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- Sentience (34)
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Articles 211 - 240 of 358
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Animal Sentience
Marino has provided an accurate and nuanced view about chickens’ complex capabilities as sentient individuals. I explore the implications of these findings for scholars as well as for activists in the protection of farmed animals.
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Animal Sentience
Beginning mainly with the “cognitive revolution” in psychology in the latter half of the 20th century, psychological science has been committing “suicide” slowly via linguistic muddling. Peña-Guzmán’s target article is but one of thousands of cuts contributing to this death by “suicide.” Having said that, given the current state of affairs in animal cognition research, there is much to commend in Peña-Guzmán’s article. I leave that to others, however. This commentary explains how the suicide by muddling of psychological science is happening in general, with the understanding that it applies also to Peña-Guzmán’s target article.
On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour
On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
What would be the moral implications of the capacity for suicide in nonhuman animals? Humans can be helped to end their lives if they no longer find them bearable. Should captive animals not be given the same possibility?
Self, Death, And Suicide: Does An Animal Know Of These?, Carolyn A. Ristau
Self, Death, And Suicide: Does An Animal Know Of These?, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán makes a strong case, using examples from the media and scientific literature, that many captive animals suffer severely. In examining the possibility of animal suicide, he dismisses the need for “reflective self-subjectivity” and “intent” in suicidal behavior. He claims that at least some animals understand “death,” citing examples of behavior he deems to be death “rituals.” But these can be more simply interpreted. The possibility of animal suicide remains more dubious than Peña-Guzmán suggests.
Changes In Behavior And Emotion Under Chicken Domestication, Martin Johnsson
Changes In Behavior And Emotion Under Chicken Domestication, Martin Johnsson
Animal Sentience
Marino’s target article provides an overview of chickens’ cognition, emotion, and personality, with the aim of changing how people view chickens. In this commentary, I will agree that chickens deserve better than their reputation, but contend with a statement about the lack of behavioral change under chicken domestication.
To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber
To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
Several additional comments on Reber (2016a) have appeared. Like those addressed in Reber (2016b), they reflect points of agreement and disagreement on various elements of my Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model. Some, however, seem to have missed key points. I'm willing to take some responsibility for this. Perhaps I was not clear about some of the more radical points of the model. Hopefully the case-by-case review here will help.
Clarifying Concepts In Cognitive Dissonance Theory, Eddie Harmon-Jones
Clarifying Concepts In Cognitive Dissonance Theory, Eddie Harmon-Jones
Animal Sentience
This commentary on Zentall’s target article focuses primarily on clarifying some postulates and variables in cognitive dissonance theory. I discuss the adaptive motivational functions of dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction, and attempt to clarify some past dissonance experiments and to tease apart a dissonance theory and contrast explanation of effort-justification-type effects. The evidence and arguments reviewed here support the explanatory power of cognitive dissonance theory in a wide variety of circumstances in human and nonhuman animals, but they depend on first defining concepts such as “cognitions” quite broadly, as Festinger did when he originally proposed the theory.
Shoring Up The Precautionary Bar, Jon Mallatt
Shoring Up The Precautionary Bar, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
I offer four ways to reinforce Birch’s precautionary principle so it can be used effectively and practically in deciding which animals to cover by legislation for humane treatment: (1) add one more credible indicator of sentience to the BAR rule; (2) use phylogenetic classification, not the outdated Linnaean classification, to test which animal clades have sentience; (3) disentangle the pain of suffering from sentience; and (4) reconsider the sentient status of decapods and insects to remove potential inconsistencies in the proposed framework.
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive …
Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers
Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
Measures of vigilance and fear might be more consistently associated if side biases are taken into account, because the right side of the brain is specialised to detect predators and to express fear responses. In species with eyes positioned laterally and with relatively small binocular fields, this brain asymmetry is manifested as eye preferences because each eye sends most of its input to be processed in the opposite side of the brain. Hence, responses elicited by stimuli on the animal’s left side are more likely be associated with fear than are responses to the same stimuli on the animal’s right …
Individual Variation In Fear Behaviour, Rob Found
Individual Variation In Fear Behaviour, Rob Found
Animal Sentience
Individual variation in behaviour adds another layer of complexity to studies of animal responses to fear and risk, but when individual responses are consistent, and correlated with other behaviours, these patterns can provide a structure that furthers our understanding. I interpret Beauchamp’s review of vigilance and fear from the perspective of my own studies of elk personality. Wild elk responses to changing stimuli (benign or aversive) illustrate how personality is a key factor in explaining variation in vigilance and fear behavior. Personality even influences how wildlife can learn to assess risk and adjust their fear responses accordingly.
