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Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons™
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Articles 181 - 210 of 519
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Sheep Are Sentient, But Not Identical, Alison Hanlon
Sheep Are Sentient, But Not Identical, Alison Hanlon
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (M&M) provide a timely reminder that sheep have advanced cognitive abilities, but do we still have to provide evidence to justify animal sentience? In the EU, regulations are designed to support farm animal welfare. Whilst the regulations are imperfect, they do emphasize behavioural needs and other concepts relevant to sentience. The persistence of sheep welfare issues such as lamb mortality indicates that regulations may not be achieving their desired goal. We can quibble about the science described by M&M yet reach the same conclusion: sheep (lambs, ewes and rams) are not all identical, but they are all …
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Our Response is centered on five major themes: (1) our presentation of human mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”) as a dimension underlying the way people perceive and treat sheep; (3) whether our review is too anthropocentric or anthropomorphic; (4) animal welfare versus animal rights (abolitionism); and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough to change human attitudes and behavior.
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
Animal Sentience
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can make some progress. In the Umwelt or perceptual world of an octopus, what the lateralized monocular eyes perceive is not color but the plane of polarization of light. Information is processed by a bilateral brain but manipulation is done by a radially symmetrical set of eight arms. Octopuses do not self-monitor by vision. Their skin pattern system, used for excellent camouflage, is open loop. The output of the motor system of the eight arms is organized at several levels — brain, …
The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra
The Ingenuity Of Cephalopods, Angel Guerra
Animal Sentience
I present a brief overview of the richness of cephalopod behavioral, neural and cognitive traits.
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus.
The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt
The Octopus: A Beautiful (But Disorganized) “Mind”, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents convincing evidence that octopuses have minds, but in the first 85% of the target article, the evidence does not come through very clearly because it is hidden by other information and by problems with the paper’s organization. I propose ways to build a tighter argument in the author’s Response to the Commentaries.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Animal Sentience
Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.
The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher
The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
Cephalopods split away from the phylogenetic tree about half a billion years ago, and octopus evolution has been accelerated by an extremely low survival rate. This helps explain why this unusual animal presents qualities found in no other. It has a radially organized nervous system with a processing centre for each of its eight tentacles. Yet, although this might suggest that each tentacle has its own centre of consciousness, it remains just one animal, with one mouth to feed, and one life to lose, and it behaves as if it is centrally controlled. Its capacity for a range of intelligent …
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ but stops short of asking what having that mind means for octopus moral standing. One consequence of understanding the octopus mind should be a refusal to subject octopuses to mass production. Octopus farming is in an experimental phase and supported by various countries. We argue that it is unethical because of concerns about animal welfare as well as environmental impacts.
Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard
Keeping Hold Of Nurse, Andrew Packard
Animal Sentience
Mather draws from a lifetime devoted to studying individual octopuses in the wild and in aquaria to combine a natural history account of their actions with an argument from design adopted from second-, often third-hand sources. The 'distributed' [decentralised] nervous system said to contrast with that of vertebrates – a premise largely accepted by Mather’s commentators so far – does not reflect the original literature on motor control, nor the facts of comparative anatomy, functional morphology and morphogenesis. Ontogeny is absent. With the help of some old or little-known illustrations from my own participant-observer experimental investigations, I will try here …
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mostly unknown. This should be the starting point of a long process of scientific enquiry about these taxa, which must include discussions on operational definitions first and foremost. Discussing octopus mind might prove fruitless without more basic concepts. Some approaches are suggested here.
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Animal Sentience
An octopus has more neurons in their peripheral nervous system (PNS) than in their brain. PNS neurons could participate in forming cognitive networks with the central brain in the same way that the cerebellum is now thought to contribute to mammalian cognition. However, cephalopods lack myelinated fibres, which might decrease the ability of the PNS to participate in cognitive networks. The lack of myelinated fibres may also select for a less integrated brain, with an increased emphasis on local information processing. Alternatively, integration may still occur across distant neural centers, but proceed more slowly in cephalopods than in mammals.
Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry
Octopus Sentience: Three Criteria, Alix Noël-Guéry
Animal Sentience
The first question to ask is whether octopuses are sentient, so that, if so, they can be protected. Three consensual criteria to evaluate animal sentience can be applied to the octopus. Octopuses meet all three of them.
