Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2019

Discipline
Institution
Keyword
Publication
Publication Type
File Type

Articles 901 - 928 of 928

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Are Some Animals Also Moral Agents?, Kyle Johannsen Jan 2019

Are Some Animals Also Moral Agents?, Kyle Johannsen

Animal Sentience

Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are unique, but rejected the claim that our uniqueness justifies denying animals moral rights. Humans were thought to be unique specifically because we possess moral agency. In this commentary, I explore the claim that some nonhuman animals are also moral agents, and I take note of its counter-intuitive implications.


Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew Jan 2019

Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew

Animal Sentience

Arguments about human uniqueness apply not only to extant species but also to extinct ones, that is, the hominin predecessors of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Thus, unique and superior are doubly relative terms, in past and present. The scope for empirical comparison faces a spectrum of difficulty, from material (e.g., artefacts) to non-material (e.g., concepts) phenomena.


Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude Jan 2019

Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for …


Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington Jan 2019

Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington

Animal Sentience

Individuals have intentions, beliefs and choices. This sense of “personhood” has been known and used for centuries by those who have dealt professionally with any nonhuman mammal. All mammals have a lot in common physically and mentally. The first step toward understand another species’ point of view is anthropomorphism.


Intelligence As Mental Manipulation In Humans And Nonhuman Animals, Moran Bar-Hen-Schweiger, Avishai Henik Jan 2019

Intelligence As Mental Manipulation In Humans And Nonhuman Animals, Moran Bar-Hen-Schweiger, Avishai Henik

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman review and evaluate various aspects of the notion of human superiority. In this commentary we focus on intelligence and suggest a biologically based view of intelligence applicable to humans and non-human species alike. “Mental manipulation” (e.g., mental transformations, rotations, perspective-taking), an extension of object manipulation, provides a continuous, biologically based concept for studying intelligent behavior in humans and other species and challenges the notion of human superiority.


Taking Exception To Human Exceptionalism, Carrie P. Freeman Jan 2019

Taking Exception To Human Exceptionalism, Carrie P. Freeman

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman refute common claims used to justify human species distinctions, and they critique the animal cruelty that has resulted from this privileged status. I raise related questions for further study of the roots of human exceptionalism and about whether aspiring to be more like our fellow animals might be part of the solution.


Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens Jan 2019

Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens

Animal Sentience

Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.


Anthropocentrism: Practical Remedies Needed, Helen Kopnina Jan 2019

Anthropocentrism: Practical Remedies Needed, Helen Kopnina

Animal Sentience

It is true that one of the harmful consequences of creating categories where one group is unique and superior to others is that it justifies discriminating against the inferior groups. And outright abuse of nonhuman animals is indeed morally unjustifiable. But what is to be done about it?


Our Brains Make Us Out To Be Unique In Ways We Are Not, Matthew J. Criscione, Julian Paul Keenan Jan 2019

Our Brains Make Us Out To Be Unique In Ways We Are Not, Matthew J. Criscione, Julian Paul Keenan

Animal Sentience

Humans have long viewed themselves in a favorable light. This bias is consistent with a general pattern of self-enhancement. Neural systems in the medial prefrontal cortex underlie this way of thinking, which, even when false, may be beneficial for survival. It is hence not surprising that we often disregard contrary evidence in believing ourselves superior.


Is Human Uniqueness Fake News?, Sean Hermanson Jan 2019

Is Human Uniqueness Fake News?, Sean Hermanson

Animal Sentience

The world and its troubles don't need unfounded denials of human uniqueness.


“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino Jan 2019

“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.


Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin Jan 2019

Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman’s target article calls for a reevaluation of claims of human uniqueness and superiority. It also adds to the literature on how species differences, as Darwin noted, are more of degree than kind. The threats to environmental health and species survival are a consequence of excluding nonhuman animals from moral concern and consideration. The theory of intersectionality should include speciesism in the array of discriminatory practices.


