuates the speech act of prediction? The standard view is that prediction is individuated by the fact that it is the unique speech act that requires future-directed content. We argue against this view and two successor views. We then lay out several other potential strategies for individuating prediction, including the sort of view we favor. We suggest that prediction is individuated normatively and has a special connection to the epistemic standards of expectation. In the process, we advocate some constraints that we think a good theory of prediction should respect.
Two More For The Knowledge Account Of Assertion, Matthew A. Benton
Two More For The Knowledge Account Of Assertion, Matthew A. Benton
SPU Works
The Knowledge Norm or Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.