Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons^™

Poor In Practical Capacity: How Environmental Alienation Is Really A Deficit Of Political Know-How, Jeremy Bendik-Keymer

Faculty Scholarship

“Alienation from nature” is a popular notion in Western environmental culture. Influential Anglophone critical theorist Steven Vogel claims that it makes no sense, unlike alienation from our productive capacity to dwell on Earth, called “alienation from the environment.” His criticism is accurate, but his view isn’t. The normative sets appropriate production and consists of social processes of arriving at norms. Politics is foremost among these processes, and it is fundamentally know-how. Given these assumptions, poor practical capacity ends up being the heart of “environmental alienation” – alienation from the built environment. Look at large-scale, anthropogenic, environmental change: a deficit of …

"For You There Are No Strangers": Albert Schweitzer And The Ethics Of Necessity In Pandemic America, Joel (J.T.) Young

Faculty Scholarship

Claiming millions of lives and affecting millions more, the Covid-19 pandemic has thrust humanity into a period of intense reflection on the fragility of life. However, in this time when people have been encouraged to care for their fellow human beings by taking the precautions necessary to protect one another, many have asked the same question as one of Jesus’ antagonistic opponents in the Gospel of Luke: “and who is my neighbor?” In addition to the virus, though, the United States has been plagued by another adversary: non-necessity toward the other. By claiming no responsibility for the well-being and care …

Sovereignty And Complex Interdependence: Some Surprising Indications Of Their Compatibility, Charles F. Sabel

Faculty Scholarship

Even as democratic sovereignty and globalization are increasingly seen as incompatible in theory, this chapter argues that, in some important realms, they are proving compatible in practice. As tariffs have fallen to negligible levels, trade agreements among rich countries have come to focus on reconciling regulatory differences. In many sectors, novel forms of cooperation have emerged that allow trade partners deliberately to investigate and learn from one another’s practices, eventually recognizing the equivalence of regimes that are not strictly identical — and in the process extending domestic political oversight to relations among states while often heightening domestic accountability. The emergent …

On Waldron's Critique Of Raz On Human Rights, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

This commentary responds to Waldron’s “Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach”. It points out that some supposed criticisms are nothing more than observations on conditions that any account of rights must meet, and that Waldron’s objections to Raz are due to misunderstanding his thesis and its theoretical goal. The short comment tries to clarify that goal.

Initiating Research On Igniting Fires In The Blue Ridge Mountains During The Autumn 2016 Conflagration, Cynthia Twyford Fowler

Faculty Scholarship

An unprecedented moment in the fire ecology of the Blue Ridge Mountains occurred in Autumn 2016 when severe drought, frequent anthropogenic ignitions, and seasonality in disturbed deciduous forests fueled widespread burning. As the wildfires burned, wildland firefighters from around the U.S. temporarily moved into the region to assist local land managers. As wildfire risks increased and air quality decreased, local residents became increasingly interested in fire ecology. The community shifted continuously as wildfires were extinguished, wildland firefighters returned home, and local residents disengaged. In conducting research during the conflagration, obtaining consent from community members varied depending on whether or not …

Freedman On Machiavelli, Philip C. Bobbitt

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter links Freedman’s work to that of Niccolò Machiavelli through constructivist realism, which is an apposite term for the two thinkers, as the unchanging sense of human nature interacts with ever changing context, and humans have to adapt to new circumstances, but with the limitations imposed on them both by themselves or situations. Despite their biographical parallels, it is the similarities and complementarities in their thinking that are more profound reasons to associate them. Both wrestle with the challenge of understanding the ways and the extent to which it is possible to anticipate and to shape the future to …

Aggregating Moral Preferences, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. “Ideal-advisor” accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular, the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do diverge? …

Gun Rights Talk, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reasons: Explanatory And Normative, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

‘A reason’ has two meanings: explanatory reasons are facts that contribute to an explanation (of anything explained); normative reasons are facts that favour and guide responses, in one’s emotions, beliefs, actions, etc., to how things are. The two kinds of reasons are connected by their connection to the capacity of Reason, or rationality, and by the normative/explanatory nexus, i.e. by the fact that normative reasons can explain the response that they favour. Normative reasons are — potentially — explanatory reasons, but the explanations they provide are of a special kind that presupposes their normative character. The chapter builds on …

Moral Limits Of Dworkin's Theory Of Law And Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

At the foundation of Justice for Hedgehogs is a commitment to moral objectivity – the doctrine that there are right answers to moral questions. This nicely complements Dworkin’s legal theory, which holds that right answers to legal questions depend on right answers to moral questions. Without the doctrine of moral objectivity, Dworkin could not reasonably maintain, as he does, that law provides determinate answers to legal questions.

