Philosophy Commons^™

Our Moral Relationship To Nature, Benjamin Simpson

Senior Theses

In this paper I will explore the question of whether or not humans, as natural beings, are morally responsible for their actions in relation to nature. After all most natural beings, i.e. deer, wolves, whales, or even plants, regardless of their level of intelegence, are held responsible for their effect on the environment. When a rabbit population explodes and an ecosystem is sent into turmoil, we do not morally find fault with the rabbits. With this in mind I ask: why is it so different when humans send an ecosystem into distress? What is our moral relationship to nature? To …

Moral Problems For Schechtman's Narrative Self-Constitution View Of Personal Identity, Yasmin Aydemir

Theses and Dissertations

Marya Schechtman explicates her account of personal identity, the narrative self-constitution view, from the point of the view of a question about defining characteristics. Ultimately, she argues that personal identity is self-authored, narrative in form, and thus linear, articulable, and realistic. In this paper I argue that two big problems with the narrative self-constitution view demonstrate its incoherence and tension with the actual experience of personal existence: its morally suspect implications for moral desert and moral responsibility through its narrowness in conditions for self-narrative. By running into these issues, Schechtman’s view of personal identity faces difficulties of ableism, disempowerment of …

On “The Impossibility Of Moral Responsibility”, Dan Jaques

Honors Theses

In 1994, Galen Strawson published his paper, “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”. In this paper, Strawson offers an argument in which he claims to show the impossibility of moral responsibility, regardless of whether or not the thesis of determinism is true; he calls this argument the ‘Basic Argument’ for the impossibility of moral responsibility. A summarized version of the argument runs: (1) Nothing can be causa sui—i.e., self-caused. (2) In order to be morally responsible, one would have to be causa sui. (3) Therefore, moral responsibility is impossible.1 The main part of this paper (section III) will be devoted to …

The Limits Of Sociality, Johnna B. Mcgovern

Theses

There is a longstanding tradition in Western philosophy of emphasizing the capacity for reflection in theories about humans’ characteristic nature. In Talking to Ourselves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency, John Doris attempts to shift the focus to an emphasis on human sociality. Particularly, Doris argues that sociality, both implicitly and in the form of collaborative reasoning, is what makes humans best equipped for moral improvement. This collaborativism possesses a defining role in his account of agency and responsibility. This thesis attempts to gain an understanding of how sociality affects moral behavior and to argue that it is not conducive to agency …

Owning Our Implicit Attitudes: Responsibility, Resentment, And The Whole Self, Wesley Whitaker

CMC Senior Theses

Are implicit biases something we can rightly be held responsible for, and if so, how? A variety of social and cognitive psychological studies have documented the existence of wide-ranging implicit biases for over 30 years. These implicit biases can best be described as negative mental attitudes that operate immediately and unconsciously in response to specific stimuli. The first chapter of this thesis surveys the psychological literature, as well as presents findings of real-world experiments into racial biases. I then present the dominant model of implicit attitudes as mere associations, followed by evidence that at least some implicit attitudes take on …

Who Is Morally Responsible For Microfiber Pollution?, Luka Cai

Undergraduate Research Symposium Posters

Microplastic fiber pollution (MFP) is the persistence of microfibers (fibrous plastic particles less than 5mm in diameter and length) in the environment in levels sufficient to harm aquatic/marine ecosystems, primarily caused by the laundering of polyester garments. MFP is a compelling issue because it causes harm to natural habitats, animals, and human beings, harm that moral agents need to be held accountable for. I define moral responsibility as an agent’s accountability for an act which they voluntarily committed/contributed to. Causal responsibility is the relationship between an agent and an outcome of the agent’s act. I theorize that an agent’s moral …

Luck, Justice And Systemic Financial Risk, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

Systemic financial risk is one of the most significant collective action problems facing societies. The Great Recession brought attention to a tragedy of the commons in capital markets, in which market participants, from first-time homebuyers to Wall Street financiers, acted in ways beneficial to themselves individually, but which together caused substantial collective harm. Two kinds of risk are at play in complex chains of transactions in financial markets: ordinary market risk and systemic risk. Two moral questions are relevant in such cases. First, from the standpoint of interactional morality, does a person have a moral duty to avoid risk of …

