Comparative Philosophy Commons^™

Why Minds Need Bodies: Organismic Unity And Limits Of Artificial Consciousness, Renée Snow

Comparative Philosophy

This paper argues that functional organization alone is not sufficient for phenomenal consciousness or the existence of a unified subject of experience. While many contemporary accounts of artificial consciousness assume that replicating the causal or computational structure of the brain would be sufficient for subjective experience, this paper identifies a deeper constraint: consciousness depends on organismic unity. The argument proceeds through a triangulation of conceptual, empirical, and metaphysical considerations. First, Zuboff’s thought experiment shows that functional organization can be preserved while the unity of the subject dissolves, suggesting that causal pattern replication alone cannot secure subjectivity. Second, findings from neuroscience …

Fang Zhu’S Shen-Mie-Lun And Contemporary Physicism: A Cross-Cultural Dialogue, Soo Lam Wong

Comparative Philosophy

Fan Zhen’s 范缜 “Shen-Mie-Lun 神灭论” can be read as a debate between a physicalist and a dualist in the philosophy of mind. Many of Fan’s arguments found in the “Shen-Mie-Lun” correspond to contemporary physicalism in Western analytic philosophy. My aim in this essay is to bring Fan's “Shen-Mie-Lun” into conversation with contemporary physicalism in the following way: (1) offer an outline of Fan’s physicalism as presented in the “Shen-Mie-Lun” (2) map his view onto the key positions and concepts of contemporary physicalism, (3) show how his view is (a) incompatible with eliminative …

Imagination And The Self: A Cross-Cultural And Cross-Disciplinary Study, Qianyi Qin

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation is an interdisciplinary investigation of the imagination and the self that engages with cognitive science, philosophy of mind, Buddhism, ethical theories, and a variety of perspectives from Asian and Western philosophy. I address the following questions in three interrelated chapters. First, what does it mean for the self to appear in imagination? In Chapter 1, against certain narrow understandings of the self in philosophy of language, I build a multidimensional model of the self in imaginative experiences to capture the rich phenomenology, drawing on empirical findings on memory and imagination. Second, can the self be removed from imagination? …

Introduction: Duquesne Studies In Phenomenology Volume 5, Jeffrey Mccurry

Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology

No abstract provided.

How Theravāda Buddhism Enriches The Language Of Thought Hypothesis: Beyond Syntax, Juanjuan Cheng, Sumanasara Sandamadulle

Comparative Philosophy

The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) posits that mental states operate through a language-like representational system physically implemented in the brain. However, this purely symbolic approach faces a significant limitation: certain mental phenomena—such as intuitions, emotions, and intentions—lack the syntactically compositional structure required by LOTH and therefore cannot be adequately explained within its symbolic framework. To address this theoretical challenge, we turn to Theravāda Buddhism (TB), an early Buddhist tradition that integrates rigorous philosophical inquiry with meditative practice. Remarkably, TB began to prefigure a solution to LOTH’s limitations over 2,300 years ago. Although LOTH and TB differ …

Ahp's Tribute To Dr. Stan Charnofsky, Carroy U. Ferguson

Psychology Faculty Publication Series

The Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) mourns the “transition” of a very dear soul, Dr. Stan Charnofsky. And, while his transition is a tremendous loss to his family, friends, and colleagues, we also want to honor and celebrate a life well-lived. As a former AHP president, Stan provided outstanding leadership. Upon his passing, he also held the distinction of being the longest-serving AHP board member. He was very much cherished and highly respected by all board members throughout his long, dedicated and remarkable service to AHP and its members.

Is Buddhist View Of Mental States In Consonance With The Foundational Tenets Of Their System?: Investigating Nyāya And Buddhist Debate On Perception In Jayanta Bhatta’S Nyāyamanjari, Ajay K. Verma

Comparative Philosophy

The first noble truth in Buddhism points toward a purely phenomenal experience. Though purely qualitative in nature, the experience of suffering has an existential aspect. As stated in the second noble truth, suffering has a cause that relates to our situatedness in the world. Notwithstanding, the cause of suffering has to be something external to the mental state of suffering itself. Some of the more recent studies on mental states suggest two different positions on the nature of mental states. One may view mental states as self-referential, reflexive and purely qualitative in nature; alternatively, one could view them as transitive …

Walking Through The Aristotelian Lane: Amartya Sen On Rational Choice, Barada Laxmi Panda

Comparative Philosophy

The term ‘rational choice’ has great impact on the life of a rational agent. Rational choice helps the agent to understand her capability of making choice and the intentional involvement for working on a particular aspect considering certain circumstances. At the same time, this creates a lot of dilemmas in terms of understanding the freewill of the agent while being committed for a work. Following this, Amartya Sen’s discussion on this subject seems relevant where Sen very prominently reflects on the point that rational choice involves freedom, rationality, and normativity. These three features are coherent with each other and with …

