History of Philosophy Commons^™

Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp/Ssips 2010 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Intelligible Matter In Aristotle, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The oxymoronic phrase ‘intelligible matter’ occurs three times in Aristotle. In two passages it has the same meaning; in the third the meaning seems radically different. This gives the impression that the Aristotelian language of metaphysics is distressingly slack. This paper argues, against the nearly unanimous voice of two millennia of commentaries, that ‘intelligible matter’ has the same meaning in all three loci. In doing so it develops a capital distinction that tightens up the apparatus of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Aristotle On Learning In De Anima Ii.5, John F. Bowin

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Just as the coming to be of a substance may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the coming to be of the composite or of the individual form, so the process of learning may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the oscillation between states of truth and error or as the ‘settling down’ or cessation of this oscillation at the stage where knowledge has become a stable disposition (hexis). And …

Causation, Agency, And Law In Antiphon: On Some Subtleties In The Second Tetralogy, Joel Mann

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

That no one can or should be convicted in a law court on pollution charges is, I suggest, the implicit message of Antiphon’s second Tetralogy. More than a mere rhetorical exercise, Antiphon offers us a rational and compelling critique of religious law and of legal responsibility generally. In so doing, he anticipates modern puzzles in the philosophy of law as well as some of their more sophisticated solutions. A work not only of ingenious skepticism but also of considerable subtlety, the second Tetralogy should be considered the product of a philosopher who made perhaps the most substantial extant contribution to …

Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.4 Pac, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

What Aristotle Should Have Said About Megalopsychia, May Sim

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Megalopsychia (the greatness of soul) also translated as pride, or magnanimity, is a virtue Aristotle attributes to the good person regarding his claim to be worthy of great things, namely, honor. Despite this definition, commentators like C. Rowe, H. Curzer, R. Polansky and J. Stover, all chose to de-emphasize the centrality of honor in Aristotle’s definition of megalopsychia. Aristotle’s assertion that honor is the greatest external good also seems to be in tension with megalopsychia as a virtue that is to be pursued for its own sake, not to mention its tension with his remark that friendship is the greatest …

Against Hedonist Interpretations Of Plato's Protagoras, J. Clerk Shaw

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper, I adapt one of the pro-hedonist strategies to anti-hedonist ends. Just as some prohedonists insist that Plato’s arguments against hedonism elsewhere do not touch the actual theory found in the Protagoras (again, PH), I argue that the most natural reading of PH is inconsistent with views found in purportedly earlier dialogues (especially the Apology and Crito) as well as in purportedly later dialogues (such as the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic). In section 1, I argue that PH focuses entirely on bodily goods and bads.11 Then, in section 2, I argue that this makes the relationship between virtue …

Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.3 (Central Division), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Empirical And Dialogical Proofs Of God's Existence In Laws 10, Lewis Trelawny-Cassity

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Book 10 of the Laws is intended to prove that the gods exist, care for us, and are not persuaded by bribes (885b7-9). The arguments put forward concerning the gods in Book 10 are described as “our noblest and best prelude (kalliston te kai ariston prooimion) on behalf of the laws” (887c1). In this paper I want to investigate how Plato establishes the fact that nous, “god, in the correct sense, for the gods” (897b2), exists. Some scholars have noted the “empirical” character of Plato’s arguments for the existence of god in Laws 10. While empirical facts do provide an …

A Problem For The Political Reading Of Plato's Republic, Mason Marshall

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

On one of the most common readings of the Republic, Plato means for us to agree with Socrates and his interlocutors that their aristocratic city is the just polis. For convenience, I call this the political reading. It is no wonder, of course, that this interpretation is as common as it is, since it might be one of the most natural interpretations of the Republic. I argue, though, that it faces a serious problem: Socrates and his interlocutors’ argument for the justice of the aristocratic city has certain deficits, and—more important—there is considerable evidence that Plato was aware of at …

Theoria, Theos, And Therapeia In Aristotle's Ethical Endings, Lawrence Jost

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

My basic complaint is that it’s not at all obvious that maximizing the theoretical activity of our most divine element does full justice to the richly textured environment provided by the first 9 1/2 books of the NE, which seemed to call for focused development of the full range of our human potential, combining moral and intellectual virtues along with provision for adequate supplies of external goods. The older language of the seemingly endless debate about whether or not the NE settles for an inclusive or dominant-end conception of eudaimonia has been redescribed - in Michael Pakaluk’s new terminology - …

Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Plato On Truth And Falsehood, Anne M. Wiles

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The argument of this paper is that Plato's position on medicinal lies is neither dishonest nor inconsistent. When adequately understood in its context, the account Plato gives of truth and falsehood offers valuable insights into the nature of each and the role both play in the moral life of the individual and the state.

