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Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons™
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Articles 91 - 120 of 511
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Why Do Chapman & Huffman Think Humans Are Not Different?, Nick Zangwill
Why Do Chapman & Huffman Think Humans Are Not Different?, Nick Zangwill
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman’s (2018) denial of differences between human beings and animals and the ethical consequences they think turn on this. Rationality is proposed as a candidate for such a difference, one that also has acceptable ethical consequences.
Extending Animal Welfare Science To Include Wild Animals, Walter Veit, Heather Browning
Extending Animal Welfare Science To Include Wild Animals, Walter Veit, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Ng’s (2016) target article built on his earlier work advocating a science of welfare biology (Ng 1995). Although there were problems with the models proposed in Ng’s original paper regarding the balance of pleasure and suffering for wild animals, his call for a science of wild animal welfare was a sound one. This does not require a new discipline but just an extension of the existing frameworks and methods of animal welfare science to include wild animals.
When Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others, Steve Clarke
When Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others, Steve Clarke
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that we should attribute moral standing not only to vertebrates but also to certain invertebrates. M&P also object on ethical grounds to policies of scientific funding agencies that encourage scientists to replace vertebrates by invertebrates in research. M&P do allow that some invertebrates with brains may have lower levels of moral status than some vertebrates, but this seems to conflict with their case against replacement policies.
Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley
Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley
Animal Sentience
Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.
Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill
Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill
Animal Sentience
We attribute consciousness to other humans because their anatomy and behavior resembles our own and their verbal descriptions of subjective experiences correspond to ours. Nonhuman mammals have somewhat humanlike behavior and anatomy, but without the verbal descriptions. Their sentience is therefore open to Cartesian doubt. Robot "minds" lack humanlike behavior and anatomy, and so their sentience is generally discounted no matter what sentences they generate. Invertebrates lack both neurological similarity and language. Although it may be safest in making moral judgments to assume that some invertebrates are sentient, cogent reasons for thinking so must await an objective causal explanation for …
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
We agree with Mikhalevich & Powell but take issue with their criteria for attributing sentience. This problem is connected with difficult issues concerning moral comparisons and evaluating moral decisions when interspecific moral interests conflict.
Avoiding Anthropocentrism In Evolutionarily Inclusive Ethics, Simon Fitzpatrick
Avoiding Anthropocentrism In Evolutionarily Inclusive Ethics, Simon Fitzpatrick
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates are unworthy of ethical concern. However, developing an evolutionarily inclusive ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical scala naturae and human-centered conceptions of the biological world. In particular, we need to question the anthropocentric assumptions that still linger in discussions like these.
Zones Of Precaution, Jonathan Birch
Zones Of Precaution, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
My commentary focusses on Mikhalevich & Powell’s criticisms of the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle. I emphasize the pragmatic nature of my rationale for proposing that, rather than extending the scope of animal welfare protection on a species-by-species basis, we should be willing to protect entire Linnaean orders on the basis of evidence from a single species.
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Invertebrates deserve moral consideration. Definition of terms clarifies the relationship between sentience and welfare. All animals have welfare but humans give more protection to sentient animals. Humans should be less human-centred.
Invertebrate Cognition, Sentience And Biology, Georges Chapouthier
Invertebrate Cognition, Sentience And Biology, Georges Chapouthier
Animal Sentience
All animal species have adapted for survival and no species is superior overall. For cognitive capacities and sentience, invertebrates such as the octopus, although quite unlike vertebrates, can achieve similar performance levels. So can other invertebrates with small brains; hence they too, as sentient beings, deserve moral consideration from humans. How are we to identify these species? Only though a detailed analysis of their behavior. The decision, which is a moral judgment, depends on biological knowledge that still needs to be acquired.
Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.
Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell make a compelling case that some invertebrates may be sentient and that our moral obligations in the context of welfare should hence extend to them. Although the case is similar to that made for fishes, there is one obvious difference in that examples of invertebrate sentience probably arose independently from vertebrate sentience. We have unequivocal proof that complex cognition arose multiple times over evolutionary history. Given that cognition is our best tool for indirectly quantifying sentience, it seems highly likely that this multiple polygenesis may also have occurred for sentience. In acknowledging this, we must accept that …
Minds, Morality And Midgies, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Minds, Morality And Midgies, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and sentience in these organisms. The implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are dependent on phenomenal consciousness needs to be reconsidered in light of current neuroscientific evidence. We conclude by proposing a neural algorithmic approach for deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience.
