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The Virtue Of Sōphrosunē In Plato’S Gorgias And Phaedrus, Kristian Sheeley

Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy

This dissertation argues that the substantial differences in Plato’s accounts of virtue in the Gorgias and Phaedrus are best understood as adjustments that Socrates makes in order to have the most pedagogically and ethically valuable impact on the different interlocutors (each of which represents universal type of person) with whom he speaks. While Plato has Socrates give arguments about virtue, love, happiness, and so on that are strong when taken on their own, he also depicts Socrates tailoring these arguments with the aim of persuading his interlocutors to pursue a more virtuous life. The central example I focus on is …

Craft And Virtue In Plato's Early Dialogues, Cecilia Z. Li

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Ancient philosophers are preoccupied with the idea of craft (technê)—art, expertise, skill, and not infrequently translated as knowledge or science. The idea is often seen by ancient thinkers as the pinnacle of rational agency and offers them a vital paradigm for thinking about the world and our place within it. One longstanding tradition is the view that virtue shares important features with the sort of expertise involved in practicing a craft. In this thesis, I investigate the relationship between craft and virtue in Plato, focusing especially on the early dialogues. The overarching aim of this thesis is to …

“Meddling In The Work Of Another”: Πολυπραγμονεῖν In Plato’S Republic, Brennan Mcdavid

Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

The second conjunct of the Republic’s account of justice—that justice is “not meddling in the work of another”—has been neglected in Plato literature. This paper argues that the conjunct does more work than merely reiterating the content of the first conjunct—that justice is “doing one’s own work.” I argue that Socrates develops the concept at work in this conjunct from its introduction with the Principle of Specialization in Book II to its final deployment in the finished conception of justice in Book IV. Crucial to that concept’s development is the way in which the notion of “another” comes to …

Is Conscientiousness A Virtue? Confucian Responses, Stephen C. Angle

Stephen C. Angle

Is Conscientiousness A Virtue? Confucian Responses, Stephen C. Angle

Stephen C. Angle

Une Éthique De La Modestie Dans Les Essais De Montaigne (Towards A Modest Ethics In Montaigne's Essays), Catherine Parker Sweatt

Scripps Senior Theses

La plupart des lectures contemporaines des Essais ignore la pensée morale de Montaigne. Ici, je maintiens que Montaigne épouse ‘une éthique de la modestie’ en même temps qu’il rejette toute éthique normative. En particulier, je cherche à aborder comment Montaigne suggère que nous connaissons la vertu et agissons si deux individus ne partagent pas le même perspective et on ne peut pas être le même sujet éthique deux fois. Je vais commencer par discuter la position épistémique de Montaigne par rapport aux universels pour illustrer comment Montaigne met en question l’universalité des lois éthiques et un bien connu a priori …

What Aristotle Should Have Said About Megalopsychia, May Sim

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Megalopsychia (the greatness of soul) also translated as pride, or magnanimity, is a virtue Aristotle attributes to the good person regarding his claim to be worthy of great things, namely, honor. Despite this definition, commentators like C. Rowe, H. Curzer, R. Polansky and J. Stover, all chose to de-emphasize the centrality of honor in Aristotle’s definition of megalopsychia. Aristotle’s assertion that honor is the greatest external good also seems to be in tension with megalopsychia as a virtue that is to be pursued for its own sake, not to mention its tension with his remark that friendship is the greatest …

Deception In Aristotle's Rhetoric: How To Tell The Rhetorician From The Sophist, And Which One To Bet On, Eugene Garver

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle has a simple answer to questions about the morality of rhetoric: he distinguishes the rhetorician and the sophist. What sets the sophist apart from the rhetorician is "not the faculty (dynamis) but the moral purpose (prohairesis)" (I1.1355M7; see de Soph Elen 1.165a30). Keep straight the difference between sophist and rhetorician and all moral problems will evaporate. He certainly doesn't think telling them apart needs great philosophical development or exquisite ethical judgment. Distinguishing them requires neither phronesis nor familiarity with the Rhetoric. He gives his distinction all the explanation he thinks it needs by saying:

In rhetoric, the person who …

Aristotle's Account Of Courage In En Iii.6-9, Howard Curzer

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I shall argue that Aristotle (a) does not limit courage to life- threatening situations on the battlefield; (b) is right to maintain that courage governs both fear and confidence; (c) applies a plausible doctrine of the mean to courage; (d) appropriately distinguishes courage from continence; and (e) does not affirm that courageous acts are overall pleasant for courageous people.

Failure And Expertise In The Ancient Conception Of An Art, James Allen

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The ancient notion of an art (τέχνη) embraced a wide range of pursuits from handicrafts like shoemaking and weaving to more exalted disciplines not excluding philosophy (cf. Plato Gorgias 486b; Hippolytus Refutatio. 570,8 DDG; Sext. Emp. Μ II13). Nevertheless, there was a sufficient amount of agreement about what was expected of an art to permit debates about whether different practices qualified as arts. According to the conception which made these debates possible, an art is a body of knowledge concerning a distinct subject matter which enables the artist to achieve a definite type of beneficial result. Obviously, the failure of …

Aristotle On Reason, Practical Reason, And Living Well, Deborah K.W. Modrak

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Metriopatheia And Apatheia: Some Reflections On A Controversy In Later Greek Ethics, John M. Dillon

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The controversy about metriopatheia and apatheia, which generated such heat in later Greek philosophy, is one between the concept of a bipartite or tripartite soul, in which the lower part of parts can never be eradicated - at least while the soul is in the body - but must constantly be chastised. In practice, Stoic eupatheia in practice is very similar to a properly moderated Platonic-Aristotelian pathos, but that is irrelevant to the main point. We find in Plutarch and other Platonists of the period a remarkable unwillingness or inability to comprehend what the Stoic position was.

Zeno And Stoic Consistency, John M. Rist

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

It seems that the Stoics were prepared to say two things : 1) It will in fact pay to be virtuous provided that you want to be happy; and 2) the good man will seek virtue for its own sake. Some of the apparent difficulties in reconciling these propositions may be resolved by examining the notion of seeking virtue for its own sake. What then do the Stoics say that virtue is?

Any Cynic could advocate a consistent life, for the description is purely formal. But one consistent life might be set against another, and Zeno's appeal to natural consistency …

Socrates And Protagoras, Michael I. Stokes

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Stokes provides a close reading of the arguments in Plato's Protagoras, focusing especially on Socrates' questions after Protagoras' "Great Speech."