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- G.E.M. Anscombe; first person pronoun; ‘I’; indirect reflexives; persons; radical non-referring; ‘The First Person’ (1)
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Articles 31 - 37 of 37
Full-Text Articles in History of Philosophy
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Benjamin Hill
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Benjamin Hill
Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events
No abstract provided.
Cancelled - The Ontological Status Of Cartesian Possibilia, Daniel Stermer, Marc Bobro, Liz Goodnick
Cancelled - The Ontological Status Of Cartesian Possibilia, Daniel Stermer, Marc Bobro, Liz Goodnick
Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events
In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who …
Day 1 Schedule, Benjamin Hill
Day 1 Schedule, Benjamin Hill
Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events
No abstract provided.
Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert Stainton
Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
According to a certain ‘Straight Reading’ of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’, she holds a Radically Non-Referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogized to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her position. Her substantive view on ‘I’, rather, is that if what you mean by ‘referring term’ is a certain rich and recherché Frege-inspired notion, then ‘I’ is not one. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be bewitched by language into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax and logical role, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense. Anscombe uses this insight to …
An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert Stainton
An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.
Aristotle On The Moral Status Of Animals, Devin Henry
Aristotle On The Moral Status Of Animals, Devin Henry
Data and Test Instruments
No abstract provided.
Introduction To The Achilles Of Rational Psychology, Thomas Lennon, Robert Stainton
Introduction To The Achilles Of Rational Psychology, Thomas Lennon, Robert Stainton
Philosophy Publications
No abstract provided.