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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Applied Ethics
The Varieties Of Precaution: Which Risks, Whose Attitudes?, Tomasz Żuradzki
The Varieties Of Precaution: Which Risks, Whose Attitudes?, Tomasz Żuradzki
Animal Sentience
The Edge of Sentience offers an ambitious and timely institutional framework for proportionate precaution under uncertainty about sentience. Its systematic treatment of empirical and theoretical uncertainty across diverse cases is a major contribution. Focusing on the problem of identifying and weighing different risks when designing proportionate precautions, this commentary suggests three areas in which Birch’s framework could be developed further: a more domain-sensitive justification of the priority given to avoiding under-attribution; a clearer distinction among competing forms of risk aversion and their divergent policy implications; and a fuller explanation of how the framework generates different recommendations across cases.
What It’S Like, Or Not Like, To Bee, Cheryl E. Abbate
What It’S Like, Or Not Like, To Bee, Cheryl E. Abbate
Between the Species
In his recent work, David DeGrazia (2020) explores the possibility of insect sentience, focusing on bees as a case study. He advances a novel evolutionary approach, arguing that, from an evolutionary perspective, it’s more likely that bees are sentient than insentient., insofar as bees (allegedly) would have a selective advantage if they are motivated—in the form of feeling—to achieve their aims. His argument assumes two questionable claims: (1) if X is a selective advantage for an organism, then the organism likely has X, and (2) conscious creatures would have a selective advantage if they are sentient. I challenge both claims, …
Legal Purgatory: Why Some Animals Are Neither Persons Nor Property, Sharisse Kanet
Legal Purgatory: Why Some Animals Are Neither Persons Nor Property, Sharisse Kanet
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
All animals with non-borderline sentience are deserving of certain legal considerations independent of their use and relationship to human beings. That is, all sentient beings should have some rights. Given the current organization of the U.S. legal system, which divides all entities into property or persons, it is not surprising that animals are relegated to property status. I put forth a proposal to fix this whose central suggestion is that we create a third legal designation, legal patient, into which all non-person sentient animals (those which do not properly belong on either current category) would fit. These animals would receive …
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Spineless And Sentient: A Challenge For Moral Comparison, Patrick Forber, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
We agree with Mikhalevich & Powell but take issue with their criteria for attributing sentience. This problem is connected with difficult issues concerning moral comparisons and evaluating moral decisions when interspecific moral interests conflict.
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.
Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl
Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort people’s consideration of invertebrate minds and that the moral risks of false negatives in sentience research deserve greater consideration under precautionary frameworks. In this commentary, I draw comparisons between biases that concern wild animals and conditions in nature, arguing that the moral risks of disregarding the possible mental welfare of invertebrates are compounded by facts about their lives in the wild.
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the world not caused by any other species. The ability to conceive of and articulate a claim of rights is an example. However, possession of superior cognitive ability does not entitle humans to superior moral status. It is sentience, not cognitive complexity, that is the basis for the assignment of rights and the protections under the law that accompany them.
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are sentient. Moreover, their neuroanatomy, although different from mammalian, is sufficiently complex to support sentience. I answer some potential objections to Woodruff’s argument, and try to trace its moral significance. In so doing, I briefly address Birch’s (2017) target article as well.