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2020

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Articles 961 - 986 of 986

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Human-Controlled Survival Of Nonhumans, Donelson E. Dulany Jan 2020

Human-Controlled Survival Of Nonhumans, Donelson E. Dulany

Animal Sentience

Treves et al. are right about the need for morally just preservation of nonhumans. Their suggestions can move us in that direction. But isn’t what only humans are capable of doing in analyzing and solving these problems, in its broadest sense, “anthropocentrism”?


Group Stereotypes: Human And Nonhuman, Verónica Sevillano Jan 2020

Group Stereotypes: Human And Nonhuman, Verónica Sevillano

Animal Sentience

Treves et al.’s target article emphasizes the importance of including nonhuman animals in the scope of conservation frameworks, countering an anthropocentric orientation in conservation biology. In support, I discuss how stereotypes of other animal species may bias our behavior toward them.


Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro Jan 2020

Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro

Animal Sentience

Commentators Washington (2019) and Tiffin (2019) point out that the individual vs. collective dichotomy is much more complex than what is considered in the target article. This commentary will focus on why individuals are more important than collectives. Species differences in cognition and emotional processes and individuals’ feelings and experiences need to be taken into account.


Conventional Science Will Not Do Justice To Nonhuman Interests: A Fresh Approach Is Required, Becca Franks, Christine Webb, Monica Gagliano, Barbara Smuts Jan 2020

Conventional Science Will Not Do Justice To Nonhuman Interests: A Fresh Approach Is Required, Becca Franks, Christine Webb, Monica Gagliano, Barbara Smuts

Animal Sentience

Treves et al. (2019) make a convincing case that conservation efforts need to go beyond an anthropocentric worldview. Implementing that vision, however, will require human advocates to represent nonhuman interests. Where will the knowledge of those interests come from? How can humans know what is in the best interest of another animal, a plant, or an ecosystem? We discuss how the values embedded in current scientific practices may be ill-suited to representing nonhuman interests and we offer some ideas for correcting these shortcomings.


Preserving Nature For The Benefit Of All Sentient Individuals, Eze Paez Jan 2020

Preserving Nature For The Benefit Of All Sentient Individuals, Eze Paez

Animal Sentience

I agree with Treves et al.’s proposal for a preservation ethics based on the principle that nonhuman well-being is a matter of justice and compassion. In this commentary, I advance two objections. First, only sentient beings, rather than all life, belong in the moral community. Second, given that nature is probably harmful overall for sentient individuals, preserving it for the benefit of future human and nonhuman generations requires us to modify it as far as practicable.


The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington Jan 2020

The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington

Animal Sentience

The target article outlines various positions on conservation and preservation but ignores practical considerations of management since there is no wild habitat left. Population controls, either human or nonhuman mammals, are not discussed. The suggestions for legal changes are vague and will require much more thinking about how to integrate animal welfare with wildlife conservation concerns. “Freedoms” as outlined in the human bill of rights might help with decision making for improving animal welfare. Other commentators have made anthropocentric judgements concerning animal welfare, ignoring the importance of developing other ways of seeing and understanding the “multiplicity within unity,” combining empirical …


Is Anthropocentrism Really The Problem?, Chelsea Batavia Jan 2020

Is Anthropocentrism Really The Problem?, Chelsea Batavia

Animal Sentience

Treves et al. (2019) highlight what they consider soft forms of anthropocentrism in the practice and philosophy of conservation, e.g., when even professed non-anthropocentrists assert the precedence of human over nonhuman interests. I consider a few philosophical cases for maintaining human precedence, but ultimately offer a more psychological explanation: our explanations for why humans take precedence serve to reduce dissonance and discomfort, which arise because the norms and institutions of society often compel us to act in ways that violate our moral responsibilities to nonhuman beings.


