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Articles 451 - 480 of 511
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
An Empirical Perspective On Animal Advocacy, Allison M. Smith, Jacy Reese
An Empirical Perspective On Animal Advocacy, Allison M. Smith, Jacy Reese
Animal Sentience
Ng (2016) lists some modest examples of goals that animal advocates could work towards. We provide examples of more ambitious animal advocacy strategies that are successful now, and strategies that researchers can use to engage productively with animal advocates. We also agree with Ng and some other commentators that animal advocates and researchers should prioritize the interests of individual wild animals over the preservation of nonsentient entities.
Wild Animal Suffering And Vegan Outreach, Eze Paez
Wild Animal Suffering And Vegan Outreach, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
Ng’s strategic proposal seems to downplay the potential benefits of advocacy for wild animals and omit what may be the most effective strategy to reduce the harms farmed animals suffer: vegan outreach.
To Minimize Animal Suffering, Broaden The Definition Of Animal Cruelty, Eleonora Gullone
To Minimize Animal Suffering, Broaden The Definition Of Animal Cruelty, Eleonora Gullone
Animal Sentience
Mandatory veterinary reporting of suspected abuse might discourage caregivers from seeking treatment for their injured animals. Animal abusers are more likely to be brought to justice by raising community awareness about the link between animal cruelty and human violence and its implications for the wellbeing of both humans and animals. Commonly accepted definitions of animal cruelty focus only on cruelty that is socially unacceptable, excluding an enormous amount of unnecessary animal suffering caused by humans. Only by broadening the definition of animal cruelty can we bring about the cultural change necessary to minimize this animal suffering.
Animal Welfare At Home And In The Wild, Kyle Johannsen
Animal Welfare At Home And In The Wild, Kyle Johannsen
Animal Sentience
In recent work, economist Yew-Kwang Ng suggests strategies for improving animal welfare within the confines of institutions such as the meat industry. Although I argue that Ng is wrong not to advocate abolition, I do find his position concerning wild animals to be compelling. Anyone who takes the interests of animals seriously should also accept a cautious commitment to intervention in the wild.
Animal Suffering And Human Bias, Stijn Bruers
Animal Suffering And Human Bias, Stijn Bruers
Animal Sentience
Ng proposes concrete ways to decrease animal suffering on the basis of commonsense economic logic and research in welfare biology. But to reduce animal suffering effectively in livestock farming, animal experimentation or the natural environment we have to become more aware of our pervasive and spontaneous but unreliable intuitive moral judgments. These can generate biases that prevent us from decreasing animal suffering effectively.
An Animal Victim's Best Chance: Veterinary Legal Duty To Report Cruelty In The U.S., Lora Dunn
An Animal Victim's Best Chance: Veterinary Legal Duty To Report Cruelty In The U.S., Lora Dunn
Animal Sentience
Legislation throughout the U.S. recognizes animal sentience and the importance of veterinary reporting to combat the ongoing suffering of these animal victims: All 50 states have felony penalties available for animal cruelty crimes, and veterinary reporting is permitted or required in the majority of states. The remaining minority of U.S. states should take action to require veterinarians to report animal cruelty and render veterinarians immune for good faith reporting.
Veterinary Medical Associations Need To Educate Veterinarians For Mandatory Reporting Of Suspected Animal Abuse, Melinda V. Merck
Veterinary Medical Associations Need To Educate Veterinarians For Mandatory Reporting Of Suspected Animal Abuse, Melinda V. Merck
Animal Sentience
When animals are suffering, we have a duty to take action. With appropriate incentive and educational support mandatory veterinary reporting can be a great legal avenue to help ensure their safety and welfare.
Fish Pain's Burden Of Proof, Carl Safina
Fish Pain's Burden Of Proof, Carl Safina
Animal Sentience
A hypothesis like Key’s, that fish cannot feel pain, should really be stated as a null hypothesis — an assumption that there is no difference in the things being compared. Then evidence — including anecdotal evidence — for and against rejecting the null hypothesis can be examined and weighed. Key (2016a) has proven only that fish lack mammalian brains.