What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather
What And Where Is An Octopus’S Mind?, Jennifer A. Mather
Animal Sentience
It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind, though perhaps a mind that is different from those of “higher” vertebrates. It stimulates us to look at the welfare of these animals and challenges us to find better ways to test mindfulness and cognition across animals with widely differing natural histories and sensory and motor capacities.
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Animal Sentience
We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric …
Justice For Nature, Haydn Washington
Justice For Nature, Haydn Washington
Animal Sentience
Eight points are made in this commentary: (1) Ecocentrism is the preferable term. (2) Indigenous societies have long used a kinship ethics. (3) Earth jurisprudence and ecodemocracy should be considered. (4) Assumptions can be better defined. (5) Ethical pluralism is open to question. (6) The ethics of individuals vs. ecosystems needs further discussion. (7) Including justice for nature within social justice may be a serious mistake. (8) Trustees need to be ethically sophisticated.
Futurity, Selves And Further Organisms, Robin Attfield
Futurity, Selves And Further Organisms, Robin Attfield
Animal Sentience
Most aspects of Treves et al.’s target article are commendable, but I would suggest: explicitly including (1) Singer’s ‘equal interests’ principle; adjusting (2) Mathews’s principle of ‘bioproportionality’; and clarifying the implications of (3) Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, (4) the limits of present predictions of future needs, and (5) the application of the concept of selves to biotic individuals. There is also a problem about (6) how plants are to be individuated.
Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer
Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that policy making should include the interests and well-being of present and future generations of humans and nonhumans. There are deep and abiding conflicts of interest both between and within these groups. Trying to factor in so many considerations is likely to generate political gridlock. The authors need to explain how to avoid this.
Granting Political Representation To Non-Humans, Joe Gray
Granting Political Representation To Non-Humans, Joe Gray
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses the representation of individuals versus populations — human and nonhuman, present and future — in Treves et al.’s proposed trusteeship for futurity. Terminological questions are also discussed.
Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander
Reconciling Just Preservation, Shelley M. Alexander
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s target article can play an important role in reconciling the needs of future generations and non-human animals in conservation. Human capacities are adequate for interpreting and defining many non-human animal needs. Worldviews are more complex, however, and conservation science, like the target article itself, suffers from a lack of diversity and inclusiveness. This may pose practical impediments to realizing just preservation.
To Preserve Or To Conserve?, Liv Baker
To Preserve Or To Conserve?, Liv Baker
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. propose the notion of trusteeship to help meet our responsibility to nature and individual animals, their homes, cultures, and societies. This proposal is grounded in a real-world framework that reveals how conservation has become distorted by anthropocentrism, human exceptionalism, and ethical hypocrisy.
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that individual organisms should be protected by the courts. This already happens in many countries for rare and endangered species and for symbolically important species (e.g., raptors, songbirds, and bats in the U.S.), and through the international treaty for whales. But protection of these individuals stems from a focus on preserving their populations, whereas hunting of individuals is still a culturally accepted practice. Killing of individuals should be limited to valid reasons (e.g., eating the meat) and covered by fair-chase and humane-killing laws (which is not always the case). But “futurity” will not inherit present-day …
Just Preservation And The Half-Earth View, Helen Kopnina
Just Preservation And The Half-Earth View, Helen Kopnina
Animal Sentience
For interspecies justice, animal welfare, and animal rights, the planet needs to be divided on the basis of species' natural resource requirements. The Half-Earth View is that to maintain viable populations of the Earth's remaining species, half of landscapes and seascapes need protection from intensive economic activity. This protection is needed outside the nature preserve system, such as in agricultural areas or cities, so nature can co-exist with local communities.
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Animal Sentience
Neither human young today nor future human generations nor non-human species have a voice in protecting the biosphere. Treves et al. propose courts and trustees for defending their interests. I describe an analogy with attempts to represent the interests of children and comatose patients in medicine.
Human Interests, Helen Tiffin
Human Interests, Helen Tiffin
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s proposal is welcome, but it will have to face at least four challenges: the interconnectedness of the human and the nonhuman portions of the biosphere, conflicts of interest, human overpopulation, and capitalism itself.