Mobilizing Heads And Hearts For Wildlife Conservation, Valérie A. M. Schoof, Simon L'Allier Jan 2019

Mobilizing Heads And Hearts For Wildlife Conservation, Valérie A. M. Schoof, Simon L'Allier

Animal Sentience

Highlighting the shared evolutionary relationships between humans and animals — and recognizing that all species, including humans, are unique in their own way — may facilitate caring for and conserving animals by tapping into a human emotion: empathy.


Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus Jan 2019

Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus

Animal Sentience

I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering.


Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa Jan 2019

Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman’s moral analysis fails to prove that the exploitation of animals or the environment is causally connected to beliefs about human capacities. Their exposition of the philosophical interpretations of animal cognition ignores historical context and confounds different levels of analysis. Their analysis of the scientific literature, from which they conclude that humans should not be considered as different from other animals, does not take into account many recent psychological and neuroscientific developments and rests upon a flawed understanding of the relationship between gradual and categorical differences, misrepresenting the two as mutually exclusive concepts.


Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay Jan 2019

Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (2018) note that our tendency to categorize leads to a sense of human superiority that helps justify violence against nonhuman animals. Yet animals are turning out to have capacities previously thought to be uniquely human. We add a further factor that may contribute to the false sense of human superiority: the "corticocentric" bias of neuroscience. An evolutionary approach may help identify species similarities and differences, providing a better understanding of the uniqueness of each species.


Scepticism About Moral Superiority, Derek Ball, Benjamin Sachs Jan 2019

Scepticism About Moral Superiority, Derek Ball, Benjamin Sachs

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that we might change people’s behavior toward animals by resisting an argument that because humans are intellectually superior to animals, they are also morally superior to animals. C & H try to show that the premise is false: Humans are not intellectually superior. Several commentators have resisted this response. We suggest that there are other ways of attacking the argument: The notion of moral superiority on which the argument relies is dubious, and the obvious ways of reformulating the argument are instances of the “naturalistic fallacy.”


Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon Jan 2019

Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman propose that dropping the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman animals may reduce the atrocious acts of humans towards nonhuman animals, but will it? Taking Darwinism seriously means accepting physical and behavioral continuity across species, including the capacity to feel pain.


Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman Jan 2019

Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman

Animal Sentience

Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrating broad interest in the question. From the breadth of comments, we have identified two recurring themes, which we focus on here. The first is a preponderance of cautionary remarks about evaluating the differences between humans and nonhuman animals. The second concerns whether considering animals as worthy of moral consideration is one of many useful tools for conservationists trying to prevent extinction, habitat destruction, and climate change.


Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung Jan 2019

Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung

Animal Sentience

The difference between a cod and a lizard is not just a quantitative one. The recognition of qualitative differences between species does not imply a moral ranking. Our species’ special abilities to shape the earth mean we have a special responsibility for ensuring a liveable future for all organisms, human and non-human.


Superior Or Inferior, Human Uniqueness Is Manifold, Scott Atran Jan 2019

Superior Or Inferior, Human Uniqueness Is Manifold, Scott Atran

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (C & H) contend that, as with all biological traits, there is evolutionary continuity underlying cognitive and social traits previously thought to be unique to humans. Yet C & H, like Darwin, appeal to a seemingly unique moral aptitude that enables humans to be kind to conspecific strangers and other species.


Diversity On Human Difference: Unanimity On Human Responsibility, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman Jan 2019

Diversity On Human Difference: Unanimity On Human Responsibility, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman

Animal Sentience

Further commentaries on our original target article add important new points and expand our understanding of the differences between animals, particularly between non-human and human primates. But whether they affirm or deny that humans are unique, all commentators agree that our special abilities mean we should be taking responsibility for the care of nature and the plants and animals it supports. We ask: is humankind doing this?