A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer

Comparative Philosophy

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately …

Japanese-English Translation: Nishida Kitarō––“Self-Determination Of The Eternal Now” 「永遠の今の自己限定」、西田幾多郎著（昭和六年七月） (July 1931) §1 Of 4; Complete Draft (Supersedes Draft Of 2 Jan 19); Translated By Christopher Southward; Revision And Expansion Underway, Christopher Southward

Comparative Literature Faculty and Student Scholarship

Japanese-English Translation: Nishida Kitarō––“Self-Determination of the Eternal Now” (July 1931) 「永遠の今の自己限定」、西田幾多郎著（昭和六年七月）

§1 of 4; Complete Draft (Supersedes Draft of 2 Jan 2019)

Translated from the Japanese by Christopher Southward; Revision and Expansion Underway, October 2023

Japanese-English Translation: Miki Kiyoshi —Thinking With Master Nishida (First Published In Fujin Kōron, August 1941) Complete Draft; Translated, Edited, And Revised By Christopher Southward, October 2022-September 2023 「西田先生のことども」、三木清著（初発 婦人公論、昭和十六年八月）, Christopher Southward

Comparative Literature Faculty and Student Scholarship

Japanese-English Translation: Miki Kiyoshi —Thinking with Master Nishida (First Published in Fujin Kōron, August 1941) Complete Draft; Translated, Edited, and Revised by Christopher Southward, October 2022-September 2023「西田先生のことども」、三木清著（初発 婦人公論、昭和十六年八月）

Source text transcribed and published by Aozora Bunko–a compendium of public-domain Japanese literature, philosophy, and criticism

General website: https://www.aozora.gr.jp

Current text: https://www.aozora.gr.jp/cards/000218/files/50538_37481.html

Dissertation Chapters Underway: 10,000 Shards, Or Opening And Activating Depth: Handicraft, Value, And The Work Of Art (Shards 00000-00001), Christopher Southward, Christopher Southward

Comparative Literature Faculty and Student Scholarship

Dissertation Chapters Underway: 10,000 Shards, Or Opening and Activating Depth: Handicraft, Value, and the Work of Art (Shards 00000-00001), Christopher Southward

A Critique Of Scanlon’S Contractualism, Ashley Purdy

Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations

Part of T. M. Scanlon’s project in What We Owe to Each Other (1998) is to explain the importance and priority of moral reasons. But Scanlon also argues that this priority of moral reasons is compatible with the pursuit of other things we value, such as friendship. To this end, Scanlon claims that contractualist moral reasons internally accommodate our interests in such values. In this paper, I argue that Scanlon is unsuccessful in showing the compatibility of morality and the pursuit of our other values. The contractualist may not be able to be a good friend.

Appearance And Momentariness: The Nature Of Being Between Nāgārjuna, The Sarvāstivādins And Neo-Parmenidism, Federico Divino

Comparative Philosophy

In this article I will try to demonstrate the existence of points in common between the eternalist instances of Parmenidean philosophy and the Buddhist formulations made by some parts of the Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna, and the Sarvāstivādins. These three philosophies have numerous points in common with Emanuele Severino’s formulations from the point of view of what is defined as neo-Parmenidism. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the points in common between these systems of thought are due to a basic affinity which, despite having led them to emphasize different themes, present similar reasoning and logical consequences, which allow …

Three Buddhist Distinctions Of Great Consequence For Cross-Cultural Philosophy Of Personal Identity, Antoine Panaïoti

Comparative Philosophy

This paper seeks to lay down the theoretical groundwork for the emergence of holistic cross-cultural philosophical investigations of personal identity ¾ investigations that approach the theoretical, phenomenological, psychological, and practical-ethical dimensions of selfhood as indissociable. My strategy is to discuss three closely connected conceptual distinctions that the Buddhist approach to personal identity urges us to draw, and a lucid understanding of which is essential for the emergence of appropriately comprehensive and thus genuinely cosmopolitan discussions at the cross-road between Western and Buddhist philosophical traditions. The first, primary distinction is that between the “visceral sense of self” (VSS) and the “substance …

Social Roles And Psychological Continuity: Developing A Confucian-Psychological Continuity Hybrid Account Of Personal Identity And Ontology, Sammuel Byer

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper, I delineate a variety of questions related to personal identity and ontology. I develop and compare the Confucian conception of the person and the view of the person developed throughout Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity and ontology. I will demonstrate that the Confucian conception of the person has numerous instructive similarities with Parfit’s work on personal identity, despite a number of differences. I argue, briefly, that this project is worthwhile as a piece of comparative philosophy. One of the final two sections of the paper develop a new hybrid account of personal identity and ontology that …

Nietzsche, Foucault, Power: A Study Of Paradox And Ontology In Nietzsche, Nicholas R. Ray

