History of Philosophy Commons^™

To Hou Heneka And Continuous Change, Christopher Mirus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Beginning with Aristotle’s statement in Physics II.2 that motion must be continuous to be for the sake of an end, I argue that properly understood, continuity is actually a sufficient condition for the goal- directedness of any motion in Aristotle’s teleology. I establish this conclusion first for the simple motions discussed in Physics V-VI, and then for complex changes such as the generation and development of a living thing. In both steps of the argument, the notion of καθ’ αυτό agency serves as a key link between continuity and goal-directedness. The understanding of Aristotle’s teleology that emerges from the consideration …

Sagp Newsletter 2004.1 (December), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Programs of the Society with the Eastern Division (December 2004) and with the American Philological Association (December 2005)

Stoics On The Differentiation Of Character, Margarete Graver

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I will show that Stoic writers were perfectly capable of distinguishing among character-types also according to secondary differentia that can be exhibited independently of one another and in greater or lesser degree. Just as one may observe variations in the sea floor without disregarding the fact that all of it is equally underwater, so Stoic theory defines traits of character which differentiate one individual from another even where all concerned have the same overall moral standing. Such secondary characteristics are identified even among the virtuous; more numerous, however, and also more philosophically interesting, are the character traits of the nonvirtuous— …

Egoism And Eudaimonia - Maximization In The Nicomachean Ethics, Erik J. Wielenberg

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I argue that Aristotle holds the following principle:

(AE) An ethically virtuous person always chooses a course of action that he believes promotes his own eudaimonia at least as much as any other course of action he could have chosen.

The claim that Aristotle holds such a principle conflicts with Richard Kraut’s interpretation of Aristotle’s view presented in Kraut’s important book Aristotle on the Human Good. I am inclined to count (AE) as a brand of egoism, primarily on the grounds that it implies that sacrificing one’s own eudaimonia for the sake of the eudaimonia of others is incompatible with …

Sagp Newsletter 2004.3 (April), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

SAGP at the Central Division, April 2004

Theory And Practice In Plato's Theaetetus: The Question Of Knowledge And The Primacy Of Dialectic, Tushar Irani

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Most studies of the Theaetetus concentrate on Plato’s examination of Protagoras’s ‘Man is the Measure’ doctrine— and rightly so. The bulk of the dialogue is after all devoted to an exhaustive critique of this doctrine and its consequences, and in order to understand Plato’s views it is surely crucial to determine what position he sets up in contrast to his own. Commentators differ, however, when it comes to the finer points of Protagoras’s position— particularly concerning the validity of Plato’s infamous self-refutation argument against the Measure Doctrine at 171A6-C7—and its relation to Heraclitean flux. After some preliminaries on the overall …

A Quarrel Between The Ancients And The Moderns: Aristotle's Realism And Modern Skepticism, Michael Bowler

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

For Aristotle, the object as perceived and the subject as perceiving can only be understood with respect to the activity of perception itself and the unity it brings about between the perceived object and perceiving subject. This is a complex unity that requires further analysis and refinement. This unity is the ground of Aristotle’s “realism” with regard to perception. However, if this unity is dissolved into an external, synthetic connection between two dissimilar things only one of which we have access to, then it is at best problematic and perhaps impossible for us to discover anything about the other. This …

Politics Book Iii On 'He Ariste Politeia', Denis Vlahovic

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The thesis of this paper is that, contrary to the common reading of Book III of the Politics, the constitution identified by Aristotle as best in this book is the ideal constitution of Book VII. I present my argument for this thesis in the first part of the paper, where I examine Aristotle’s statements about the best polis, the most important of which is Aristotle’s final word on the matter, at the end of Book III. In the second part of the paper, I examine and criticize the most comprehensive argument for the common reading of Book III, presented in …

Sagp Newsletter 2004.2 (March), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Programs of the Society with the Pacific and Central Divisions, April 2004

Aristotle And Chrysippus On The Psychology Of Human Action: Criteria For Resposibility, Priscilla Sakezles

