Philosophy of Language Commons^™

Review Of Rene Van Woudenberg’S "The Epistemology Of Reading And Interpretation.”, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

I here review Rene van Woudenberg’s monograph, The Epistemology of Reading and Interpretation

On Reading, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

What is reading?  Seeing and comprehending a contentful, written text counts as reading, of course, but that is simply the paradigm; it is not reading itself.  Blind people, e.g., often read using Braille.  It is sometimes claimed that one engages in reading when one listens to an audiobook.  So, my project in this paper is to address this question: What is the proper analysis of person S reads text W?  Surprisingly, no philosophical attempts to analyze reading exist; this question has (to my knowledge, anyway) yet to be tackled.  Can other sensory modalities be used to read?  What more …

Morpho: Expectations & Mutations, Lynda Bostrom

Masters Theses, 2010-2019

Morpho: Expectations & Mutations is a written document accompanying the culmination of my three years painting at a graduate level. The result of which is an autobiographical body of work navigating the tension of being a human with an invisible disease, while straining to understand Western societal constructs of women. I simultaneously reject these fairy tales as a standard recipe for happiness, yet identify with its visual language that is rooted in the vernacular of my generation. Redefining the elements I reject or embrace helps me to look beyond the boundaries of these constructs, and adopt an attitude of curiosity …

Material Poetics, Ellen G. Reid

Masters Theses, 2010-2019

quench: /kwen(t)SH/

a : put out, extinguish

b : to put out the light or fire

c : to cool suddenly by immersion

d : to cause to lose heat or warmth

e : to bring to an end typically by satisfying, damping, cooling, or

decreasing

f : to relieve or satisfy with liquid

This is often how projects begin, a haunting idea, word, or experience inundates my consciousness and sub-consciousness. How could the body directly relate to an experience of quenching? This provoked the idea of the extreme sport: freediving. To adequately depict the definition of quenching, any …

Review Of Anthony Everett's "The Nonexistent", Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

I here review Anthony Everett's monograph, The Nonexistent

Creatures Of Fiction, Objects Of Myth, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

Artifactualists hold that some abstracta are contingent entities, products of the intentional activities of people.  A great many artifactualists are fictional creationists, asserting that fictonal characters are abstracta of this sort, but some, notably Kripke (1973), Salmon (1998, 2002), and Braun (2005), further embrace mythical creationism.  They hold that certain entities that figure in false theories are likewise abstracta that are produced by our intentional activities.  A paradigm example would be Vulcan, the planet proposed by Le Verrier to be the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Mercury.  I here argue that one may not reasonably take the metaphysical …

On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, And Scientific Hypothesizing, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

In my “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth” (2014), I present and defend an argument for thinking that mythical creationism – the view that mythical objects like phlogiston and Vulcan are abstract artifacts – is false.  One intriguing sort of objection to my argument has been recently put forth by Zvolenszky (2016); she claims that a crucial premise is seen to be unjustified once one considers the phenomena of inadvertently created abstracta, specifically, inadvertently created fictional characters.  I here argue that even if we admit inadvertently created abstracta into our ontology, my argument survives.  I ultimately defend a view on …

Review Of Peter Alward's "Empty Revelations", Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

I here review Peter Alward's monograph Empty Revelations

Pretense Theory And The Imported Background, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F.  The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument – one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions – for the falsity of the pretense theory.

A Critical Discussion Of Talking Past One Another, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

One sort of usage of the phrase ‘talking past one another’ that is quite prevalent in the philosophical literature suggests the following account of a particular phenomenon of miscommunication: Agent A and agent B talk past one another during a philosophical discussion if and only if A has in mind one meaning or conception of a crucial expression P that is distinct from some meaning or conception of P had in mind by B.  In this paper, however, I argue that this account – given the sort of phenomenon it is intended to be an account of – misses the …

An Extended Lewis-Stalnaker Semantics And The New Problem Of Counterpossibles,, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

Closest-possible-world analyses of counterfactuals suffer from what has been called the ‘problem of counterpossibles’: some counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents seem plainly false, but the proposed analyses imply that they are all (vacuously) true.  One alleged solution to this problem is the addition of impossible worlds.  In this paper, I argue that the closest possible or impossible world analyses that have recently been suggested suffer from the ‘new problem of counterpossibles’: the proposed analyses imply that some plainly true counterpossibles (viz., ‘counterlogicals’) are false.  After motivating and presenting the ‘new problem’, I give reasons to think that …

Where Is Sherlock Holmes?, Jeffrey C. Goodman

Faculty Scholarship

Most philosophers would say that fictional characters lack spatiotemporal location simply because such entities do not exist.  However, even prominent believers in ficta hold that they must lack location.  I here focus on the views of one such believer, Amie Thomasson, and her Artifactual Theory.  The fundamentals of her ontology seem correct, but I argue that the view implies that ficta do have location.  I provide a diagnosis of an argument Thomasson gives for the contrary, and then suggest a way for the Artifactual Theory to account for the locations of ficta.  I conclude by discussing some potential applications of …