Disentangling Different Forms Of Justice, Anna Wienhues Jan 2020

Disentangling Different Forms Of Justice, Anna Wienhues

Animal Sentience

Treves et al.’s article is an important contribution to an emerging interdisciplinary literature on what constitutes a viable and just response to the current biodiversity crisis. My commentary addresses three interrelated themes: (1) overcoming divisions, (2) hierarchies of moral worth and (3) ‘multispecies justice’ in the broader context of justice.


Game Theory And Artificial Intelligence In Just Preservation, David L. Dowe, Nader Chmait Jan 2020

Game Theory And Artificial Intelligence In Just Preservation, David L. Dowe, Nader Chmait

Animal Sentience

We humans can show presumption, arrogance and many dubious traits. By virtue of being land-dwelling, dexterous, relatively intelligent, and having good communication hardware and (good) fortune, we have for recent millennia largely had dominion of our planet. Yet humans often do not treat themselves (let alone other species) particularly well. Treves et al.’s idea of a multispecies justice system — not “prioritizing humans” but “finding practical ways to work within human systems” — invites consideration.


Conflicts And Triage, Kate E. Lynch, Daniel T. Blumstein Jan 2020

Conflicts And Triage, Kate E. Lynch, Daniel T. Blumstein

Animal Sentience

To represent diverse interests successfully, a strategy for dealing with conflicts is needed. We discuss an approach to maximizing the interests of the greatest number of individuals, present and future.


Just Preservation, Trusteeship And Multispecies Justice, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, Adrian Treves, William Lynn Jan 2020

Just Preservation, Trusteeship And Multispecies Justice, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, Adrian Treves, William Lynn

Animal Sentience

We are grateful to all the commentators who engaged with our target article. Some commentators have offered important insights into our proposed design and methods for legally intervening on behalf of futurity. Others have focused on theoretical considerations central to our proposal for multispecies justice and trusteeship. All have inspired modifications and further elaboration of our initial proposal. In this Response, we engage with the commentaries, integrating their suggestions, striving for convergence and complementarity, but also discussing points of divergence with our proposed framework where necessary. There is substantial overlap in the points of view of the three co-authors, but …


Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell Jan 2020

Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell

Animal Sentience

Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections despite their considerable cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary diversity. Some ethical and policy inroads have been made for cephalopod molluscs and crustaceans, but the vast majority of arthropods, including the insects, remain excluded from moral consideration. We argue that this exclusion is unwarranted given the existing evidence. Anachronistic readings of evolution, which view invertebrates as lower in the scala naturae, continue to influence public policy and common morality. The assumption that small brains are unlikely to support cognition or sentience likewise persists, despite growing evidence that arthropods …


No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2020

No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as well as between species, but broad classifications such as invertebrates are functionally meaningless in this context. Cognition should relate to welfare only to the extent that it relates to the capacity to suffer or to experience pleasure.


Invertebrates Should Be Given Ethical Consideration, Marie-Claire Cammaerts Jan 2020

Invertebrates Should Be Given Ethical Consideration, Marie-Claire Cammaerts

Animal Sentience

Invertebrates are far more numerous than vertebrates. Most of them are essential to the survival of humanity. Their physiology, behavior, know-how, and cognitive abilities are often as complex as those of vertebrates. Invertebrates should be considered and studied as are vertebrates, i.e., ethically, and cautiously.


Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl Jan 2020

Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort people’s consideration of invertebrate minds and that the moral risks of false negatives in sentience research deserve greater consideration under precautionary frameworks. In this commentary, I draw comparisons between biases that concern wild animals and conditions in nature, arguing that the moral risks of disregarding the possible mental welfare of invertebrates are compounded by facts about their lives in the wild.


Intuition And The Invertebrate Dogma, Jonathan Balcombe Jan 2020

Intuition And The Invertebrate Dogma, Jonathan Balcombe

Animal Sentience

Just as intuition, fueled by hubris, led us to exclude insects from moral consideration, so intuition can lead to the opposite conclusion. Observed insect behavior, combined with scientific support for insect consciousness summarized in Mikhalevich & Powell’s target article, and bolstered by the Precautionary Principle, all militate against completely denying moral status to insects.