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle believes we are responsible for all our voluntary actions; the Stoics hold us responsible for what comes about "through us," that is, whatever is causes by our impulse and assent. The terminology is different, but i conclude that the Stoic and Aristotelian classes of what one is responsible for are coextensive, and their criteria defining responsible actions are nearly identical (where impulse provides the internal origin of the action and assent provides the awareness of what is being done). The only significant difference is that Aristotle claims such actions are in our power to do or not to do …

Aristotle And Theophrastus On The Emotions, William W. Fortenbaugh

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Fortenbaugh here revisits his 1975 study, Aristotle on Emotion, incorporating the contributions of Theophrastus to the Peripatetic synthesis of analyses of the emotions. He modifies earlier views, adding new analyses and illustrative material, replying to criticisms of his positions.

A.P.

Hybristes Ei: Socrates, Alcibiades, And Agathon, Elizabeth Belfiore

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Alcibiades’ portrait of Socrates can be better understood in light of the philosopher’s complementary, but less studied, interactions with Agathon. Like Alcibiades, Agathon attributes to Socrates a superior wisdom that he seeks to acquire by touch (175c7-d2; cf. 218c7-d5), and, like Alcibiades, Agathon accuses Socrates of hybris after failing in this attempt (175e7). There are indications, however, that Agathon is better able to benefit from his association with Socrates than is Alcibiades. After a brief discussion of the Greek concepts of hybris and disdain (section 2), this paper focuses on Socrates’ interactions with these two men. I argue that Socrates …

The Thomistic Cosmological Argument, W. David Beck

SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations

No abstract provided.

Review: Biblical Ideas Of Nationality: Ancient And Modern, Donald L. Fowler

SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations

No abstract provided.

Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics And Social Theory, Peggy Desautels, Margaret Urban Walker

Philosophy Faculty Publications

Book abstract: Moral psychology studies the features of cognition, judgement, perception, and emotion that make human beings capable of moral action. Perspectives from feminist and race theory immensely enrich moral psychology. Writers who take these perspectives ask questions about mind, feeling, and action in contexts of social difference and unequal power and opportunity. These essays by a distinguished international cast of philosophers explore moral psychology as it connects to social life, scientific studies, and literature.

Chapter abstract: Most of us view ourselves as having moral commitments and expect that when given the opportunity, we will follow through on these commitments. …

Kant And The Logic Of Aristotle, Kurt Mosser

Philosophy Faculty Publications

In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers his best-known—indeed, notorious—remark about Aristotle's logic:

• Since Aristotle . . . logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and completed doctrine (Bviii).1

I wish to explore here the following question: is Kant in fact saying that since Aristotle, there need be no more concern about logic as a discipline or a field of study, that Aristotle (with some minor embellishments, in terms of presentation) is the last word in logic? Certainly that is how …

Dogs, Domestication, And The Ego, Gary Shapiro

Philosophy Faculty Publications

In Zarathustra's "On the Vision and the Riddle," three animals-a spider, a snake, and a dog-make significant appearances, as do three human or quasihuman figures-Zarathustra himself, the dwarf known as the Spirit of Gravity, and the shepherd who must bite off the head of the snake. Of these animals, it is the dog who receives the most extended attention. Here, in the passage that along with "The Convalescent" (with its eagle and serpent) is usually and rightly taken to be Nietzsche's most articulate and yet highly veiled approach to explaining the teaching of eternal recurrence, the riddling vision involves animals. …

Sympathy And Approbation In Hume And Smith: A Solution To The Other Rational Species Problem, David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

This paper examines a key implication of the different conceptions of sympathy and the approbation associated with sympathy in the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith. For Hume, sympathy is an empathy we feel for those like us and hence we are motivated to obtain the praise or approbation of those with whom we sympathize. In Hume’s construction there is a direct link from sympathy to motivation because sympathy is reflected self-love. By contrast, in Smith’s construction sympathy is an act of imagination which only habit makes motivational. The abstraction by our imagination means we earn the approbation (or …