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
Animal Sentience
Animal vigilance is concerned with the monitoring of potential threats caused by predators and conspecifics. Researchers have argued that threats are part of a landscape of fear tracking the level of risk posed by predators and conspecifics. Vigilance, which is expected to vary with the level of risk, could thus be used as a measure of fear. Here, I explore the relationship between vigilance and fear caused by predators and conspecifics. The joint occurrence of vigilance and other physiological responses to fear, such as increased heart rate and stress hormone release, would bolster the idea that vigilance can be a …
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principal is often invoked when talking about the evidence of sentience in animals, largely because we can never be certain what any animal is thinking or feeling. Birch (2017) offers a preliminary framework for the use of the precautionary principal for animal sentience combining an epistemic rule with a decision rule. I extend this framework by adding an evolutionary phylogentic approach which spreads the burden of proof across broad taxonomic groups and a risk assessment component which magnifies the likely impact by the number of animals involved.
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Animal Sentience
Birch’s formulation is persuasive but not nuanced enough to capture at least one situation where it is reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle (PP): when we have multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically significant evidence of a single credible indicator of sentience within the order as required by BAR. I respond to the worry that if we include such cases in our framework for applying the PP, we open ourselves to the charge of being “unscientific.”
What Harmful Practices? The Material Scope Of Animal Protection Legislation, Eze Paez
What Harmful Practices? The Material Scope Of Animal Protection Legislation, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch proposes a criterion for the subjective scope of animal protection legislation. He says nothing about its material scope: which harmful practices it should regulate. I argue, first, that most moral views would agree that the worst forms of animal exploitation should be legally forbidden, even if there will inevitably be disagreement about some cases of animal experimentation. I also argue that, when feasible, there should be legal provisions to help wild animals.
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Assuming an animal to be sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an extreme position, hence it should not and could not be the default assumption. Birch explains how the precautionary principle may be used to substantiate decisions to give the animal the benefit of doubt. Although I am reluctant to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument for the use of the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more research is needed to refine and understand this relationship.
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) is right to emphasize that we should study consciousness (sentience) in its simplest form, taking its evolution into account. However, not enough evidence is presented to support CBC’s unorthodox claim that even simple, one-celled organisms are conscious. As pointed out by other commentators, the CBC seems to be based on outdated ideas about evolution and does not acknowledge that consciousness could be an evolutionary novel feature. Such emergent features are abundant in living organisms. We review our own emergentist solution, in which consciousness evolved in the elaborating nervous systems of the …
Animal Pain And The Social Role Of Science, Leslie Irvine
Animal Pain And The Social Role Of Science, Leslie Irvine
Animal Sentience
Assuming that all animals are sentient would mean ending their use in most scientific research. This does not necessarily imply an unscientific or anti-scientific stance. Examining the social role of science reveals its considerable investment in preserving the status quo, including the continued use of animal subjects. From this perspective, the use of animal subjects is a custom that science could move beyond, rather than a methodological requirement that it must defend.
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
Beauchamp’s target article raises important questions about the features that often accompany fear. How reliable an indicator of fear is vigilance? Is it constitutive, cause, or consequence of fear? These questions force us towards a clearer definition of “fear.”
What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk
What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Zentall’s thoughtful review of the literature on cognitive dissonance in nonhumans helps to highlight the common finding that similar outcomes in humans and nonhumans can be attributed to different underlying mechanisms. I advocate a more fully comparative approach to the underlying mechanisms, avoiding the assumption of shared processes in humans and nonhumans.
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory.
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal consciousness. This is generally done on the grounds that the fish pallium lacks a sufficiently expansive gross parcellation, as well as even minimally sufficient neuronal organization, intrinsic connectivity, and reciprocal extrinsic connections with the thalamus to support the subjective experience of qualia. It is also argued that fish do not exhibit the level of behavioral flexibility indicative of consciousness. A review of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioral studies is presented which leads to the conclusion that fish do have neurobiological correlates and behavioral flexibility of sufficient …
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Animal Sentience
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Animal Sentience
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Animal Sentience
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …
Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris
Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris
Animal Sentience
Kujala’s (2017) target article is ostensibly focused on how everyday folk (fail to) make sense of canine emotions. However, the theories outlined in the article apply to making sense of all aspects of the mentality of both human and non-human animals. The target article neglects the fundamental arguments surrounding the problem of other minds. I explore the relevant arguments and briefly review approaches suggesting that our everyday-life sense that both human and non-human animals are thinking, feeling, emotional beings has a secure epistemological basis.
Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Animal Sentience
I explore how the findings reviewed by Kujala (2017) influence our understanding of the human-dog bond. The special social cognitive abilities of dogs may be unique among animal species, probably influenced by the circumstances surrounding canine domestication. The bond has influenced animal welfare policies, giving dogs a privileged place among animals. To determine what protections other species should have in a rational animal welfare policy, more research is needed on whether other species have similar social cognitive abilities.
Inferring Emotion Without Language: Comparing Canines And Prelinguistic Infants, Stefanie Hoehl
Inferring Emotion Without Language: Comparing Canines And Prelinguistic Infants, Stefanie Hoehl
Animal Sentience
Research on canine emotions has to deal with challenges quite similar to psychological research on social and emotional development in human infants. In both cases, verbal reports are unattainable, and behavioral and physiological methods have to be adjusted to the specific population. I will argue that both regarding empirical approaches and conceptual work, advances in research on social-cognitive development in human infants can inform the study of canine emotions.