Deciphering Dignity, Leslie Meltzer Henry

Faculty Scholarship

This commentary draws on dignity’s usage in law, ethics, and public policy to contemplate a narrow question about what the concept of dignity means in debates about human enhancement technologies. In particular, it considers arguments made by Fabrice Jotterand and other bioethicists who aim to repudiate the transhumanist claim that individuals can enhance their dignity through technological modification. The trouble with the positions on both sides of this debate is that it is extremely difficult to make normative comparisons about human and post-human dignity without first infusing dignity with particular metaphysical assumptions. To that end, the commentary offers a brief …

Secularism, Religion, And Liberal Democracy In The United States, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is divided into three categories: some brief remarks about forms of secularism, an outline of American constitutional law as it relates to religion, and a discussion from the standpoint of political philosophy of the proper place of religion (and other similar perspectives) in making political decisions within liberal democracies. Because the audience for whom the oral comments from which the essay is derived was mainly non-American, the middle part of the essay sets out many propositions familiar to anyone acquainted with this branch of constitutional law. And because of the informal nature of the original presentation, I offer …

The Myth Of Instrumental Rationality, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

My main aim is to explain the normative character of the phenomena that are commonly discussed when theoretical writers discuss instrumental rationality and instrumental reasons. The discussion will assume that there are forms of practical normativity, of practical reasons, which are not instrumental in nature. The question central to the inquiry is what, if any, normative difference does adopting or having an end make? For example, are there instrumental reasons and, if there are, how do they relate to having ends? Are instrumental reasons distinctive kinds of reasons, whose normativity differs in its underlying rationale from that of, say, moral …

Two Concepts Of Immortality: Reframing Public Debate On Stem-Cell Research, Frank Pasquale

Faculty Scholarship

Regenerative medicine seeks not only to cure disease, but also to arrest the aging process itself. So far, public attention to the new health care has focused on two of its methods: embryonic stem-cell research and therapeutic cloning. Since both processes manipulate embryos, they alarm those who believe life begins at conception. Such religious objections have dominated headlines on the topic, and were central to President George W. Bush's decision to restrict stem-cell research.

Although they are now politically potent, the present religious objections to regenerative medicine will soon become irrelevant. Scientists are fast developing new ways of culturing the …

Face-Ing The Other: An Ethics Of Encounter And Solidarity In Legal Services Practice, Marie Failinger

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, the author proposes that those who work in any capacity with impoverished clients and embattled minority communities imagine practice from within Levinas' key images. First, that ethics is first philosophy - that knowledge of the self, the Other and the context in which ethical action is possible does not precede ethical understanding, decision-making and action, but that rather that we become human in the ethical encounter with the incommensurable Other. Second, that representing a client is in each moment an encounter with the face of the Other. We look up into the face of the Other calling …

Rethinking "Original Intent", David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Although Dred Scott v. Sandford is one of the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions, it is not often taught or read. But its approach to constitutional interpretation is by no means outdated, and its historical importance has not diminished. So it seems a good example to consider.

Church-State Relations And Religious Convictions, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Since the title of my talk is hardly self-explanatory, I want to begin by outlining my topic. My overall concern is with the proper place of religious convictions in lawmaking in our society. My special focus is on the place of religious convictions in the political resolution of churchstate issues.

The Connection Between Law And Morality: Comments On Dworkin, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Our discussions yesterday seemed haunted by a contrast--never quite formulated--between Natural Law and Legal Positivism. The standard interpretation turns on the idea of a "necessary connection" between law and morality. Positivism has often been understood to hold, and Natural Law to deny, that there can be unjust laws.

Justification And Judicial Responsibility, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

These Centenary Lectures are devoted to the "tension between rule and policy" in adjudication. The charge to the lecturers suggests it is "naive" to suppose that "the proper function of a court is to apply an established rule of law to the dispute before it." This topic has been a focus of legal theory at least since Holmes delivered his famous lecture, "The Path of the Law"--nearly as long as law has been taught at the University of California. It merits our continuing study.

Need, Necessity, And Political Obligation, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

In Law and Obedience, Professor Woozley denies that there is an obligation to obey the law just because it is the law. Professor Honoré disagrees. He does so, however, not by offering small criticisms of what he calls "the skeptical philosophy," but by giving us a vigorous and original argument for the more conventional, conformist view.

Authority And Consent, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

My starting point is the assumption that there is no general obligation to obey the law, not even a prima facie obligation and not even in a just society. This assumption is perhaps becoming more popular. In recent years it has been defended by several writers. There is more that needs to be said in its support, but I will not attempt to do so here. Instead, I will reflect on a problem posed by accepting it, a problem concerning the relations between an individual citizen and the state. It is common to think that the state has authority over …

Vietnam Amnesty – Problems Of Justice And Line-Drawing, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

The troublesome issue of pardon for crimes connected with the Vietnam War raises some of the most complex and difficult questions in the philosophy of law. What are the purposes of criminal punishment? Under what conditions is violation of obligations imposed by law morally justified? When, and on what conditions, is it proper to excuse those who have violated the law for conscientious reasons? How much should decisions whether to pardon turn on what offenders "deserve" and how much should they turn on what will be socially acceptable and promote future social harmony? How far should the desirability of dispositions …

The Nature Of The Contract Argument, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

As truth is the first virtue of belief, so justice is of social institutions. That is John Rawls's view, and it seems true, at any rate, of the law. Official acts, laws, and legal arrangements generally are characterized as just or unjust, while other moral categories are much less frequently invoked. Justice seems inseparable from good law. It is therefore striking and important that justice has recently been regarded by prominent legal theorists as rationally disreputable--as, in Kelsen's words, "an irrational idea." Many divergent conceptions of social justice have been propounded, and it is held that there is no rational …

On Formal Justice, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

A number of legal and political theorists have suggested that public officials who fail to act within the law that they administer act unjustly. This does not mean that injustice is always likely to be done merely because it often happens to be done when officials depart from the law. Some writers have held that injustice is done whenever an official fails to act within the law, regardless of the circumstances. I shall call this type of view "formal justice."