Democracy In Plato's Republic: How Bad Is It Supposed To Be?, Mason Marshall

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Scholars have typically thought that in the Republic democracy is supposed to be worse than timarchy and oligarchy. But lately, certain commentators have denied that it is. Is it, then? I argue that pursuing this question leads us to a dead end, because it is not clear how bad democracy is supposed to be in the Republic. Perhaps a debate on this topic would help us answer other questions, whatever they might be; but otherwise it would be fruitless. To make my case, I marshal the strongest available evidence that democracy is supposedly better than timarchy and oligarchy. Next I …

Aristotle On [Part Of] The Difference Between Belief And Imagination, Ian Mccready Flora

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In book 3, chapter 3 of his On the Soul, Aristotle gives several arguments meant to demonstrate the type non-identity of belief and imagination. Each of these arguments rewards study, but this discussion will focus on one in particular, perhaps the most puzzling. The argument concerns the relation between truth and control. Belief is connected with truth and falsehood in a way that imagination is not, and that in turn means that we can control what we imagine in a way that we cannot control what we believe. Here is Aristotle’s argument in full:

(1) It’s clear as well …

Aristotle's Generic Being, Edward C. Halper

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Being is not a genus in the strict sense because there is no categorial nature that is common to all beings. This paper argues that Aristotle nevertheless treats being as a genus, that this treatment is what he means in Metaphysics Gamma by the science that studies being qua being, and that what is common to all beings is not some particular nature, but their each having a nature. This nature is its ousia, and in Gamma, these ousiai are the primary beings to which other beings are related, though later in the Metaphysics, in a different stage …

Aristotle On Friendship And Self-Knowledge: The Friend Beyond The Mirror, Mavis Biss

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Read through the lens of modern concerns regarding shard moral perception and difference between the self and other, Aristotle’s theory of primary friendship raises challenging questions regarding the role of relationships in moral self-evaluation. Aristotle’s emphasis on sameness of character in his description of the virtuous friend as “another self” figures centrally in all of his arguments for the necessity of friendship to self-knowledge. Although the attribution of the Magna Moralia to Aristotle is disputed, the comparison of the friend to a mirror in this work has encouraged many commentators to view the friend as a mirror that provides the …

Sagp Newsletter 2008/9.2 Central, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Newsletter 2008/9.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Announcement of SAGP programs with the American Philological Association and with the American Philosophical Association 2008/2009 academic year.

Sagp/Ssips 2008 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp/Ssips 2008 Abstract Collection, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Belief And Persuasion In The Socratic Elenchus, Dylan Futter

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Socrates’ philosophical method is how unsuccessful it is. One problem is that elenchus seems able only to destroy common belief without generating anything substantive in its place. Another is that it seems incapable of getting anyone to relinquish his unsupported beliefs. Plato is acutely aware of these problems. In the Meno, he undertakes to show that Socrates’ method of inquiry is capable of generating substantive results. In the Gorgias, he reveals why some people are not moved by reasoned argument. And in the Republic he proposes a complex model of moral belief-formation, …

Aristotle's Abstract Ontology, Allan Bäck

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle has a metaphysics of individual substances, substrata persisting through time that are neither in nor said of a subject. That I do not dispute. However, when we move from the individual to the universal, from perception to knowledge, Aristotle has a metaphysics of relations. This I will try to sketch out here.

Aristotle appeals to abstraction at key places in his philosophy. Somehow abstraction gets us to the first principles and to the objects of the most fundamental sciences. Somehow universals are abstracted from singulars and have no transcendent existence.

Aristotle never states his theory of abstraction formally or …

Plato And Aristotle On The Instant Of Change - A Dilemma, John Bowin

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

There is an ancient puzzle about motion in Plato at Parmenides 155e-157b which has been the subject of scholarship by Richard Sorabji and more recently, Nico Strobach.1 The puzzle, as Plato gives it, can be roughly summarized as follows: At every time, a given object must either be in motion or at rest; there is no third possibility. Also, an object can never be simultaneously both in motion and at rest. The only way for an object to be both in motion and at rest is for it to be in motion and at rest at different times. But how …

Sagp Newsletter 2007/8.2 Pacific Central, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Appetites And Actions In Aristotle's Moral Psychology, Tom Olshewsky

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The so-called practical syllogism is best understood in dispositional terms. Animate movement originates with orexis (appetite), but appetite is the result of the coming together of dual dispositions, the orektikon and the orekton. For calculative appetite, multiple objectives can be imagined, and deliberation determines which objective is best for this person in this circumstance. Deliberation is an antecedent of the actualized appetite, not its consequence. This psychology makes clear that satisfaction of appetites is a two-stage process for calculative beings: first the determination of the appetite, then movement to fulfillment in its objective. In deliberation, the determination is which …

Persuasion And Force In Plato's Republic, Christopher Moore

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Despite the frequent pairing of and contrast between persuasion and force, Plato’s Republic undermines any coherent split between these two modes of handling others. This paper provides two major pieces of evidence to support this claim: (i) Book I dramatizes the weakness of the distinction; and (ii) the arguments that the best rulers will rule only under coercion (in Books I, V, VII, and IX) makes the distinction into an obvious conundrum. Further evidence omitted here is Plato’s tendency to subvert this same rhetorically popular binary elsewhere, especially Statesman, Sophist and Laws. Given that Plato doesn’t explicitly question the persuasion-force …

Aristotle's Analytic Tools, Mary Mulhern

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle developed analytic tools to deal with conceptual difficulties that were important in his time. Some of these tools are his explicit analysis of homonymy, his eightfold classification of subjects and predicates and its elaboration into the predicaments and predicables, his syntactical analysis of ordinary language sentences, and his construction of a formal language for deductive and demonstrative syllogistic. Some of these conceptual difficulties are traceable to theories of Ideas, in which definitory predicates were not distinguished from non-definitory ones, as for instance in Hypothesis V of the Parmenides, where it is argued that the (non-existent) one is not equal …

Studying Mathematics For The Sake Of The Good, Andrew Payne

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In the Republic, Socrates describes the good as the end of all human action: “Every soul pursues the good and does what it does for its sake. It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the benefits, if any, that even those other things may give.” I wish to examine how humans act for the sake of the good in the sections of the Republic following this passage. Human action is oriented toward the …