Do Arthropods Respond To Noxious Stimuli Purely By Reflex?, Robert W. Elwood Jan 2020

Do Arthropods Respond To Noxious Stimuli Purely By Reflex?, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong to dismiss the idea of sentience in invertebrates. Here, I expand on the evidence for crustaceans responding to noxious stimuli in ways that are not explained by mere reflexes, and that are consistent with pain. I consider the idea that male praying mantids must not feel pain because they may continue to mate whilst being consumed by the female. I finish with thoughts about the idea that because robots may be constructed to act as if they experience pain, the argument that animals might experience pain is diminished.


On The Possibility Of Invertebrate Sentience, David Degrazia Jan 2020

On The Possibility Of Invertebrate Sentience, David Degrazia

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including the capacity for affect. They argue persuasively against assuming that all invertebrates are insentient and hence ineligible for moral consideration. In addition to the relatively clear case of cephalopods, various arthropods may prove to be sentient. We should be aware of various sources of prejudice that M&P discuss and not assume that it would be absurd to attribute sentience and moral status to certain invertebrates.


Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff Jan 2020

Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.


Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara Jan 2020

Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara

Animal Sentience

Studies on invertebrate minds suggest that the neural machinery for basic cognition is cheap, and that bigger brains are probably associated with greater memory storage rather than more advanced cognition. Sentience may be linked to feedforward mechanisms (Reafferenzprinzip) that allow organisms with active movement to distinguish active and passive sensing. Invertebrates may offer special opportunities for testing these hypotheses.


Sentience In All Organisms With Centralized Nervous Systems, Lori Marino Jan 2020

Sentience In All Organisms With Centralized Nervous Systems, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates, especially insects, by asking whether invertebrates have the cognitive and neural characteristics necessary for sentience. This approach assumes that human neural and cognitive complexity is the basis of sentience. But insight might also be gained by turning this approach on its head and examining the notion that sentience may be a fundamental biological property, appearing very early in the evolution of life in all organisms with centralized nervous systems.


Does Sentience Come In Degrees?, Andrew Y. Lee Jan 2020

Does Sentience Come In Degrees?, Andrew Y. Lee

Animal Sentience

This commentary is about whether sentience, or what philosophers call “phenomenal consciousness,” comes in degrees.


Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds Jan 2020

Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm.


Snowfall Impact Study For Spokane, Washington, Brian G. Henning, Levi Keesecker, David Camp, Erik Budsberg Jan 2020

Snowfall Impact Study For Spokane, Washington, Brian G. Henning, Levi Keesecker, David Camp, Erik Budsberg

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Examines historical trends in snowfall for the Spokane region, future climate projections and mountain snow forecasts, and determines what these data suggests about the future of winter recreation at Spokane’s five-area ski resorts (Mt. Spokane Ski & Snowboard Park, 49 Degrees North Mountain Resort, Silver Mountain Resort, Schweitzer Mountain Resort, and Lookout Pass Ski Area).


Reply To Joshua Mugg’S ‘How Not To Reply To The Tragic Dilemma', Charles Lassiter Jan 2020

Reply To Joshua Mugg’S ‘How Not To Reply To The Tragic Dilemma', Charles Lassiter

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Social Justice And Liturgical Practice: Engaging The Earth/ Cultivating Solidarity, Daniel O'Dea Bradley Jan 2020

Social Justice And Liturgical Practice: Engaging The Earth/ Cultivating Solidarity, Daniel O'Dea Bradley

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

In North America, across the political spectrum, we have a strong tendency to reduce religion to nothing more than a tool to promote our own socio-political views. Tis is a natural consequence of our hyper-polarized culture and our impoverished view of “religion.” It is also, however, a problem—particularly for those inspired by the call to renewal through an integration of the quest for social justice and the pursuit of the spiritual life. By focusing on the value of participating in religious liturgy, I show how a renewed respect for religion can help the proponents of social justice fulfill some of …