Philosophy of Language Commons^™

Thinking Blue / Writing Red: Marxism And The (Post)Human, Stephen C. Tumino

Publications and Research

Thinking Blue/Writing Red interrogates contemporary culture across a range of texts, from the pandemic (‘Covid’ and ‘Trump Speak’) to high theory (Melville's narratives) and popular culture (Beyoncé's ‘Formation’ and Super Bowl performance, Twin Peaks , metamodern ‘cli-fi’ films). Inspired by Derrida’s idea of the secret, Tumino examines the significance of social movements (Black Lives Matter, Occupy, alter-globalization) and naïve art (Darger, Ryden) to argue that these texts speak of the secrets that capitalism cannot speak. Contending that the cultural surfaces narrate only the ‘nonsecret,’ that to see the social logic of the culture one must dig into what Bruno Latour …

Theorizing, Bounded Rationality, And Expertise: Cognitive Sociology And The Quasi-Realism Of Problem-Solving As A Course Of Activity, Michael W. Raphael

Publications and Research

The question facing sociology is whether it is a field or a discipline. If it is a field, then there is no need for theorizing. However, if sociology is a discipline, then problem-solving cannot be disentangled from theorizing without a loss of intelligibility – the inability to explain the social as the concept of the discipline. Through the quasi-realism of problem-solving as a course of activity, this chapter presents cognitive sociology as a paradigm appropriate to the concept of the social understood as an ongoing course of activity. In doing so, it is shown how bounded rationality and expertise play …

Notas Para Una Teoría Glotopolítica, José Del Valle

Publications and Research

En este artículo se define la glotopolítica como perspectiva intelectual y se identifican sus posiciones teóricas en relación con el lenguaje. Esta definición, se afirma, supone una apuesta interdisciplinaria en la que la sociolingüística crítica busca activamente establecer relaciones dialógicas con disciplinas tales como la antropología, la filosofía, la historiografía o la sociología. En este sentido, el artículo aborda la visión del lenguaje del crítico literario y cultural galés Raymond Williams, y de las posibilidades metodológicas y teóricas que ofrece su concepto de palabras clave.

This article discusses the theoretical underpinnings of glottopolitical studies, defined as an intellectual perspective. Such …

Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon

Publications and Research

This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it looks at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are …

Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon

Publications and Research

The chapter examines fifty years of philosophers working on lying - from the 1970s to the current day – focusing on how lying is defined (descriptively and normatively), whether lying involves an intention to deceive (Deceptionists) or not (Non-Deceptionists), why lying is wrong, and whether lying is worse than other forms of deception, including misleading with the truth. Philosophers discussed include Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, Alan Donagan, Sissela Boy, Charles Fried, David Simpson, David Simpson, Bernard Williams, Paul Faulkner, Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Andreas Stoke, Jonathan Webber and Clea Rees

Secrets Vs. Lies: Is There A Moral Asymmetry?, James E. Mahon

Publications and Research

In this chapter I argue that the traditional interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is incorrect. On the standard interpretation of the commonly accepted view, lies are prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally permissible. I argue that, when secrets are distinguished from mere acts of reticence and non-acknowledgement, as well as from acts of deception, so that they are defined as acts of not sharing believed-information while believing that the believed-information is relevant, the correct interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is that secrets are …

Español (Y Castellano), José Del Valle, Vitor Meirinho

Publications and Research

El significando y traducibilidad de «español» está indefectiblemente ligado al vocablo «castellano», cuyo significado y traducibilidad resultan también inaccesibles si se ignoran los de aquel. Cualquier relato que persiga trazar la historia de este idioma y, especialmente, determinar su origen se encuentra con la coexistencia de, al menos, estas dos palabras. Esta sinonimia, que como tal se manifiesta imperfecta e incómoda, revela también la condición política de la lengua que designa, es decir, su participación en la construcción y cuestionamiento de subjetividades políticas –ya sean regionales, nacionales o sociales–. Es precisamente la condición política de la palabra –de «español», de …

The Noble Art Of Lying, James E. Mahon

Publications and Research

In this chapter I examine the writings of Mark Twain on lying, especially his essays "On the decay of the Art of Lying" and "My First Lie, and How I Got Out of It." I show that Twain held that there were two kinds of lies: the spoken lie and the silent lie. The silent lie is the lie of not saying what one is thinking, and is far more common than the spoken lie. The greatest silent lies, according to Twain, were the national silent lies that there was nothing wrong with slavery (the U.S.), that there was nothing …

The Truth About Kant On Lies, James E. Mahon

Publications and Research

In this chapter I argue that there are three different senses of 'lie' in Kant's moral philosophy: the lie in the ethical sense (the broadest sense, which includes lies to oneself), the lie in the 'juristic' sense (the narrowest sense, which only includes lies that specifically harm particular others), and the lie in the sense of right (or justice), which is narrower than the ethical sense, but broader than the juristic sense, since it includes all lies told to others, including those who are bent on harming innocent others.