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Full-Text Articles in Applied Ethics
What's In A Wage? A New Approach To The Justification Of Pay, Jeffrey Moriarty
What's In A Wage? A New Approach To The Justification Of Pay, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In this address, I distinguish and explore three conceptions of wages. A wage is a reward, given in recognition of the performance of a valued task. It is also an incentive: a way to entice workers to take and keep jobs, and to motivate them to work hard. Finally, a wage is a price of labor, and like all prices, conveys valuable information about relative scarcity. I show that each conception of wages has its own normative logic, or appropriate justification, and these logics can come apart. This explains some of the debate about wages and makes the project of …
Smilansky, Arneson, And The Asymmetry Of Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty
Smilansky, Arneson, And The Asymmetry Of Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Desert plays an important role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, but an unimportant role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice. Saul Smilansky has recently put forward a defense of this asymmetry. In this study, I argue that it fails. Then, drawing on an argument of Richard Arneson’s, I suggest an alternative consequentialist rationale for the asymmetry. But while this shows that desert cannot be expected to play the same role in distributive justice that it can play in retributive justice, it does not fully vindicate the asymmetry, since desert can still play an important role in the …
Justice In Compensation: A Defense, Jeffrey Moriarty
Justice In Compensation: A Defense, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Business ethicists have written much about ethical issues in employment. Except for a handful of articles on the very high pay of chief executive officers and the very low pay of workers in overseas sweatshops, however, little has been written about the ethics of compensation. This is prima facie strange. Workers care about their pay, and they think about it in normative terms. This article's purpose is to consider whether business ethicists' neglect of the normative aspects of compensation is justified. I examine several possible justifications for neglecting compensation and show that they fail. What remains is a case for …
Does Distributive Justice Pay? Sternberg’S Compensation Ethics, Jeffrey Moriarty
Does Distributive Justice Pay? Sternberg’S Compensation Ethics, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Compensation has received a great deal of attention from social scientists. Characteristically, they have been concerned with the causes and effects of various compensation schemes. By contrast, few theorists have addressed the normative aspects of compensation. An exception is Elaine Sternberg, who offers in Just Business a comprehensive theory of compensation ethics. This paper critically examines her theory, and argues that the justification she gives for it fails. Its failure is instructive, however. The main argument Sternberg gives for her theory points in the direction of a different one. This, in turns, helps us to see what a justification of …
Deserving Jobs, Deserving Wages, Jeffrey Moriarty
Deserving Jobs, Deserving Wages, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
This chapter applies recent work on desert to two sets of issues in business ethics. The first set of issues concerns who ought to be hired, fired, promoted, and demoted. Call these issues of “job justice.” The second set of issues concerns how much workers, including managers, ought to be paid. Call these issues of “wage justice.” I focus on job and wage justice because considerations of desert play an important, though sometimes tacit, role in discussions of these issues.
Ross On Desert And Punishment, Jeffrey Moriarty
Ross On Desert And Punishment, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
W. D. Ross thinks it is good, other things equal, that people get what they deserve. But he denies that “the principle of punishing the vicious, for the sake of doing so, is that on which the state should proceed in its bestowal of punishments.” Ross offers two main arguments for this denial: what I call the “scope argument” and the “state's purpose argument.” I argue that both fail. In doing so, I illuminate Ross's distinctive views about desert and the state.
The Epistemological Argument Against Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty
The Epistemological Argument Against Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Most contemporary political philosophers deny that justice requires giving people what they deserve. According to a familiar anti-desert argument, the influence of genes and environment on people's actions and traits undermines all desert-claims. According to a less familiar – but more plausible – argument, the influence of genes and environment on people's actions and traits undermines some desert-claims (or all desert-claims to an extent). But, it says, we do not know which ones (or to what extent). This article examines this ‘epistemological’ argument against desert. It gives reason to believe that it fails, emphasizing the importance of justice relative to …
Do Ceos Get Paid Too Much?, Jeffrey Moriarty
Do Ceos Get Paid Too Much?, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In 2003, CEOs of the 365 largest U.S. corporations were paid on average $8 million, 301 times as much as factory workers. This paper asks whether CEOs get paid too much. Appealing to widely recognized moral values, I distinguish three views of justice in wages: the agreement view, the desert view, and the utility view. I argue that, no matter which view is correct, CEOs get paid too much. I conclude by offering two ways CEO pay might be reduced.
Against The Asymmetry Of Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty
Against The Asymmetry Of Desert, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
The concept of desert has traditionally played a central role in theories of both distributive and retributive justice. But while desert continues to play a central role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, it plays little or no role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice. This asymmetric treatment of desert is prima facie strange. If people should have the punishment they deserve, shouldn’t they also have the social benefits they deserve? I first offer an intuitive argument against the asymmetry, then consider and reject four potential justifications of it. I do not claim that the asymmetry cannot be …
Desert And Distributive Justice In A Theory Of Justice, Jeffrey Moriarty
Desert And Distributive Justice In A Theory Of Justice, Jeffrey Moriarty
Philosophy Faculty Publications
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I present the standard interpretation of Rawls’s account of desert. I then show how this interpretation is inadequate, bringing to light certain subtleties of the account that give it entirely new meaning. Next, I examine the criticisms of Nozick and Sher and show how, due to misconceptions of Rawls’s account of desert, they fail. Finally, I offer a criticism of Rawls’s theory of justice based on the correct interpretation of his account of desert.