What Does The Child Protection Movement Teach Us About The Role Of The Mandated Reporter Of Abuse?, Bill C. Henry
What Does The Child Protection Movement Teach Us About The Role Of The Mandated Reporter Of Abuse?, Bill C. Henry
Animal Sentience
Requiring veterinarians to report suspected animal abuse faces many of the same issues, concerns and hurdles once faced by the child protection movement. The history of child protection may hence provide a strategic model for progress in animal protection. Being able to anticipate the hurdles will help prepare us to overcome them.
Burden Of Proof Lies With Proposer Of Celestial Teapot Hypothesis, Brian Key
Burden Of Proof Lies With Proposer Of Celestial Teapot Hypothesis, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Bertrand Russell famously imagined the existence of a celestial teapot to highlight that the burden of proof of a hypothesis lay with its proposer and it was not the responsibility of others to refute it. Those who propose that fish feel pain must bear the burden of proof for their hypothesis. There are several common arguments adopted by those defending the position that fish feel pain. For instance, proponents envisage that pain is so important for human survival that they can’t imagine fish could exist without it. Out of this argument from incredulity emerges the idea that pain must have …
Animal Suffering In China, Peter J. Li
Animal Suffering In China, Peter J. Li
Animal Sentience
Chinese policy has been aimed at maximizing GDP; it is time to focus also on minimizing animal suffering.
Science And Sensibility, Bernard E. Rollin
Science And Sensibility, Bernard E. Rollin
Animal Sentience
The sentience and suffering of animals is obvious to common sense, even if science and industry claim to be agnostic. Economic incentives to reduce the suffering of animals are welcome, but it is not clear whether animals can turn to science for help.
When The Client Is Not The Abuser, But One Of The Abused, Tania Signal
When The Client Is Not The Abuser, But One Of The Abused, Tania Signal
Animal Sentience
The question of client confidentiality and reporting animal abuse is complicated when the client is not the abuser, and when the abuse (of both people and animals) may escalate precisely because it has been (or may be) reported.
A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood
A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) describes the neural system involved in human pain experience in an excellent fashion but then suggests that only that complete system can generate the experience of pain. Thus animals without all components will not feel pain. This argument has been refuted in the past by analogy to vision where it is clear that a broad range of taxa, vertebrate and invertebrate, have good visual abilities albeit with completely different central nervous systems and receptors. This known counterargument to Key’s main idea is not mentioned in the target article. Further criteria that might indicate pain and studies examining these …
Cortex Necessary For Pain — But Not In Sense That Matters, Adam J. Shriver
Cortex Necessary For Pain — But Not In Sense That Matters, Adam J. Shriver
Animal Sentience
Certain cortical regions are necessary for pain in humans in the sense that, at particular times, they play a direct role in pain. However, it is not true that they are necessary in the more important sense that pain is never possible in humans without them. There are additional details from human lesion studies concerning functional plasticity that undermine Key’s (2016) interpretation. Moreover, no one has yet identified any specific behaviors that mammalian cortical pain regions make possible that are absent in fish.
Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt
Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) discussion of his claim that fish do not feel pain ignores the history of attempts to study the attribution of mental states to other species. Although willing to accept that mammals feel pain, Key claims that fish lack the mammalian neural mechanisms underlying pain and are unconscious of their experiences. Consequently, we do not need to be overly concerned about fishing practices that would otherwise be viewed as painful. Key uses a flawed anthropomorphic lens. All attributions of mental events to organisms other than oneself involve inferences derived from anthropomorphic processes through which we process physiological and behavioral …
Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Animal Sentience
Evidence from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology suggests that the experience of feelings in humans does not depend exclusively on structures of the cerebral cortex. It does not seem warranted to deny the possibility of feeling in animals on the grounds that their cerebral cortices are not comparable to those of humans.
Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key
Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key
Animal Sentience
The reader of Animal Sentience may surmise that because the weight of the commentaries on my target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is leaning towards not supporting my argument, it follows that the premise "fish do not feel pain" is incorrect. However, science does not prevail by popular opinion. History is plagued with numerous (and often widely accepted) examples of biological phenomena being explained by mysterious forces. In the absence of a mechanistic understanding, the many different guises of vitalism (the principle that life involves a vital energy) are often invoked to explain the unknown. Spurious …
Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Key's (2016) arguments against the view that fish feel pain can be shown to be fallacious by considering some damage-related behaviors in invertebrates. Pain may have different neural bases in different organisms, so the absence in fish of the cortical structures that might underlie pain in mammals does not settle the question of fish pain.
