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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Epistemology
Early Response To False Claims In Wikipedia, 15 Years Later, P.D. Magnus
Early Response To False Claims In Wikipedia, 15 Years Later, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Fifteen years ago, I conducted a small study testing the error-correction tendency of Wikipedia. Not only is Wikipedia different now than it was then, the community that maintains it is different. Despite the crudity of that study’s methods, it is natural to wonder what the result would be now. So I repeated the earlier study and found surprisingly similar results.
The Scope Of Inductive Risk, P.D. Magnus
The Scope Of Inductive Risk, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values which load a theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive …
Cautious Realism And Middle Range Ontology, P.D. Magnus
Cautious Realism And Middle Range Ontology, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology is centrally about how metaphysics is embrangled with epistemology. I begin by discussing the broader literature in science and values, where arguments akin to Chakravartty's have been much-discussed. Then I talk about my own preferred approach, middle range ontology, which does not fit neatly into any of the three stances Chakravartty discusses. Finally, I use these considerations to pose a dilemma.
Novel Passions : Re-Reading English Fiction Through The History Of Emotion, 1689-1751, Joel P. Sodano
Novel Passions : Re-Reading English Fiction Through The History Of Emotion, 1689-1751, Joel P. Sodano
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
“The passions” were of paramount importance in the 18th century. Classical contexts established excessive emotions as potentially dangerous forces that could override the will and dictate human action, but they also perceived them as inessential to and even extirpable from human nature. With the advent of empiricism, the theoretical framework of emotion shifted from an external condition to an internal proposition. Thus, in the 18th century a conceptual symbiosis is formed between “the Gales of Passion” and “the Reins of Reason” (Spectator, no. 408, 1712). This seemingly archaic idea is actually being confirmed by contemporary neuroscience. For recently discovered neural …
The Self In Hume's "Treatise", David M. Krueger
The Self In Hume's "Treatise", David M. Krueger
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
Much has been written about Hume's treatment of the self and personal identity in his Treatise. However the scholarship generally focuses on individual aspects of Hume's discussion of self and personal identity. This account is an attempt to elucidate Hume's view of the self and personal identity throughout the Treatise, including the Appendix. I argue for a consistent and cohesive interpretation of Hume's account, one that rejects a more traditional view of identity for an unreflective view of identity.
Epistemic Categories And Causal Kinds, P.D. Magnus
Epistemic Categories And Causal Kinds, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Within philosophy of science, debates about realism often turn on whether posited entities exist or whether scientific claims are true. Natural kinds tend to be investigated by philosophers of language or metaphysicians, for whom semantic or ontological considerations can overshadow scientific ones. Since science crucially involves dividing the world up into categories of things, however, issues concerning classification ought to be central for philosophy of science. Muhammad Ali Khalidi's book fills that gap, and I commend it to readers with an interest in scientific taxonomy and natural kinds. He works through general issues to craft a useful philosophical conception and …
State Of The Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters, P.D. Magnus, Heather Douglas
State Of The Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters, P.D. Magnus, Heather Douglas
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
It has become commonplace to say that novel predictive success is not epistemically special. Its value over accommodation, if it has any, is taken to be superficial or derivative. We argue that the value of predictive success is indeed instrumental. Nevertheless, it is a powerful instrument that provides significant epistemic assurances at many different levels. Even though these assurances are in principle dispensable, real science is rarely (if ever) in the position to confidently obtain them in other ways. So we argue for a pluralist instrumental predictivism: novel predictive success is important for inferences from data to phenomena, from phenomena …
The I Think, Self-Awareness And Reflexivity : A Reconstructed Kantian Model Of Self-Awareness, Jie Yin
The I Think, Self-Awareness And Reflexivity : A Reconstructed Kantian Model Of Self-Awareness, Jie Yin
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
I aim to explore, in this dissertation, whether Kant has a plausible view on self-awareness in his Critique of Pure Reason, and that if the answer is positive, then in what way one could best appreciate his insight; and besides that, I also want to explore how Kant's view sheds light on contemporary debate on self-awareness. I aim to consider two questions addressed by Howell (2006) as below: (A) how exactly the I think functions, designatively, to represent the self and bring it to our thought-awareness, and (B) how, theI thinK orI, a simple representation and a mere designation of …
Epistemology And The Wikipedia, P.D. Magnus
Epistemology And The Wikipedia, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia that is written and edited entirely by visitors to its website. I argue that we are misled when we think of it in the same epistemic category with traditional general encyclopedias. An empirical assessment of its reliability reveals that it varies widely from topic to topic. So any particular claim found in it cannot be relied on based on its source. I survey some methods that we use in assessing specific claims and argue that the structure of the Wikipedia frustrates them
Hormone Research As An Exemplar Of Underdetermination, P.D. Magnus
Hormone Research As An Exemplar Of Underdetermination, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Debates about the underdetermination of theory by data often turn on specific examples. Many cases are invoked often enough that they become familiar, even well-worn. Here I consider one such commonplace: the connection between prenatal hormone levels and gender-linked childhood behavior. Since Helen Longino's original discussion of this case a decade-and-a-half ago, it has become become one of the stock examples of underdetermination. However, the case is not genuinely underdetermined. We can easily imagine a possible experiment to decide the question. The fact that we would not perform this experiment is a moral, rather than epistemic, point. Further, I argue …