Asian Elephant Rescue, Rehabilitation And Rewilding, Liv Baker, Rebecca Winkler
Asian Elephant Rescue, Rehabilitation And Rewilding, Liv Baker, Rebecca Winkler
Animal Sentience
Thailand has fewer than 10,000 elephants left. More of them are living in captivity to serve the tourist industry under grim conditions than are living free in what is left of their wild habitat. Conservation efforts need to be focused on all surviving members of the species, captive and free, but they need to take into account the inextricable entanglement of human and nonhuman animal lives in Thailand today. There is an opportunity for rescuing, rehabilitating and reintroducing captive elephants to the wild with the help of the traditional expertise of a mahout culture that has been elephant-keeping for centuries. …
Anthropology And Conservation, Nicolas Lainé
Anthropology And Conservation, Nicolas Lainé
Animal Sentience
Baker & Winkler make a welcome contribution to elephant conservation in Thailand in advocating a role for joint human/elephant labor and local expertise in rewilding. Their argument would benefit, however, if it drew more upon the local ethnographic evidence. Ethnocentric notions such as “welfare” and “wellbeing” may not fit into the local perception of pachyderms.
Rewilding And Domestication: Clarifying Terminology, Catia Correia-Caeiro
Rewilding And Domestication: Clarifying Terminology, Catia Correia-Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Baker & Winkler (B&W) describe the state of Asian elephant conservation, raising unique issues, and proposing a direction based on rewilding. The long history and socio-biology of elephants and humans has some parallels with the domestication of dogs (and other species). However, markers of domestication seem absent from elephants. The proper use of terms such as “wild” and “domestic” is crucial in defining the best conservation strategies, and, more important, in attending to the welfare needs of individuals, which can differ between wild and domestic animals. B&W’s target article represents an important starting point for discussion around elephant conservation, but …
Global Risks Of Intensive Animal Farming And The Wildlife Trade, Deborah Cao
Global Risks Of Intensive Animal Farming And The Wildlife Trade, Deborah Cao
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses two issues highlighted by Wiebers & Feigin in the context of the current and future global health crisis: the wildlife trade and factory farming. Both are instances of globalized animal cruelty – in China as well as worldwide -- that require global solutions for the well-being of both humans and nonhumans.
One Planet, One Health, Michael W. Fox
One Planet, One Health, Michael W. Fox
Animal Sentience
We have to reduce our collective exploitation and consumption of animals. That is what is bringing on pandemics and other zoonotic diseases, accelerating climate change, destroying biodiversity, and causing untold amounts of animal suffering.
Cultured Meat Could Prevent The Next Pandemic, Jonathan Anomaly
Cultured Meat Could Prevent The Next Pandemic, Jonathan Anomaly
Animal Sentience
Wiebers & Feigin identify intensive agriculture and trade in exotic animals as the main sources of novel zoonotic viral infections. They recommend a transition away from meat. I would add that we would do well to invest in the mass production of cultured meat, derived from stem cells, as a radical alternative to animal agriculture.
Innovation In Meat Production: A Problem And An Opportunity, Christopher J. Bryant
Innovation In Meat Production: A Problem And An Opportunity, Christopher J. Bryant
Animal Sentience
Innovation in meat production has enabled modern humans to inflict far greater harm on animals, the environment, and public health than was possible just a few decades ago. Wiebers & Feigin aptly express the urgency with which these issues must be addressed. Those advocating for animals on moral grounds face resistance from omnivores citing taste, price and convenience. Further innovation in meat production (plant-based and cultured meat) will enable us to preserve the experience of eating meat whilst phasing out the many problems caused by industrial animal farming.
Harm, Earth Jurisprudence And Human/Nonhuman Relationships, Tanya Wyatt
Harm, Earth Jurisprudence And Human/Nonhuman Relationships, Tanya Wyatt
Animal Sentience
To prevent the next pandemic and to protect the environment and non-human animals, there needs to be a clear definition of harm and a legal system grounded in Earth Jurisprudence. Drawing on evolutionary principles to redefine harm and to radically alter the legal system to be Earth-centred will help ensure that harmful actions like certain wildlife trade, wildlife trafficking, and intensive farming do not threaten the survival of any life.
Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates
Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates
Animal Sentience
Attention needs to be directed to the processes that control behavior in humans and the adaptive problems that they solved in our early evolutionary environment. The evolutionary mismatch between the current environment and the human brain can yield important insights into the problems that beset us in the context of environmental degradation and nonhuman animal welfare.
Re-Engage With The World For Global Health And Animal Welfare, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Re-Engage With The World For Global Health And Animal Welfare, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Animal Sentience
Wiebers & Feigin (2020) make a strong argument for measures that would limit future zoonoses, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, by closing live-animal markets, changing our habits of food consumption and production, and reducing habitat destruction. These would help human health, animal welfare, and conservation of at-risk wildlife all at the same time. China’s command-and-control government can accomplish some of these things by edict, but slower-to-act western democracies play a surprisingly large role in these global problems by the power of their consumerism, including the illicit wildlife trade. We citizens need to insist that our government use all of its …
Thinking Longer, Looking Deeper, Ronnie Z. Hawkins
Thinking Longer, Looking Deeper, Ronnie Z. Hawkins
Animal Sentience
We need to situate the present crisis within the larger context of what we humans have done to the nonhuman forms of life with which we evolved, taking a longer view of our own evolutionary origins and a deeper look at what might be a more appropriate role for our species to play within the Biosphere.
Reflections On Psychological And Psychiatric Consequences Of Covid-19 Pandemic, Donatella Marazziti
Reflections On Psychological And Psychiatric Consequences Of Covid-19 Pandemic, Donatella Marazziti
Animal Sentience
Although far from reaching a clear conclusion, some evidence increasingly highlights the possible connections among climate change, environmental pollution and the current COVID-19 pandemic, as well as their intertwined detrimental effects on both physical and mental health. Such a catastrophic event calls for a novel awareness of the interdependence of all biotic and nonbiotic factors in our environment and planet.
Bridging The Empathy Gap For Invertebrates, John M. Marzluff
Bridging The Empathy Gap For Invertebrates, John M. Marzluff
Animal Sentience
The actions of sentient vertebrates command our attention and inform our morality. Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) argue that similar activities in a wide range of invertebrates with central nervous systems should do likewise. However, humans most readily empathize with creatures we recognize as similar in behavior, physiology, or appearance to ourselves. Helping humanity overcome this bias is a significant challenge for those who study invertebrates. Until this empathy gap is bridged, I believe few people and the policies they craft will afford invertebrates the moral standing that M&P argue they deserve. Therefore, I suggest those interested in raising appreciation …
Affective Sentience And Moral Protection, Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich
Affective Sentience And Moral Protection, Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?
Improving Invertebrate Welfare, Heather Browning, Walter Veit
Improving Invertebrate Welfare, Heather Browning, Walter Veit
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates. They do not offer any examples, however, of how their welfare should be considered or improved. We draw on animal welfare science to suggest some ways that would not be excessively demanding.
Drawing The Boundaries Of Animal Sentience, Walter Veit, Bryce Huebner
Drawing The Boundaries Of Animal Sentience, Walter Veit, Bryce Huebner
Animal Sentience
We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not.
Sentience In Evolutionary Context, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Sentience In Evolutionary Context, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but we differ on some of their definitions and terms. Affects (emotional feelings) should be part of sentience. Although the evidence presented for insect sentience is strong, we list some of the counterevidence that should be considered. Our own research supports M&P’s choice of arthropods, cephalopods, and vertebrates as the only sentient organisms with moral status.
Relationship Between Cognition And Moral Status Needs Overhaul, Carrie Figdor
Relationship Between Cognition And Moral Status Needs Overhaul, Carrie Figdor
Animal Sentience
I commend Mikhalevich & Powell for extending the discussion of cognition and its relation to moral status with their well researched and argued target article on invertebrate cognition. I have two small criticisms: that the scala naturae still retains its appeal to some in biology as well as psychology, and that drawing the line at invertebrates requires a bit more defense given the larger comparative cognitive-scientific context.