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Animal Sentience
In discussing fish pain, Key (2016) privileges pain in humans — “the only species able to directly report on its feelings.” Human experience of pain is not necessarily best reflected by verbal self-report, however. Neural responses to noxious stimuli are influenced by individual differences and by context. Nonverbal pain displays such as facial expressions reflect part of the neural response to noxious stimuli. Most mammals have a specific facial grimace reflecting pain. If fish have a somatic expression of pain, the development of a reliable and accurate somatic pain scale specific to fish could make a contribution to the debate …
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege
Animal Sentience
In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral …
Fish Sentience And The Precautionary Principle, Robert C. Jones
Fish Sentience And The Precautionary Principle, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key makes a number of conceptual, philosophical, and empirical errors that undermine his claim.
An Invertebrate Perspective On Pain, Jennifer A. Mather
An Invertebrate Perspective On Pain, Jennifer A. Mather
Animal Sentience
Although Key (2016) argues that mammals feel pain and fish do not, from an invertebrate perspective, it is obvious that the pain experience is shared by animals from a number of different animal groups.
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Animal Sentience
The target article by Key (2016) examines whether fish have brain structures capable of mediating pain perception and consciousness, functions known to depend on the neocortex in humans. He concludes, as others have concluded (Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2014), that such functions are impossible for fish brains. This conclusion has been met with hypothetical assertions by others to the effect that functions of pain and consciousness may well be possible through unknown alternate neural processes. Key's argument would be bolstered by consideration of other neurological as well as behavioral evidence, which shows that sharks and ray are fishes …
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Animal Sentience
In his excellent target article, Key (2016) develops a mechanistic argument in an attempt to show why it is unlikely that fish can “feel” pain or for that matter, “feel” anything. The topic is controversial and likely to achieve the goal of getting many hits for the inaugural issue of the new journal, Animal Sentience. In my view, the question is unlikely to be answered, for two reasons. First, because the proponents of the “fish feel pain” controversy are untrained and unskilled in the details and jargon of neurophysiology and/or neuroanatomy, and the opponents of the controversy, like Key, …
Fish And Pain: The Politics Of Doubt, Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel
Fish And Pain: The Politics Of Doubt, Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel
Animal Sentience
The commentaries on Key’s (2016) target article make it clear that there is a great deal of doubt about Key’s thesis that fish do not feel pain. The political question therefore is about how we should respond to doubt. If the thesis of Key and others (that fish do not feel pain) is wrong, then the negative impact for fish in terms of suffering caused by human utilisation would be extreme. In the face of this doubt, the very least we can do is to adopt basic welfare precautions to mitigate the potential impact if fish do suffer, with attention …
How Not To Move The Line Drawn On Pain, Bjorn H. Merker
How Not To Move The Line Drawn On Pain, Bjorn H. Merker
Animal Sentience
In this second commentary I outline the inadequacy of Key's responses to the many peer critiques of his thesis that have so far appeared in Animal Sentience. I illustrate with examples drawn from his response to my first commentary.
Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective, Yew-Kwang Ng
Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) target article provides some strong arguments but also makes some logical mistakes. The arguments are not sufficient to support a definite conclusion that fish cannot feel pain. A multi-faceted perspective taking into account brain structure, chemical secretion in brain, animal behavior, and evolutionary biology may be useful and appears, at least in some aspects, to suggest the opposite conclusion from that of the target article.
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims fish that fish do not feel pain because they lack the necessary neuronal architecture: their responses to noxious stimuli, according to Key, are executed automatically without any feelings. However, as pointed out by many of his commentators, this conclusion is not convincing. Plants might provide some clues. Plants are not usually thought to be very active behaviorally, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, in stressful situations, plants produce numerous chemicals that have painkilling and anesthetic properties. Finally, plants, when treated with anesthetics, cannot execute active behaviors such as touch-induced leaf movements or rapid trap closures after localizing …
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Whether fish feel pain is a hot political topic. The consequences of our denial are huge given the billions of fish that are slaughtered annually for human consumption. The economic costs of changing our commercial fishery harvest practices are also likely to be great. Key outlines a structure-function analogy of pain in humans, tries to force that template on the rest of the vertebrate kingdom, and fails. His target article has so far elicited 34 commentaries from scientific experts from a broad range of disciplines; only three of these support his position. The broad consensus from the scientific community is …