Exile As “Place” For Empathy, Ilana Maymind Jan 2019

Exile As “Place” For Empathy, Ilana Maymind

Religious Studies Faculty Books and Book Chapters

"Historically, exile has been a political act that has various philosophical and psychological ramifications. In the Roman world, exile was a substitute for physical death.1 Adorno argues that exile is a 'life in suspension' as a result of being placed in the diasporic conditions of estrangement. For Adorno, 'it is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home,'2 since being in exile makes one a perpetual stranger and sharpens one’s ethical stance. The idea of being a stranger leads to the significance of the issue of empathy. In this chapter, I discuss Shinran and Maimonides …


Illusionist Integrated Information Theory, Kelvin J. Mcqueen Jan 2019

Illusionist Integrated Information Theory, Kelvin J. Mcqueen

Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

The integrated information theory (IIT) is a promising theory of consciousness. However, there are several problems with IIT's axioms and postulates. Moreover, IIT entails that some twodimensional grids of identical logic gates have more consciousness than humans. Many have found this prediction to be implausible, and as will be argued here, this prediction also exacerbates the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. Recently, it has been argued that if we treat the phenomenological aspects of consciousness as an illusion (illusionism), we can avoid the hard problem altogether by replacing it with the more tractable illusion problem: the problem of explaining how …


Self-Ownership As Personal Sovereignty, John Thrasher Jan 2019

Self-Ownership As Personal Sovereignty, John Thrasher

Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

Self-ownership has fallen out of favor as a core moral and political concept. I argue that this is because the most popular conception of self-ownership, what I call the property conception, is typically linked to a libertarian (of the left or right) political program. Seeing self-ownership and libertarianism as being necessarily linked leads those who are not inclined toward libertarianism to reject the idea of self-ownership altogether. This, I argue, is mistaken. Self-ownership is a crucial moral and political concept that can earn its keep if we understand it not as type of property right in the self, but rather …


Missing The Apes Of The Trees For The Forest, Carlo Alvaro Jan 2019

Missing The Apes Of The Trees For The Forest, Carlo Alvaro

Publications and Research

The debate over ape personhood is of great social and moral importance. For more than twenty-five years, attorney Steven Wise has been arguing that animals who have cognitive complexities similar to humans should be legally granted basic rights of au- tonomy. In my view, granting personhood status and other rights to great apes are at- tainable goals. But how should we go about it? My worry is that Thompson’s suggest- ed strategy relies on Kantian ethics, in particular on Kant’s notion of autonomy. In fact, I am worried about Kantian ethics in general because of its influence on morality and …


Nietzsche And The Aestheticization Of The Natural Sciences, Sean Dillard Jan 2019

Nietzsche And The Aestheticization Of The Natural Sciences, Sean Dillard

Open Access Theses & Dissertations

This Thesis is an exploration of Friedrich Nietzsche's dictum that life only justifies itself aesthetically. Given his attempt to physiologize aesthetics, this project attempts to show the value of the parallels and reciprocities between taste, style, beauty, and good health for scientists - especially natural scientists. It hopes to show something valuable about what late-modern scientific practice lost, especially in the context of the departmentalization of the sciences in universities. Specifically, I argue, disentangling scientific practice from philosophical concerns - the death of what used to be natural philosophy - has resulted in worse scientists, worse scientific practice, and a …


The Illusion Of An Abundant End- A Phenomenological Approach To Sustainability: The Progress Trap And The Transformative Potential Of Dialogue, Shantanu Rojatkar Jan 2019

The Illusion Of An Abundant End- A Phenomenological Approach To Sustainability: The Progress Trap And The Transformative Potential Of Dialogue, Shantanu Rojatkar

Open Access Theses & Dissertations

Abundance is a concept according to which a thing is deemed to be in plenty. The feeling of satisfaction and assurance, arising from something that is concretely abundant, serves as a material reason for motivation of a desired action. Just like the stock of food lying in our fridge, ensuring more than just the needs of the moment, the abundance cooks the taste of freedom, freedom from worrying about tomorrow. However, over consumption out of greed as a potential outcome of abundance, could result in the increased capacity of a person in order to reach the initial level of satisfaction. …