The Dark Side Of Reactive Attitudes: From Persons To Compatibilism, Mallory A. Parker

Open Access Theses

This thesis contains two independent papers that both address the problems associated with the reactive attitudes. The first paper, presented in Chapter 2, discusses the negativities of the reactive attitudes in debates regarding skepticism about the moral notion of persons. The second paper, presented in Chapter 3, presents the negativities associated with the reactive attitudes in debates concerning compatibilism about moral responsibility. Neither chapter deals solely with presenting the negativities associated with the reactive attitudes. More than present these, both chapters undermine the non-realist or compatibilist philosophical arguments that attempt to save either the moral notion of persons (Chapter 2) …

Shaky Ground, William Simkulet

William Simkulet

The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that free will and moral responsibility require control - the …

On Robust Alternate Possibilities And The Tax Evasion Case, William Simkulet

William Simkulet

In his recent article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again,” Pereboom (2008) presents what he calls the “Tax Evasion” case, a Frankfurt-style case designed to show the falsity of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). According to Pereboom, PAP requires robust alternate possibilities such that an agent could have acted in a manner in which she knew she would have lacked moral responsibility for her actions. However, according to his “Tax Evasion” case, the tax evader lacks such robust alternate possibilities, and yet is still uncontroversially morally responsible for his actions. Here I argue Pereboom’s account of robust alternate possibilities is deficient, …

Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet

William Simkulet

No abstract provided.

In Control, William Simkulet

William Simkulet

In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that none of these are genuine instances of moral luck, nor counterexamples to the control principle.

Lucky Assassins: On Luck And Moral Responsibility, William Simkulet

William Simkulet

No abstract provided.

Abortion, Property, And Liberty, William Simkulet

William Simkulet

In ‘‘Abortion and Ownership’’ John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violinist’s right to life does not trump your right to liberty in the violinist case.

A Preference For Freedom: Kantian Implications For An Incompatibilist Will And Practical Accountability, Maggie Miller

CMC Senior Theses

This thesis aims to provide a coherent account of free will and practical grounds to prefer it. Its goal is to develop a pragmatic understanding of agency by which to hold individuals morally accountable. The paper begins with a critique of P.F. Strawson, whose seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” bypasses the question of free will altogether in its claims about morality. Subsequently, it proceeds to a defense of incompatibilism that traces an argument through the existing literature. From this position, it claims that neither Strawson nor traditional compatibilists can provide an account of morality that is reliable or well enough …

Paradigmatic Self-Deception, David Stephen Winchell

Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations

I present a theory of what I call "paradigmatic self-deception," the most serious and vivid cases of self-deception. While there has been much philosophical discussion of self-deception in recent decades, existing work does not explain how and why some cases of self-deception are more severe than others, when self-deception is intentional, and when an individual may justifiably be held morally responsible for being self-deceived. This dissertation answers all three of these important questions. The first chapter reviews the existing literature and motivates the need for a theory of paradigmatic cases. In the second chapter, I introduce three characteristic features of …

Responsibility, Blame And The Psychopath, Matthew William Ruble

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation examines the moral responsibility of psychopaths. I begin with an analysis of the concept of psychopathy by situating it within the context of a central debate in the philosophy of psychiatry over the conceptual nature of mental illness to demonstrate that psychopathy is an inherently value-laden concept. I argue against the disease-model of psychopathy and against their automatic exemption from moral responsibility as argued for by many moral philosophers. Psychopaths possess sufficient agency such that exempting them from moral responsibility is problematic both epistemically and morally. Yet psychopaths frequently offer reasons for their behavior that reveal their distance …

A Framework Of Responsibility And Absolution, Tobin Wilson

Featured Research

Suppose we have a choice between A and B, and that both options are morally reprehensible. If we were forced or tricked into making a decision, would we still be responsible? The answer is usually quite easy to find, but the question of why we are responsible seems much harder to discern. In any discussion about moral responsibility, is seems there needs to be a system of necessary and sufficient conditions. However such requirements tend to exist in a hazy philosophical space, so it is not surprising that we often confuse them. Thus, my paper will attempt to create …