Honors Thesis

This thesis investigates a paradox at the heart of Nietzsche and utilizes Foucault as an instrument to understand this dilemma. The paradox is the synthesis of Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism and his ontological doctrine of the will to power. Put simply his doctrine of perspectivism says there can be no ontological facts yet Nietzsche articulates the will to power as an ontological matter of fact. This thesis explores the "First Essay" of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals to demonstrate the existence of this paradox. Further, I will conduct a Foucauldian cross-examination to further flesh out this paradox, where and why it …

The Illusion Of Self Revisited: Replies To Critics, Karsten J. Struhl

Comparative Philosophy

Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits have presented thoughtful comments and provocative challenges to my article “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self?” Their challenges raise significant questions about the nature of illusion, whether Buddhism is denying the self in all senses of the term, whether there could be a self that exists for some limited duration of time and has at least some measure of control, whether there is a phenomenal illusion of self, whether the neuropsychological assumptions embedded in Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model is consistent with Buddhist metaphysics, the usefulness of evolutionary psychology …

Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya

Comparative Philosophy

Karsten Struhl has offered an intriguing account of what kind of illusion the self is. His account is based on Buddhist philosophy, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. This critical notice examines his arguments, and aims to question whether or not the self is the kind of illusion Struhl argues it to be.

Buddhist Modernism, Scientific Explanation, And The Self, Sean Smith

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.

Born Believer?, Mark Siderits

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.

Born Believers?, Mark Siderits

Faculty Publications - Philosophy

A Response to Karsten Struhl’s “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self”.

What Kind Of An Illusion Is The Illusion Of Self, Karsten J. Struhl

Comparative Philosophy

Both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to demonstrate that the self is an illusion. This article begins with a brief review of some of the arguments but then proceeds to show that these arguments are not themselves sufficient to dispel the illusion. It analyzes three ways in which the illusion of self manifests itself – as wish fulfillment, as a cognitive illusion, and as a phenomenal illusion (what might be called the “I” sense). With respect to this last, the article reviews some recent developments in cognitive neuropsychology and neuroscience to discuss the way …

Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci

Comparative Philosophy

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen (meditation). This is examined step by step from the perspective of …

When Down Looks Like Up: Self-Deceptive Self-Handicapping, Kyle T. Hallam

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

In this thesis, I present a novel example of intentional self-deception as embodied in self-handicapping behavior. Self-handicapping is the proactive construction or acquisition of some obstacle to success in some domain, and is employed by individuals primarily as a means of deflecting blame for a failure or negative outcome. I argue that this behavior stands in a mutual, symbiotic relationship to self-deception. On the one hand, self-handicapping is the behavioral instantiation of the biased evidence manipulation which facilitates self-deception; while on the other hand, self-handicapping effectively functions to bias judgments in this way only in case concurrent self-deception sustains the …

Mental Associations And Music Therapy: Including The History Of Associationism And The Neurology Of Associations, Dianna Rose

Expressive Therapies Capstone Theses

Associations are formed in our minds based upon three elements: sensory experience, emotions, and memories. These associations, unique to each individual, dictate thoughts, beliefs, behaviors, and actions. Some are necessary and supportive, while others can be maladaptive. Established associations can be changed, and new associations can be formed, to align with a client’s goals. The literature presents a strong history of associationism, as well as a body of research that demonstrates the neurological processes of how mental associations are formed. There are also studies showing how music activates the brain. However, there is a lack of research which draws direct …

Flower Unfurling: Buddhist Modernism And The Early Writing Of James Joyce, Erin Garrow

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation traces the history of the references to Buddhism in Stephen Hero, James Joyce’s first and unpublished novel, through the author’s previous writing, his sources, and his context, in order to determine how—if at all—the tradition bore upon his earliest depiction of consciousness. Acknowledging that Joyce habitually revisited and refined earlier ideas and prose, it attends to previous essays, notebooks, book reviews, conversations, letters, epiphanies, poems, and autobiographical prose; to available material, bibliographical, and biographical evidence about the specific volumes and performances to which Joyce had access; to language and paratext—including advertisements, introductions, and appended essays—in those volumes; …

Book Review On Free Will, Agency And Selfhood In Indian Philosophy (Edited By Mathew R. Dasti And Edwin F. Bryant), Prabal K. Sen

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.

Cognitivism, Feelings, And The Background Structures Of Emotion, David R. Willard

UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations

The aim of this thesis is to call attention to some of the shortcomings of a cognitivist theory’s incorporation of feeling into a philosophy of emotion. There has been a tendency within the cognitivist theories to assume as irreducible the intentional structures through which these theories operate. A consequence of this tendency often sees feelings compartmentalized through internal and external distinctions, such as bodily feelings and world-directed feelings. What appears to be ignored is the notion that prior to all emotional experience we have already found ourselves belonging to a world, and attempts at a phenomenological understanding of a category …

Reply To Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather, Jonardon Ganeri

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.