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Epistemology Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Epistemology

A Case Against Pragmatic Encroachment, Mahali Kuzyk Mar 2026

A Case Against Pragmatic Encroachment, Mahali Kuzyk

Global Tides

In their paper, Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Fantl and McGrath offer a seemingly intuitive and attractive route to a revision of what counts as epistemic justification and knowledge. They argue that knowledge is not just a matter of evidence, but depends in part on one’s practical situation. Higher stakes and different utilities can change whether a belief is knowledge-constituting. This essay will argue that Fantl and McGrath’s attempt to use their Knowledge-Action principle (KA) to back pragmatic encroachment ultimately fails.


The Role Of Intuition In Knowledge, Kenzi Mcspadden Apr 2025

The Role Of Intuition In Knowledge, Kenzi Mcspadden

Global Tides

In this paper, McSpadden challenges Climenhaga's use of intuitions as evidence by arguing that one does not have to cite memories, sensory experiences, and testimony in order to subconsciously use them to form her beliefs. McSpadden argues that there is a psychological definition of what intuitions could be, that intuitions do not always make philosophers more confident in their beliefs, and that intuitions can instead be explained by a cognitive reaction using past experiences.


From Explanationism To Pragmatic Explanationism: A New Framework For Knowledge And Stakes, Jacob Guise Apr 2025

From Explanationism To Pragmatic Explanationism: A New Framework For Knowledge And Stakes, Jacob Guise

Global Tides

In "From Explanationism to Pragmatic Explanationism: A New Framework for Knowledge and Stakes", Guise defends the thesis that Pragmatic Explanationism helps overcome Explanationism's limitations in addressing pragmatic encroachment, specifically in high stakes scenarios and situations involving hidden practical factors. Guise argues that Pragmatic Explanationism should be adopted over Explanationism.


Criticisms Of Evidentialism:A Critique Of Jonathan Way’S Solutions To The Issues Of Evidentialism, Kailey Echeverria Apr 2024

Criticisms Of Evidentialism:A Critique Of Jonathan Way’S Solutions To The Issues Of Evidentialism, Kailey Echeverria

Global Tides

This paper will begin with a brief introduction of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee’s definitions and examples ascribed to their original argument for Evidentialism in order to provide context for the remainder of the paper. The paper will turn to Jonathan Way’s concerns surrounding the original argument for Evidentialism, and break down his revamped definitions of Evidentialism and what Way calls “incentives”. Then, the paper will turn to Way’s solutions to the concerns he addressed, where he introduces the “argument from good reasoning” and the Link principal, a modified and refreshed version of Feldman and Conee’s “argument from reasoning”. Further …


Clarifying The Gettier Objection To Plantinga’S Theory Of Knowledge, Scott J. Woods Jan 2014

Clarifying The Gettier Objection To Plantinga’S Theory Of Knowledge, Scott J. Woods

Global Tides

In “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems,” Linda Zagzebski provides a specific Gettier case to Plantinga’s proper function theory of knowledge. However, her objection fails to understand Plantinga’s cognitive environment criterion. Specifically, a cognitive environment must be assessed alongside the faculties being used in the formation a belief. Zagzebski’s example is then adapted accordingly. This paper ends with a dilemma: either Plantinga’s theory adopts a dangerously strong condition for warrant, or admits that it cannot escape Gettier cases.


How A Skeptical Foundationalist Might Respond To Peter Klein, Maximillian M. Muller Jan 2013

How A Skeptical Foundationalist Might Respond To Peter Klein, Maximillian M. Muller

Global Tides

In this article I attack Peter Klein's argument for epistemic infinitism by showing that there is at least one foundational belief, and by rejecting his principle of avoiding arbitrariness.