Niebuhr’S Immoral Society And Bellah’S Good Society: A Conversation About Moral Man, Harlan Stelmach

Harlan Stelmach

The title of my paper is an indication of where I began my thinking about this project. I was convinced from the start that Niebuhr’s and Bellah’s most significant disagreement would be how they viewed the role of collective life. Second, I assumed that they would have their most significant area of agreement on the moral capacity and responsibility of individuals. If you focus on Niebuhr’s early work, especially in Moral Man and Immoral Society and Bellah’s mature work today, these assumptions are generally true. Further, I still expected some broad lines of continuity in the work of these two …

On Robust Alternate Possibilities And The Tax Evasion Case, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

In his recent article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again,” Pereboom (2008) presents what he calls the “Tax Evasion” case, a Frankfurt-style case designed to show the falsity of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). According to Pereboom, PAP requires robust alternate possibilities such that an agent could have acted in a manner in which she knew she would have lacked moral responsibility for her actions. However, according to his “Tax Evasion” case, the tax evader lacks such robust alternate possibilities, and yet is still uncontroversially morally responsible for his actions. Here I argue Pereboom’s account of robust alternate possibilities is deficient, …

Abortion, Property, And Liberty, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

In ‘‘Abortion and Ownership’’ John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violinist’s right to life does not trump your right to liberty in the violinist case.

Indeterminism In Kane’S Event-Causal Libertarianism, Robert J. Nowell

Pursuit - The Journal of Undergraduate Research at The University of Tennessee

In this paper, I examine the plausibility of event-causal libertarianism, a prominent view on free will which regards indeterminism in the causal history of a decision as necessary for an agent’s moral responsibility for a subsequent action. Specifically, I investigate how Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian account fares in light of Derk Pereboom’s powerful “disappearing agent” objection, in addition to criticisms of my own. Kane concludes that Pereboom’s objection is ineffective against his account. I argue against Kane’s conclusion by highlighting a dilemma which results from Kane's response to the disappearing agent objection; either way Kane’s position is interpreted, his account …

In Defense Of The Direct Argument For Incompatibilism, Paul Roger Turner

Doctoral Dissertations

Is moral responsibility compatible with the truth of causal determinism? One of the most influential arguments that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism is the so-called ‘Direct Argument,’ developed by Peter van Inwagen in his An Essay on Free Will. Informally put, the Direct Argument goes as follows:

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But we are not responsible for what went on before we were born, and neither are we responsible for what the laws of nature are. Therefore, we are not …

Shaky Ground, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that free will and moral responsibility require control - the …

Lucky Assassins: On Luck And Moral Responsibility, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

In Control, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that none of these are genuine instances of moral luck, nor counterexamples to the control principle.

Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, Ken M. Levy

Ken Levy

How should we judge psychopaths, both morally and in the criminal justice system? This Article will argue that psychopaths are generally not morally responsible for their bad acts simply because they cannot understand, and therefore be guided by, moral reasons.

Scholars and lawyers who endorse the same conclusion automatically tend to infer from this premise that psychopaths should not be held criminally punishable for their criminal acts. These scholars and lawyers are making this assumption (that just criminal punishment requires moral responsibility) on the basis of one of two deeper assumptions: that either criminal punishment directly requires moral responsibility or …

Basic Desert Of Reactive Emotions, Zac Cogley

Publication

In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.

The Three-Fold Significance Of The Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley

Book Sections/Chapters

Many philosophers working on moral responsibility understand that concept in a Strawsonian way; they follow P.F. Strawson in thinking that we should understand claims about someone’s moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of a certain class of emotions. In this paper, I use recent work in psychology of emotion to direct attention to the reasons why emotions are so tightly connected to our moral responsibility practices. Using the blaming emotions (anger, indignation, and resentment) as a model, I identify three different functions that emotions serve: motivation, appraisal and communication. Identifying discrete functions that the blaming emotions serve then allows …